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1.1. Knowledge and Skepticism 
 
It seems to be an obvious fact about human life that we know things. Each one of us knows various 
things about ourselves and our surroundings. I can tell with ease, and I also claim to know, for 
example, my name, address, home country, education, and the color of the clothes I am wearing 
today. In addition to facts about myself, I am able to tell, and again I claim to know, that we humans 
have inhabited the Earth for ten thousands of years, that the Earth is located in the Milky Way in the 
infinite space, and that the distant heavenly bodies are not the souls of the deceased but physically 
real material entities. As I am aware that I know many things, I also recognize the fact that there are 
many things that I simply do not know at the moment, and maybe never will. For example, it seems 
to be a distant dream that some day I could understand and know the basics of genetic engineering. 
I also acknowledge that I am fallible; various times in my life I have come to notice that the things I 
have claimed to know have turned out to be false. This liability to error has taught me certain 
humbleness and care regarding my ability to attain knowledge. In sum, three main features 
characterize our position towards knowledge: we take ourselves to know various things, knowledge 
of each individual in separate seems to be rather limited, and we are liable to error. 
 
We take ourselves to know, but do we? We tend to think that our beliefs are true or sufficiently 
accurate representations of the world around us, but is that so? Namely, we also acknowledge that 
things are not always as they appear. Sometimes we mistakenly believe that inanimate objects are 
living beings; for example, when we erroneously think that a crooked twig on the ground is a snake. 
Or sometimes we erroneously believe that a total stranger, seen from distance, is a good friend of 
ours. Or what about dreams? In dreams we see all sorts of things, we interact with the persons and 
objects of that world, and we carry on our lives as usual, but suddenly  at the moment of 
awakening  we realize that nothing of it was real. On the other hand, modern science tells us that 
the reality consists of tiny particles such as quarks, but then it seems that the world is not as we 
perceive it; i.e. filled for example with middle-sized objects such as tables, chairs, and rocks.    
 
Of course, we think that it is easy to distinguish between the states of being awake and dreaming, 
but exactly how can we tell the difference? At this very moment I think that I am typing in front of 
my computer, but I am also aware that this is only a belief my brain has formed of the surrounding 
reality. It would be desirable that our brains presented the world around us as it is, but it is quite 
The Inevitability of Skepticism. A Study on the Problem of the Criterion 
 8
problematic to try to check whether the beliefs we have of the external world actually correspond 
with the reality. We must rely on our perceptions of the external world, but are they accurate 
representations of the reality or not? It is certainly possible that our beliefs match with the reality 
itself, but is also possible that they are blatantly misguided. It could be that we are living in a sort of 
dream; that our beliefs about the external world had no connection whatsoever to the reality. And if 
that is the case, we certainly know far less than we suppose we do. René Descartes, the French 
philosopher, once famously claimed to search for something absolutely certain, infallible beliefs. 
Certainly our beliefs about the external world can be mistaken, due to the fact that, for example, we 
are dreaming right now. Descartes even postulated the existence of a deceiving and malevolent 
demon, who could lead us astray in everything.  
 
Now, the question arises, how seriously should we take the possibility of an evil demon, dreaming 
or similar skeptical scenarios? Skeptical scenarios challenge our claims that we have knowledge. 
The skeptical argument proceeds to show that in order to know, for example that I have two hands, I 
must be able to exclude the existence of a deceiving and omnipotent demon. However, arguably, no 
one is able to exclude such possibilities, and thus no one knows that one has two hands. The same 
argument can be replicated with respect to each of our beliefs, and thus it could be concluded that 
we do know nothing at all. Or almost nothing, for, if we follow Descartes, I can be certain at least of 
my own existence, evil demons notwithstanding. But beyond my own existence, it is unsure 
whether I could be certain of anything else. However, it is noteworthy that the structure of the 
argument could also be reversed to defend the view that we have knowledge. For example, it could 
be claimed that if I know, say, that I have two hands, then I know that I am not deceived by an evil 
demon. And clearly I know that I have two hands, thus I also know that I am not deceived by a 
malicious demon. 
 
Skeptical arguments purport to show the plausibility of skepticism. However, skepticism comes in 
many forms. For example, skeptical arguments can propagate skepticism about the external world; 
i.e. that our senses do not provide us with knowledge of the external world. Skepticism can be also 
narrowed, for example, to religious beliefs or moral values. In this manner, it is claimed that we 
cannot have knowledge of God or other things supernatural in character, or that ethical statements 
such as Killing is wrong do not have truth-values and thus we cannot have knowledge of them. 
Skepticism can also be global in scope, and thus it is claimed that we do not know anything. In 
addition to differences in scope, various skeptical arguments also differ with respect to the strength 
of the skeptical conclusions they promote. For example, a skeptical argument can be so radical that 
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it is advanced to show that the area of knowledge in question is impossible. A more moderate 
skeptical argument is advanced to show that we do not know anything though knowledge is 
possible. We, as knowers, should be able to defeat the skeptical argument and establish that we 
actually know, or otherwise skepticism holds. In this study I defend a moderate view of skepticism 
that is almost global in scope. In specifically, I claim that, in the end, we have no reasons to deem 
our beliefs justified or true, and, therefore, we cannot say that we know anything. Maybe we can be 
certain, after Descartes, of our own existence, but that is cold comfort if we have to give up 
everything else we have held as knowledge. Again, it is perfectly possible that we actually do know 
most of the things that we think that we know, but also that we actually do not. What is crucial is 
that we cannot tell apart, or so I will argue, which state of affairs prevails  that we have knowledge 
or that we have not  and therefore we cannot say that we know.  
 
Those who promote skepticism are, obviously enough, skeptics. To repeat, skeptics claim, roughly 
put, that we do not have knowledge, in contrast to the claims of the anti-skeptics, i.e. people who 
think that we have knowledge. How can we resolve the conflict between the skeptics and their 
opponents? Or is there any real controversy at all? Maybe we can just disregard the claims of the 
skeptics similarly as we disregard the claims of madmen, who claim, for example, that moon is 
made of cheese and that the universe is controlled by astral dolphins. Is it not indicative of the 
skeptic's foolishness that she argues that we do not know anything? But if we really do not know 
anything, there is nothing to argue about and more to the point, there is nothing on the basis of 
which to claim anything. Briefly, the skeptic is refuting herself and that is a sufficient reason to 
ignore her words.  
 
A quick glance at epistemological books shows that skepticism has been taken seriously over and 
over again. No one dares to say that to get rid of skepticism it is enough to shrug one's shoulders 
nonchalantly. Even if ordinary people do not care much about the skeptic's charges, epistemologists 
tend to be really worried about them. Indeed, skepticism seems to be solely the problem of 
epistemologists; and it could even be said that it is a problem they have made for themselves! 
Epistemologists do not conduct surveys by asking laypeople whether they think that skepticism is a 
plausible view.1 Skepticism would not be refuted even if the majority of people thought that it is 
false. Amongst the epistemologists, in turn, there is a real controversy about the plausibility of 
skepticism. Most, or even all, of them recognize skepticism as a problem that must be solved. And 
it is tempting to think that a satisfactory solution is not found yet, or why else skepticism continues 
to be a focus of a lively debate? The overall situation is rather bizarre: to have knowledge is most 
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unproblematic while living our ordinary lives, but immediately after engaging in the realm of 
epistemology we seem to lose all knowledge. As David Lewis has aptly said: [I]t will be inevitable 
that epistemology must destroy knowledge. That is how knowledge is elusive. Examine it, and 
straightway it vanishes.2 
 
1.2. Skepticism and the Ideal of an Objective Viewpoint 
 
In this section I will show that the problem of skepticism is, in a sense, inevitable. The leading idea 
is borrowed from Nagels aptly named book, The View from Nowhere. According to Nagel, the 
problem of skepticism is created when we try to attain an external view with respect to our 
cognitive enterprise. An external view is not restricted by any particular, subjective viewpoints  a 
sort of view from nowhere. Clearly, such a viewpoint is unattainable, since every view is someones 
view. The idea of a completely objective viewpoint  possible perhaps for a being like an 
omnipotent God  is somehow conceivable although not possible for cognitive beings like us. 
Nevertheless, such a viewpoint seems desirable, telling us for good the way the world really is, how 
we and our subjective viewpoints relate to the world, and, most importantly, what we in fact know. 
In other words, the completely objective viewpoint would let us see ourselves and our cognitive 
relation to the alleged external world from the outside of our restricting, subjective perspectives. 
Furthermore, Nagel argues that several other philosophical problems  for example, those 
pertaining to free will, mind-body relation, and the existence of objective moral values  are created 
similarly from the tension between our particular, subjective viewpoints and the ideal of totally 
general and objective viewpoint.3    
 
The problem of skepticism follows when we are reflecting whether we know anything. Namely, it is 
a platitude that not all of our beliefs can count as knowledge, for sometimes we err. Or perhaps 
there is not any cognitive error on our part, but still we can be led to think that something is real 
when it is not. Consider, for example, the unavoidability and relative easiness of color appearances 
although they do not necessarily correspond to anything real. And as soon as we propose the 
distinction between appearances and the reality, the skeptic is having her prime time. The skeptic 
drives a wedge between appearances and the reality, claiming, in effect, that we have no way of 
deciding which appearances conform to the reality. However, it is hard to avoid making the 
distinction, for it is another platitude that things are not always as they appear. As John Greco puts 
it, any minimally plausible ontology must recognize a distinction between appearance and 
reality4. This inevitable distinction between appearances and the reality  and not so much, for 
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instance, the quest for certainty and necessary truths  seems to be responsible for bringing about 
the problem of skepticism.5 In any case, we seem to need a criterion to distinguish between those 
appearances that have a truth-conferring connection with the reality and those that do not. But as I 
will show in this study, it is not easy to decide which criteria are genuine and which are not. 
  
Of course, the alleged gap between appearances and the reality could be tried to be bridged simply 
by appealing to things we think that we know. For example, having heard that skeptics doubt the 
existence of external, material objects, I execute several times the test of looking down at my hands, 
closing my eyes, and looking at my hands again. And surprisingly, every time I open my eyes, I see 
without doubt my two hands. Thus, I have refuted skepticism and shown that external things exist. 
Or alternatively, I could go to a library and read books of history, biology, and other sciences. I 
would learn several facts of mankinds past, the biological and chemical constitution of species, and 
general laws of mechanics. Accordingly, I would infer that there certainly are, and have been, 
external objects and they interact with each other in accordance with the laws of nature. But have I 
thereby refuted skepticism? No. It seems to be a ridiculous strategy of answering the skeptics 
challenge by appealing to things we think we know. None of my beliefs is privileged as being 
exempt from the skeptics doubts, and thus none of them as such can be used to answer those 
doubts. As Barry Stroud explains:  
 
We recognize that when I ask in that detached philosophical way whether I know that there are external 
things, I am not supposed to be allowed to appeal to other things I think I know about external things in 
order to help me settle the question. All of my knowledge of the external world is supposed to have 
been brought into question at one fell swoop; no particular piece of it is to be available as unquestioned 
knowledge to help me decide whether or not another particular candidate is true. I am to focus on my 
relation to the whole body of beliefs which I take to be knowledge of the external world and to ask, 
from outside it as it were, not simply whether it is true but whether and how I know it even if it is in 
fact true. It is no longer simply a question about what to believe, but whether and how any of the things 
I admittedly do believe are things that I know or can have any reason to believe.6 
 
On the other hand, if the skeptics challenge calls into question all of my empirical beliefs, it is hard 
to see how I could ever dissolve those doubts; namely, the existence of the external world is, 
arguably, a contingent matter, and if I cannot appeal to any of my beliefs pertaining to contingent 
matters, it is hard to see how I could decide over the existence of the external world purely on a 
priori grounds. And clearly, it is impossible to get outside of ourselves, but, still, this seems to be 
what the challenge of skepticism amounts to. We aspire to get outside of ourselves, and view the 
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world from nowhere within it7. The desire to get outside of ourselves is created when we realize  
via skeptical arguments, for example  that our subjective viewpoints, including all the experiences, 
appearances, and beliefs within it, could remain the same although there were no connection 
whatsoever to the underlying reality. If my beliefs do not conform to the reality, I clearly cannot 
have knowledge either. If my belief that Kilimanjaro lies in Tanzania and it is the highest 
mountain in Africa is true, it must also be true from an objective point of view. Similarly, if there 
have ever been dinosaurs, it is an objective fact that remains true, despite whatever I happen to 
believe about dinosaurs. Now, the desire to get outside of ourselves amounts to an external check 
that would unfold the objective facts and how the world really is.  
 
Thus, the problem of skepticism seems to be inevitable. But is skepticism also inevitable; i.e. has 
skepticism no solution? That is the question I will concentrate on in this study. More specifically, I 
study whether a skeptical argument known as the problem of the criterion could be solved.     
 
1.3. The Problem of the Criterion 
 
Let us suppose that we should distinguish between good and bad apples; we start picking up the 
apples and throw the bad apples to one basket, and the good ones to another. Now, if we are asked 
how we knew which apples are good and which bad, we could refer to some set of characteristics 
on the basis of which we recognize the good apples. We could tell that, for example, good apples 
look, taste, feel, and smell different from bad apples. But now the skeptical twist comes: how could 
we tell the difference between good and bad beliefs, that is, between true and false beliefs? Of 
course we can divide our beliefs on the basis of some characteristics of beliefs, but how can we 
know that our chosen characteristics really mark out true beliefs, in contrast to false beliefs? These 
problematics lead to the ancient paradox, the problem of the criterion, also known as the diallelus. 
The structure of the problem is relatively simple, and it proceeds in the following way:  
 
In order to know, we should be able to distinguish between true and false beliefs. Thus, it seems 
that we need a way to distinguish true from false beliefs. Obviously, this way equals to a standard or 
criterion of true beliefs. The problem arises when we propose a criterion for true beliefs, for then it 
can be further asked, how do we know that our chosen criterion holds good? Now, we can try to 
justify the initial criterion with some supporting reasons, but then, it seems, we should justify these 
new reasons too. Obviously, this path leads to an infinite regress of reasons. And it seems that if 
knowledge requires infinite reasons then knowledge is impossible, at least for us mortals. 
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Alternatively, we can try to avoid the regress by appealing to a preceding reason in our chain of 
reasons. Unfortunately, supporting one's claim by appealing to an already stated reason equals to 
circular reasoning. And circular arguments are not too convincing in general. Finally, we can 
refuse to justify the alleged criterion and only insist that it holds good, or we can try to justify the 
criterion with reasons, but at some point refuse to appeal to any new reason and merely insist that 
the previous reason holds good. However, mere assumption does not seem to be too convincing 
either. Therefore, it seems that we have only three options in justifying an alleged criterion of true 
beliefs: either to give infinite reasons, argue circularly, or dogmatically assume that the alleged 
criterion holds good. Now, the skeptic claims, obviously enough, that none of these three options is 
acceptable, and that therefore we cannot distinguish between true and false beliefs. Furthermore, the 
skeptic argues that since we cannot give an acceptable and justified criterion for true beliefs, we 
cannot know anything. Thus, the problem of the criterion entails skepticism. To clarify, the problem 
in the problem of the criterion concerns our attempts to justify an alleged criterion of true beliefs, 
and then it is stated that none of the possible ways to justify the criterion is acceptable, hence 
skepticism follows.   
 
The diallelus can be formulated differently than I have done here. My formulation is meant to be 
just a sketch, a rough initial description of the problem that is somewhat faithful to the original 
formulation given by Sextus Empiricus. Different formulations of the diallelus result, obviously, in 
different accounts of the problem. Thus, we should advance with great care when formulating the 
problem. The question of uttermost importance is what is the extent of the problem of the criterion? 
The way in which we define the extent of the diallelus determines how we see both the whole 
problem and the possible solutions to it. On the other hand, it should be asked whether the different 
versions of the problem, i.e. versions with differing extents, really are separate problems, or do they 
basically present the same problem? And if the all, say, three versions present the same problem, 
what is the problem? Is it a fourth formulation of the diallelus, or is it one of the three versions? 
How should we exactly formulate the problem of the criterion and whose accounts of it should we 
pay attention to? 
 
There are surprisingly few explicit treatments of the problem of the criterion in philosophical 
literature. Clearly the most influential ones are the original formulation found in the writings of 
Sextus Empiricus8 and Roderick Chisholms modern version of it9. Also a noteworthy discussion is 
Robert Fogelins comprehensive study on the problem of the criterion with respect to the theories of 
epistemic justification.10 Fogelins treatment comes close to the problem known as the regress 
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problem that is, in turn, widely discussed in epistemology. If the problem were taken narrowly 
enough, it would suffice to concentrate only on, for example, Sextus account of the problem. On 
the other hand, if the problem were taken broadly enough, almost any remark on global skepticism 
would be relevant; namely, the problem of the criterion can be construed as so general that it equals 
to the problem of skepticism, and therefore any theory of knowledge can be seen as an attempt to 
answer to the problem of the criterion11. It would clearly be too vast a task to study all 
epistemologies and all treatments of skepticism in one book. Therefore I aim for the moderate 
position between being too narrow or too broad a treatment on the problem of the criterion. 
 
The problem of the criterion constitutes a powerful and plausible argument for skepticism. But there 
are also various other skeptical arguments in the ballpark, so what makes the problem of the 
criterion so special? First of all, the problem of the criterion is extremely economical as a 
skeptical argument; we need not postulate malicious demons or other weird possibilities in order to 
present the argument. Quite the contrary, the real beauty of the problem of the criterion is that it 
demands only the minimal assumptions that we know something and our claims to knowledge 
should be supported by good reasons. A related point is that, in the problem, it is not assumed that 
we should be able to convince some hypothetical global skeptic who denies everything we say. 
Instead, it only states that if we are to rationally hold that we have knowledge of some proposition 
p, we should be able to show our reasons for thinking that p is, indeed, true or justified. Moreover, 
this is our own assumption: we think that in order for arguments to be plausible and convincing, 
they must be supported by good reasons. In short, the problem of the criterion is economical and it 
constitutes of plausible premises that we all accept.     
 
1.4. The Aims of the Study 
 
The fundamentality and neglected status of the problem of the criterion is neatly summarized by 
Andrew Cling, in his words: 
 
Although it has been largely neglected in contemporary philosophy, the problem of the criterion raises 
questions which must be addressed by any complete account of knowledge. But the problem of the 
criterion suffers not only from neglect but also from the lack of a clear, comprehensive, and complete 
statement of the problem itself. As a result, it has been unclear what must be done to solve it.12 
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In this study I meet the above concerns by giving a clear and comprehensive treatment of the 
problem of the criterion. I begin in chapter 2 examining Chisholms influential formulation of the 
problem and arguing that Chisholms formulation is misguided. In chapter 3, I study the ancient 
account of the problem that is derived from the writings of Sextus Empiricus. I argue that the 
ancient account is superior to Chisholms account and it provides us with a real skeptical paradox.13 
Then, in chapters 4 and 5, it is shown that the problem of the criterion manifests itself also as the 
regress problem and as the problem of validating our cognitive faculties. The problem of the 
criterion is a general and deep problem. One of my aims in this study is to show that the problem of 
the criterion is an uttermost cognitive worry, the solving of which should be in every 
epistemologists interest.  
 
Obviously enough, various solutions have been proposed to skepticism and the problem of the 
criterion. My purpose is to study the most notable different solutions in detail and answer the 
question of whether any of them succeeds in solving the problem of the criterion. It should be noted 
that different solutions depend on the particular understanding of the problem, i.e. its formulation. 
Therefore, examining the different formulations and solutions of the problem of the criterion is an 
interrelated task. It is also possible to claim that we do not have to solve the diallelus, for the simple 
reason that it is an unintelligible problem. The skeptics challenge is like asking one to draw a 
rounded square  impossible in principle. We do not have to care about the skeptics claims, for she 
is refuting herself and thus she cannot have any claims to begin with. There are also other 
difficulties concerning the viability of the skeptical position, but despite them, I will show that the 
skeptics challenge is intelligible. Then the only complaint against the skeptic is that her position is 
highly unintuitive. So, in the end, I should say something about our intuitions concerning 
knowledge, which I will briefly do in the end of chapter 5.  
 
In sum, in this study I will answer to the following pair of questions: 
(i) What is the problem of the criterion? What kinds of different formulations of the problem are 
there and how should the problem be formulated? 
(ii) How has the problem of the criterion been tried to solve? What are the pros and cons of each 
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1.5. Some Preliminary Remarks 
 
Before the kick-off, something should be said about the studys central concepts such as knowledge, 
justification, belief, proposition, and truth. First and foremost, the notion of criterion should be 
clarified. 
 
1.5.1. The Notion of Criterion 
 
It could be roughly said that, in general, criteria specify some conditions that must be fulfilled in 
order for some A to be B. For example, if I make a judgment that This apple is sweet, there are 
some specific features that form the basis of my judgment. Those features can be said to be the 
criteria of my judgment, and if any other object fulfills the criteria, my judgment should be the 
same. It is another question whether my criteria are true or universally valid; if they were, I could 
formulate the sufficient and necessary conditions, i.e. criteria, for the sweetness of apples. Similarly 
with respect to the notion of knowledge, we could say that criteria of knowledge specify the 
necessary and sufficient conditions of knowledge. Now, we are not interested in the definition of 
knowledge, which can be agreed upon as justified true belief. The problem of the criterion is about 
finding a touchstone for distinguishing true beliefs from false ones. In other words, what we are 
looking for is a criterion of truth. A criterion of truth should be again distinguished from a 
definition of truth; namely, if we define truth as correspondence between the propositional content 
of beliefs and facts, it does not yet give us a criterion with the help of which we can distinguish true 
from false beliefs. As Cling illuminatingly writes:  
 
The criteria at stake  [in the problem of the criterion] are criteria of truth. An ideal criterion would 
express a reliable and complete touchstone of truth: a mark or sign by which we could distinguish true 
from false propositions on any topic. Having such a criterion is not the same as grasping the meaning of 
true, for we might understand what it would be for a proposition to be true without being able to tell the 
true from the false.14    
 
Clings characterization of the notion of criterion is quite demanding, for he speaks of a complete 
touchstone of truth that would distinguish true from false propositions on any topic. However, as 
Cling notes, we can relax this ideal insofar as we have some way to distinguish between true and 
false propositions or beliefs. Cling continues the characterization of the criterion of truth as follows:  
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To have a criterion of truth is to grasp that some detectable property other than the property of being true 
would correctly distinguish true from false propositions. Thus we may think of an ideal criterion of truth 
as a principle according to which a specified property C is such that C is not part of the meaning of true, 
but a proposition P would have C (in the appropriate circumstances) if, and only if, P were true. Ideally, 
then a criterion of truth would provide us with a perfectly reliable indicator of truth and of falsehood. We 
may relax this ideal and count principles as criteria of truth even though they specify only sufficient 
conditions, only necessary conditions, or only probabilistic necessary or sufficient conditions for truth. 
Descartes [sic] rule of clear and distinct perception  everything I clearly and distinctly perceive is true 
 is intended to be a criterion of truth.15 
 
To repeat, the problem of the criterion challenges us to find a criterion of truth. And the problem in 
the diallelus concerns our attempts to justify the proposed criteria.  
 
That said, it is time to complicate things a little by noting that it is also possible to formulate the 
problem of the criterion as concerning the criteria of justified belief. In principle, the problem of the 
criterion challenges us to find, first and foremost, a criterion of truth in order for us to distinguish 
true from false beliefs. In practice, however, the problem extends to apply to epistemic justification 
and criteria of justified belief as well. Accordingly, we are searching for criteria of justified beliefs 
in order to distinguish between justified and unjustified beliefs. Of course, truth and justification 
are, or at least should be, connected, for with the help of the correct criteria of justification we 
would be able to distinguish justified from unjustified beliefs, and justified beliefs are likely to be 
true.   
 
If the problem of the criterion is applied to concern epistemic justification, we are dealing with the 
regress problem that will be studied in detail in chapter 4. Furthermore, the problem of the criterion 
can also be understood as a demand for truth-conferring sources of knowledge. As Chisholm writes: 
[o]ne approach to the question How are we to decide, in any particular case, whether we know? 
is to refer to the sources of our knowledge and to say that an ostensible item of knowledge is 
genuine if, and only if, it is the product of a properly accredited source.16 Now, we are again 
searching for a criterion of truth, but this time we are asking which of our cognitive faculties are 
reliable in general. If we knew which faculties are reliable, we could easily solve the problem of the 
criterion by pointing out that particular faculties mostly produce true beliefs. The question about the 
reliability of cognitive faculties creates a problem of its own, known as epistemic circularity, the 
topic of chapter 5. What is crucial for present purposes, however, is to note that the problem of the 
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criterion can take different forms depending on whether we are asking which beliefs are true, which 
beliefs are justified, or which faculties are reliable.  
 
1.5.2. The Analysis of Knowledge 
 
Because the skeptic challenges our ability to attain knowledge, it should be spelled out what we 
mean by the notion of knowledge. According to the traditional analysis, the origin of which is in 
Platos Theaetetus dialogue17, knowledge is justified true belief. The analysis is formally presented 
as follows: 
 
S knows that p if and only if 
 
 (i) p is true; 
 (ii) S believes that p; 
 (iii) S is justified in believing that p. 
 
S refers to the knowing subject, often called also as an epistemic agent, and p refers to the 
proposition being known. The first condition of the above analysis should be obvious enough: what 
is false cannot be known. The second condition is almost as compelling as the first one: if I claim 
that I know p, I certainly will believe that p too. The plausibility of the second condition depends on 
how we define justification, the third condition of the analysis. Maybe it is in some sense possible 
to know that p without believing that p. For example, I might be able to answer some trivia 
questions correctly although I do not believe my answers, for they just popped into my head. Now 
one could claim that I knew the answers after all, even if I was not able to recall consciously the 
evidence for my answers.18 Unbeknownst to me, my cognitive faculties were processing the 
information I had previously gathered, which resulted in the correct answers. I had knowledge 
although I did not know that I knew. Even though I sympathize with the view that knowledge 
entails belief, the issue remains controversial. Moreover, if it is maintained that in order to know we 
do not have to be aware of the reasons of our knowledge claims, we might be able to break out of 
the skeptics grip. The infinite regress of reasons is not a threat anymore if we can know without 
reasons. 
 
The third condition, or rather its proper content, of the analysis of knowledge is the most 
controversial one. The obvious function of the justification condition is to prevent lucky guesses 
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from being knowledge; namely, merely true belief is not enough for knowledge.19 Otherwise we 
should say that I know in cases where my beliefs just happen to be true due to lucky guesses. 
Knowledge, then, is something added to a true belief, and traditionally that something else is held to 
be justification. Now, recall the example of the trivia quiz where I answered correctly without 
having any reasons for my answer. Let us change the example a little and suppose that I also believe 
my answer, say, the claim that Queen Elizabeth I died in 1603. Is my belief justified and does it 
count as knowledge? The so-called externalists about epistemic justification would say Yes to 
both questions. If my belief is a product of a reliable cognitive process, and my belief is true, then it 
is also knowledge. In this account, then, justification amounts to reliable workings of cognitive 
faculties. I do not have to, even if I somehow could, be aware of the way my cognitive faculties 
function, for all that matters for justification of my beliefs, is that my cognitive faculties work 
reliably, i.e. produce true beliefs with high frequency. However, it is likely that the opponents of 
externalists, the so-called internalists, would deny both that I have a justified belief and that I know 
in the example given above. Internalists emphasize the importance of subjects reasons or evidence 
for her beliefs. I should have some recognized reasons for my beliefs in order to them to be 
justified, and that is what excludes lucky guesses from being justified in the first place. Of course 
not just any kinds of reasons are acceptable, for they should evidentially support the belief based on 
them. 
 
1.5.3. The Notion of Justification 
 
Depending on whose side, externalists or internalists, we are in the debate about epistemic 
justification, the meaning of knowledge alters drastically. It is worth asking whether the opposing 
parties even talk about the same issue. On the other hand, the two views are often mixed, and thus it 
might be hard to tell whether a considered theory exemplifies internalism or externalism. Even 
more curiously, it is not so clear what is at stake with these different accounts. As Richard 
Fumerton writes: While the internalism/externalism debate in epistemology has moved to center 
stage, I believe that there remains enormous confusion concerning what precisely is fundamentally 
at issue between proponents of the respective views.20 Supposedly, justification was meant to be 
the device with the help of which we could distinguish mere true beliefs from knowledge. 
Unfortunately, it is possible, as was famously shown by Edmund Gettier, to construct cases of 
justified true belief that are not cases of knowledge21. Therefore, the question arises whether 
justification has any role whatsoever in epistemology, for it does not succeed in its initial task of 
distinguishing mere true beliefs from knowledge. If there is any role for justification, it definitely is 
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the role of enhancing the likelihood of our beliefs being true. In other words, justification is the 
good with the help of which we can gain true beliefs. In Laurence BonJours words: It is only if we 
have some reason for thinking that epistemic justification constitutes a path to truth that we as 
cognitive beings have any motive for preferring epistemically justified beliefs to epistemically 
unjustified ones.22 
 
If we insist on too strong a connection between justification and truth, then we will come close to 
the view that justification entails truth. This view is highly problematic, for it would imply that we 
do not have justified false beliefs. However, it seems intuitively plausible that a good few of our 
beliefs, if, for example, formed in responsible and careful manner, can be justified even if they are 
not true. Secondly, the truth condition of the analysis of knowledge would become redundant and 
knowledge could be defined as (strongly) justified belief. In short, justification would be all too 
demanding a concept. On the other hand, if we do not require any conceptual connection between 
truth and justification, we cannot avoid problems that way either; namely, justification would be 
then a kind of subjective notion and it could be possible that all of our justified beliefs would turn 
out to be false. Justification would not constitute a path to truth and, therefore, it would become a 
redundant concept.23 Maybe we should aim for a moderate conception of justification, as one not 
being too strong or weak, but it is far from obvious how this should be done. 
 
Justification seems to be a tricky concept to define. It is easy to find different distinctions, but it is 
not so easy to see what we can benefit from them. Furthermore, it is not so clear whether 
justification is an all or nothing issue. Namely, it could be claimed that justification comes in 
degrees and there is some definable amount of it that is sufficient for knowledge.24 It has also been 
claimed that there is a difference between a justified belief and justifying beliefs, and that the latter, 
i.e. the act of giving reasons for one's beliefs, is not in any way necessary for epistemic justification 
of beliefs.25 It would be possible to introduce more specifications and isms on justification, but the 
bottom line of this discussion is that justification indeed is a messy playground in epistemology.  
 
1.5.4. The Notion of Belief 
 
We have assumed that the objects of justification are beliefs, rather than propositions. Of course we 
could say that S has justification for a proposition that p, without implying that S really believes that 
p. In epistemology we are interested in the justification of beliefs and evidential relations obtaining 
between them. Naturally, our beliefs should have a propositional content in order to be justified or 
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unjustified. For example, my belief that I have ten fingers could be considered justified, for my 
perceptual evidence for the proposition that I have ten fingers is overwhelming. Beliefs in which we 
are interested can be called propositional attitudes; we take an attitude of belief towards a 
proposition, we believe that something is the case. The propositional content of a belief is the way 
the belief represents things as being. 
 
It is surely possible that the source of a beliefs justification is itself nondoxastic. It could be 
claimed, for example, that the source of the justification of our perceptual beliefs is in 
unconceptualized sense experience. That way we might be able to block effectively the infinite 
regress of justified beliefs. Still, the presumption favored in this work is that epistemic justification 
is doxastic in character. Another specification concerns the strength of beliefs that may be strong or 
weak. For example, it could be argued that my belief that I exist is far stronger than my belief that 
Calgary Flames will win the Stanley Cup this year  I am strongly convinced of the former, but not 
so of the latter. It could be suggested that the strength of a belief should be proportional to 
justification of a belief.26 Accordingly, my belief that I exist is more justified than my belief that 
Calgary Flames will win the Stanley Cup this year. However, if my belief that p is significantly 
weak, it is questionable whether I believe that p at all. If I believe that p is only marginally more 
probable than its negation, then it might be claimed that I should suspend judgment about p. For 
instance, if I happened to consider, for some strange reason, that it is slightly more probable that the 
number of stars is even than odd, I should still suspend my judgment about the matter altogether.27 
 
1.5.5. The Notion of Truth 
 
Finally, a few words on the notion of truth. As said above, beliefs represent things as being some 
way or other. And if our beliefs represent the reality correctly and accurately, we are willing to say 
that our beliefs are true. Truth is at least as tricky definiendum as justification. As I am not going 
into detail on the concept of truth in this study, which is just the opposite case in contrast to the 
concept of justification, I should briefly say what kind of theory of truth is presupposed in this 
study. I understand truth along the lines of correspondence theory of truth, in which truth is the 
relation obtaining between states of affairs (or facts) and beliefs (or propositions). If there is a 
corresponding fact for my belief Elizabeth I died in 1603, it is true, otherwise it is false. To quote 
Aristotle: To say that that which is is not or that which is not is, is a falsehood; and to say that that 
which is is and that which is not is not, is true.28 We can ponder over whether Aristotles words are 
so informative, but I think that the gist of his message is easily grasped because of its intuitiveness. 
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It is intuitive and even commonsensical to claim that a proposition or a belief is true if it represents 
things as they are. 
 
It is another thing whether the facts to which our beliefs should correspond are mind-independent. 
One can endorse the view that truth consists in correspondence with facts and also hold that facts 
are mind-dependent entities. I am not willing to go along with this strand of thought, so I am 
inclined to concede the existence of a mind-independent reality. Truth is understood, then, in this 
study as correspondence between our beliefs (or propositions) and mind-independent facts. It is of 
course highly problematic what kinds of facts correspond with, for instance, mathematical 
propositions. Furthermore, propositions about minds are made true by virtue of their relation to 
mind-dependent states of affairs. However, at least with beliefs based on sense perception it is easy 
to understand the claim that there is a mind-independent empirical reality that makes my perceptual 
beliefs true due to the correspondence between my beliefs and empirical facts. Of course, the 
problem of skepticism seems to be evident and inevitable as soon as we propose the existence of a 
mind-independent reality; namely, we should be able to tell how and when our beliefs match with 
the facts of the external, mind-independent world. Now, the skeptic can be seen as attacking 
precisely this point; claiming, in effect, that we cannot bridge the gap between our beliefs and the 
external facts, and, thus, we cannot know whether any of our beliefs is true and, therefore, 
skepticism holds. So maybe we could avoid the whole problem of skepticism by changing our 
presuppositions, moving from the realistic metaphysics to anti-realistic one. For example, the 
coherence theory of truth is often accompanied with an anti-realistic metaphysics, making the mind-
dependent reality the only reality there is. In the coherence theory of truth, truth is defined solely on 
the basis of the internal relations obtaining between beliefs. However, I am interested in studying 
the problem of skepticism, and, sure, anti-realistic metaphysics is one way to deal with skepticism, 
but then the whole problem ceases to be. Which, in my opinion, is too easy a way out.  
 
With these preliminary remarks at hand we can face the skeptics beloved tool, the problem of the 
criterion. Although our initial definitions of knowledge, justification, and truth were exposed as 
problematic, the problems should not be too insurmountable. As a preliminary sketch it is suggested 
that in order to know that p, ones belief that p must be true and, according to the internalists, it 
should be based on adequate reasons, or, according to the alternative, externalist view, it should be a 
product of a reliable cognitive process.  
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1.6. The Structure of the Study 
 
The study consists of four main chapters. The study starts off by examining Chisholms account of 
the problem of the criterion, which is the topic of chapter 2. Chisholm provides a neat and simple 
formulation of the problem, thus it is a perfect starting point for the study. I examine Chisholms 
formulation of the problem and the alternative possible solutions he sees in answering it. In fact, 
Chisholm sees only two possible alternatives to skepticism with respect to the problem of the 
criterion  either we proceed from instances of knowledge to criteria of knowledge or vice versa. I 
consider the plausibility of these two solutions as well as two other possible solutions that are not 
discussed by Chisholm. The first one of these suggests that since criteria of knowledge and 
instances of knowledge are dependent on each other, we can work them out into a coherent whole  
the resulting theory is a sort of coherentism. The second approach tries to dissolve the problem 
altogether: it is claimed that the problem of the criterion is not intelligible at all. In the end, all the 
suggested solutions are found faulty. However, I also find out that Chisholms formulation turns out 
to be ultimately misguided and, thus, it is not a genuine skeptical paradox. 
 
Chapter 3 studies the ancient account of the problem of the criterion, the skepticism of Pyrrhonists 
and the writings of their representative, Sextus Empiricus. It is shown that the ancient Pyrrhonist 
account is superior to Chisholms account and it provides us with a genuine skeptical paradox. In 
fact, Pyrrhonists intend to find the truth, but as they are unable to produce uncontroversial criterion 
of truth, they suspend judgment about everything. Pyrrhonists are also willing to cure others of their 
dogmatism  i.e. they have claims to knowledge  and thus the Pyrrhonists have invented skeptical 
techniques with the help of which anyone can achieve a global suspension of judgment. The most 
powerful of these skeptical techniques, derivative of the so-called Five Modes, presents the ancient 
account of the problem of the criterion. The chapter is closed by examining some accusations 
against skepticism  e.g. the claim that skepticism refutes itself.    
 
In effect, the Five Modes call into question the reasons we have for our beliefs. Thus, the Five 
Modes can be seen as presenting the so-called regress problem, the topic of chapter 4. The 
examination of the regress problem leads us quickly in touch with differing theories of epistemic 
justification, for each theory can be seen as proposing a solution to the regress problem. Theories 
that can be seen as following directly from the structure of the regress problem are foundationalism, 
coherentism, and infinitism  each one of these theories rejects a different premise in the regress 
problem, which contributes to the resulting conception of epistemic justification that each 
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respective theory draws. The aforementioned theories are usually representatives of internalism, as 
opposed to externalism, both of whose general features are also studied in the chapter. An epistemic 
justification theory known as contextualism offers still another unique way to deal with the regress 
problem and the problem of skepticism. Briefly, contextualists hold that the standards of knowledge 
are different in different contexts. Accordingly, we can know that p in one context, but if the 
context changes, it could happen that we do not know that p anymore. Of course, it is trivially 
obvious that indexicals and comparative terms can make the truth-value of propositions context-
dependent, but it is implausible to suggest that this holds of all propositions. Contextualism as well 
as the aforementioned internalist theories is found faulty and unable to solve the regress problem. 
The chapter is closed by considering the externalist approach to epistemology and its respective 
solution of skepticism. We conclude that while internalist theories are unable to provide a plausible 
solution to the regress problem, their externalist counterparts seem to ignore the problem altogether 
as well as the problem of skepticism in general.  
 
Externalist theories try to eliminate the demand for justifying reasons  which creates, in effect, the 
regress problem  by holding that it suffices for knowledge if our beliefs are true and, in fact, 
products of reliable cognitive faculties. This raises, however, the problem of how we know that our 
faculties are reliable. This problem is discussed under the topic of epistemic circularity in chapter 5. 
This time a version of the problem of the criterion concerns the alleged knowledge of the reliability 
of our faculties. The chapter begins with examining William Alstons influential discussion on 
epistemic circularity. After that I show that the problem inherent in epistemic circularity is a version 
of the diallelus, in which Chisholms formulation of the problem proves to be useful. I analyze three 
suggested solutions to the problem, two of which are remarkably similar with the ones already 
discussed with respect to Chisholms account of the problem. Consequently, similar criticisms can 
be applied here again. Only the third examined solution is novel, and its crucial idea is that we 
should distinguish between two levels or kinds of knowledge. Accordingly, we work our 
unreflective, spontaneous knowledge into reflective knowledge and are thus, arguably, able to break 
out of the grip of the diallelus. However, this suggested solution is found implausible, as are the 
other solutions examined in the chapter. In the end, the examination of epistemic circularity shows 
how deep and serious the problem of the criterion is. For we must take for granted the reliability of 
at least some of our faculties if we are to examine anything at all. This inevitable epistemic 
circularity gives the skeptic such a strong hold that, as Thomas Reid puts it, he must even be left to 
enjoy his skepticism29. The chapter also includes a brief discussion on our epistemic intuitions. 
Intuitions are an important part of skepticism, since the more plausible a skeptical argument is, the 
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more intuitive its premises are. On the other hand, it is intuitively obvious that we have knowledge. 
So should we rely on this initial intuition of ours (that we have knowledge) or on the skeptical 
argument consisting of intuitive premises? Could we evaluate our different epistemic intuitions and 
decide which of them are the most important? More questions are raised than answered about the 
status of intuitions, but since intuitions are fundamental part of skepticism, future discussions on 
skepticism should focus more on our epistemic intuitions. 
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2. RODERICK CHISHOLM AND THE PROBLEM OF THE CRITERION 
 
In this chapter I focus on Roderick Chisholms formulation of the problem of the criterion. I could 
have chosen differently regarding the beginning of my study, but I defend my preference via the 
following words of Andrew Cling: Discussions of the problem of the criterion rightly begin with 
the work of Roderick Chisholm for he is virtually the only major contemporary epistemologist who 
has given sustained attention to this ancient skeptical paradox.30 
 
This chapter has two main purposes. Firstly, I examine Chisholms formulation of the diallelus, and 
secondly, I consider the different solutions provided to the problem. After completing these two 
tasks, I also pay attention to the notion of dependence found in Chisholms formulation, which 
leads me to conclude that the formulation is misguided, after all.  
 
2.1. Chisholm on the Problem of the Criterion 
 
In what follows, I will bring out, firstly, how Chisholm approaches the problem of the criterion, 
secondly, how he eventually formulates the problem, and thirdly, what he sees as possible answers 
to it and which one he takes to be the most plausible one.  
 
2.1.1. Approaching the Problem 
 
One of Chisholms earliest formulations of the problem of the criterion can be found in his 
Perceiving: A Philosophical Study, published in 1957.31 A modified account is found in his Theory 
of Knowledge32, originally published in 1966. Chisholms Aquinas lecture, published in 1973, 
provides his most extensive treatment of the subject; the lecture was aptly named as The Problem 
of the Criterion.33 I will mainly follow the Aquinas lecture as the definitive guide to Chisholms 
views on the problem of the criterion. 
 
Chisholm starts off his lecture by confessing the problem of the criterion to be one of the most 
important and one of the most difficult of all the problems of philosophy.34 Chisholms first 
characterization of the problem is a paraphrase of Montaigne, and it proceeds as follows:  
 
To know whether things really are as they seem to be, we must have a procedure for distinguishing 
appearances that are true from appearances that are false. But to know whether our procedures [sic] is a 
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good procedure, we have to know whether it really succeeds in distinguishing appearances that are true 
from appearances that are false. And we cannot know whether it does really succeed unless we already 
know which appearances are true and which ones are false. And so we are caught in a circle.35   
 
Chisholm seems to take it for granted that there are different appearances. Indeed, this is a plausible 
assumption, for our lives are filled with myriad spectra of appearances. It is not necessary that 
appearances should be limited to perceptual beliefs, for just as it appears to me that I see a computer 
in front of me, just as well it could be said that it appears to me that two plus two equals four. The 
latter appearance is indeed a lucid and indisputable one. However, the crucial question is, despite 
the vividness or clarity of some of our appearances, is there something out there that properly 
corresponds to them? Briefly, are our appearances true? Even if my belief that two plus two equals 
four appears to me as certain, indubitable, and true, is it true? Certainty does not seem to be a 
satisfactory criterion of truth, for all kinds of madmen and bigots are dead certain about their absurd 
beliefs although all the others, the sane, can easily tell how nonsensical and false the fools' beliefs 
are. Surely we know things, but how can we exactly distinguish the good and true beliefs from the 
bad and false ones? In my opinion, Chisholm is here dealing with the most fundamental questions 
of philosophy. Somehow we should be able to show both that the fanatics and madmen claim to 
know too much, and that we can know far more than the skeptic claims36.   
 
Chisholm states the problem yet in a different way, speaking now of beliefs instead of appearances. 
He writes: 
 
The question we started with was: How are we to tell the good ones [beliefs] from the bad ones 
[beliefs]? In other words, we were asking: What is the proper method for deciding which are the good 
beliefs and which are the bad ones  which beliefs are genuine cases of knowledge and which beliefs 
are not?  
And now, you see, we are on the wheel. First, we want to find out which are the good 
beliefs and which are the bad ones. To find this out we have to have some way  some method  of 
deciding which are the good ones and which are the bad ones. But there are good and bad methods  
good and bad ways  of sorting out the good beliefs from the bad ones. And so we have a new problem: 
How are we to decide which are the good methods and which are the bad ones?  
If we could fix on a good method for distinguishing between good and bad methods, 
we might be all set. But this, of course, just moves the problem to a different level. How are we to 
distinguish between a good method [and a bad method] for choosing good methods? If we continue in 
this way, of course, we are led to an infinite regress and we will never have the answer to our original 
question.37   
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The problem Chisholm poses seems to be relatively simple, that is, to understand, not to solve. 
First, we wonder whether any of our beliefs are true. Then, we realize that we need a method  that 
is, a criterion of truth  for distinguishing true belies from false ones. Finally, we wonder whether 
our chosen method is a good one. The threat of an infinite regress seems inevitable. Let us see 
Chisholms final formulation of the problem.  
 
2.1.2. Chisholms Formulation of the Problem 
 
Chisholm decides to formulate the problem of the criterion with the help of the following two pairs 
of questions: 
 
A) What do we know? What is the extent of our knowledge? 
B) How are we to decide whether we know? What are the criteria of knowledge?38 
 
Interestingly, Chisholm notes that the above pairs of questions are relevant with respect to some of 
the philosophical issues that are involved here39. This raises the questions of whether there are also 
some additional philosophical issues involved, and what are their respective contents. Maybe 
Chisholm just wants to remark that his initial characterization of the problem is rather broad, and on 
the basis of it one could drift to consider theories of perception, theories of truth, metaphysical 
theories of realism and idealism, and whatnot. The questions at hand, however, are not ambiguous, 
for here we clearly are dealing with the criteria and the extent of knowledge. At first glance, it 
seems that answering either question presupposes an answer to the other question. It seems that I 
just cannot start listing instances of knowledge  that is, to give an answer to the questions stated in 
A  if I have no clue how to distinguish between true and false instances of knowledge. In other 
words, I need a criterion in order that I could tell what I know. Thus, I should have an answer to the 
questions stated in B in order to answer the questions stated in A, and vice versa.40 A skeptical 
conclusion seems to close in on us. As Chisholm puts it:  
 
And so we can formulate the position of the skeptic on these matters. He will say: You cannot answer 
question A until you have answered question B. And you cannot answer question B until you have 
answered question A. Therefore you cannot answer either question. You cannot know what, if anything, 
you know, and there is no possible way for you to decide in any particular case. Is there any reply to 
this?41   
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On the basis of the above quotation, Chisholm sees that the problem of the criterion culminates in 
the following skeptical argument:  
 
Question A: What do we know? 
Question B: How are we to decide whether we know? 
1. You cannot answer question A until you have answered question B. 
2. You cannot answer question B until you have answered question A.  
3. Therefore, you cannot answer either question. 
 
According to Chisholm, there are three possible reactions to this argument. The first is the position 
of the skeptic, who, obviously, accepts the argument and states that there is no possible way for us 
to decide whether we know anything in any particular case. The other two views refute the skeptical 
conclusion. The so-called particularists reject the first premise of the skeptical argument, and they 
claim that we can determine the criterion of knowledge on the basis of our chosen sample of good 
beliefs. Particularists think that they have an answer to A and on the basis of it they work out their 
answer to B; From instances of knowledge to criteria of knowledge seems to be their motto. In 
other words, we are able to pick out true beliefs prior to a usage of any criterion. The last camp, the 
so-called methodists, proceeds the other way around. Methodists reject the second premise of the 
skeptical argument and they claim that we can determine the goodness of beliefs on the basis of our 
pre-chosen criterion. Methodists think that they have an answer to B on the basis of which they 
figure out their answer to A  From criteria of knowledge to instances of knowledge could be 
their respective motto. Thus, methodists think that we can pick out the criterion of knowledge prior 
to any instance of good belief.42  
 
In sum, Chisholm understands the problem of the criterion as interrelated questions concerning the 
criteria and instances of knowledge. According to Chisholm, there are three possible answers or 
positions with respect to the problem of the criterion. Skeptics claim that we cannot answer either 
question without presupposing an answer to the other, and therefore the questions cannot be 
answered at all43. Particularists presuppose instances of knowledge and proceed from them to 
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2.1.3. Methodism, Particularism, and Skepticism 
 
Chisholm objects to methodism  the view that we can proceed from criteria of knowledge to 
instances of knowledge  in two respects.44 He cites empiricism  rather curiously, I think  as an 
example of methodism45, and it amounts to the view that genuine items of knowledge must be 
derived from sense experience. Chisholm mentions John Locke and David Hume as examples of 
empiricist philosophers.46 According to the first objection that applies to all forms of methodism, no 
matter which criterion methodists happen to choose as their guide to knowledge, the criterion is 
very broad and far-reaching and at the same time completely arbitrary47. Chisholm wonders how 
anyone could begin with such a broad generalization, and he finds it particularly odd that the 
empiricists who favor sense experience start out with such a broad generalization.48 The choice of 
criterion is also arbitrary, for the methodist leaves us completely in the dark so far as concerns 
what reasons he may have for adopting this particular criterion rather than some other49. The 
second objection applies particularly to empiricism that implies that all we can know is our present 
sensations. We cannot know the existence of any physical things such as trees, houses, and bodies. 
Furthermore, I cannot even know that there is an I who recollects and unifies the sensations I am 
having. Thus, I cannot know that I am having sensations, or that there have been any sensations in 
the past, for all there is, is the present flow of sensations.50    
 
Chisholm characterizes methodism in a rather grim tone, and he even blatantly states that Im 
inclined to think that the methodists are wrong51. His description of particularism is, in contrast, 
more positive in tone. Chisholm interprets Thomas Reid and G. E. Moore as particularists, who 
proceed from instances of knowledge to criteria of knowledge. Particularists take it for granted that 
many beliefs of ours are consonant with common sense. Accordingly, we know things such as that 
we have bodies, that there are external objects, that there are other persons, and that the Earth has 
existed for billions of years. How, then, would particularists answer the objections made by the 
skeptics, or methodists, who claim that we cannot know anything beyond our current sensations?52 
Here Chisholm imagines Moore raising his hand and uttering the following words: I know very 
well that this is a hand, and so do you. If you come across some philosophical theory that implies 
that you and I cannot know that this is a hand, then so much worse for the theory53. Particularists 
refute the need for criteria of knowledge in the first place; we can know with ease things such as 
that we have hands without applying some criterion.54   
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As Chisholm takes particularism to be the most reasonable choice compared to its rivals, 
methodism and skepticism, it is natural enough that he tries to flesh out the first-mentioned theory. 
He thinks that, in a particularist framework, we should regard senses as innocent until proven guilty. 
This means that most of the time we can trust in the deliverances of our senses. Although we 
acknowledge that our senses sometimes deceive us, it is not a sufficient reason to dismiss senses 
altogether. If, however, we have on a particular occasion a good reason to suspect our senses, then 
we should on that occasion doubt the beliefs produced by our senses. If there is nothing particularly 
alarming in a given situation, we can safely take the reports of our senses at face value.55 Chisholm 
sums up particularism as follows: We have then a kind of answer to the puzzle about the diallelus. 
We start with particular cases of knowledge and then from those we generalize and formulate 
criteria of goodness  criteria telling us what it is for a belief to be epistemically respectable.56    
 
Chisholm has his own suggestions for correct epistemic criteria and principles that both are derived 
from our instances of knowledge.57 The details of Chisholms theory of epistemic principles, 
however, are not important in the present context;58 instead, we should concentrate on his remarks 
on the third alternative, skepticism. The proper place to begin is to consider Chisholms following 
closing words of his lecture on the problem of the criterion: 
 
But in all of this I have presupposed the approach I have called particularism. The methodist and 
the skeptic will tell us that we have started in the wrong place. If now we try to reason with them, 
then, I am afraid, we will be back on the wheel. 
What few philosophers have had the courage to recognize is this: we can deal with the 
problem only by begging the question. It seems to me that, if we do recognize this fact, as we should, 
then it is unseemly for us to try to pretend that it isn't so.  
One may object: Doesn't this mean, then, that the skeptic is right after all? I would 
answer: Not at all. His view is only one of the three possibilities and in itself has no more to 
recommend it than the others do. And in favor of our approach there is the fact that we do know many 
things, after all.59  
 
The above quotation from Chisholm is, in a word, perplexing, and it shows, in my opinion, how 
puzzled he is about the plausibility of particularism. On the one hand, he seems to take 
particularism as the most reasonable option,60 a kind of answer,61 and a solution62 to the problem of 
the criterion. On the other hand, Chisholm admits that each possible solution to the problem is 
unappealing,63 and that we can deal with the problem only by begging the question64. Moreover, 
on another occasion he claims that the problem of the criterion has no solution65. Although the 
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problem is insoluble66, it does not prevent Chisholm from trying to formulate a kind of answer 
that seems to him to be on the right track67.    
 
To sum up, Chisholm openly admits that we cannot solve the problem of the criterion. If, however, 
we are not willing to be skeptics, we should aim for particularism, for methodism is not, Chisholm 
claims, a viable alternative. It is noteworthy that Chisholm takes the diallelus as a general problem, 
for he interprets philosophies of, e.g., Locke, Hume, Reid, and Moore as responses to the problem 
of the criterion. Even though the aforementioned philosophers do not consider the diallelus in the 
same terms as Chisholm does, if they are concerned with it at all, they still are, Chisholm seems to 
think, entangled with this ancient problem. One lesson of Chisholms discussion on the problem of 
the criterion is this: when you engage in the business of epistemology, you are, like it or not, 
dealing with the problem of the criterion.  
  
Two points strike me as salient about Chisholms discussion on the problem of the criterion. Firstly, 
I wonder the nature of his suggested solution, particularism, to the problem: how can we just 
casually state that in favor of our approach there is the fact that we do know many things68? The 
problem of the criterion, and skepticism in general, is supposed to challenge our conviction that we 
have knowledge, and therefore it seems to be clearly insufficient to answer this challenge just by 
repeating the initial assumption that we do have knowledge. This cannot be an acceptable way to 
solve philosophical problems. Otherwise we could resolve other enigmas of philosophy in a similar 
manner; for example, we could unravel the mystery of free will just by saying that In favor of our 
approach there is the fact that we can and do choose our deeds. As Laurence BonJour aptly writes, 
Chisholms position [i.e. particularism] rules out the possibility of skepticism in what seems to me 
an objectionably question-begging way69. Secondly, Chisholm seems to draw a distorted picture of 
methodism, and one wonders could this view not be depicted more sympathetically than Chisholm 
does. Moreover, Chisholm openly admits that his preferred position, particularism, begs the 
question against skepticism. Are not, then, both views, particularism and methodism, on a par, at 
least with respect to skepticism? As Robert Amico points out, if begging the question is dealing 
with the problem, then the methodist has the same recourse open to him70.  
 
Next I will examine commentaries and remarks pertaining to Chisholms formulation on the 
problem of the criterion. First, many commentators deem Chisholms formulation of the problem as 
meta-epistemological, i.e. it is directed towards our knowledge about knowledge, rather than our 
first-order knowledge. Thus, I must discuss on which level, so to speak, Chisholms problem 
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operates, or at least can be seen as operating. Second, I will examine critical remarks pertaining to 
Chisholms accounts of methodism and particularism. Third, I will consider the question of whether 
Chisholms list of different answers to the problem is exhaustive. In fact, many commentators think 
that Chisholm has omitted a relevant fourth alternative, a sort of coherentism. Fourth, I will 
examine Amicos solution  or dissolution", as he calls it  to the problem of the criterion. Fifth, I 
will examine the nature of dependence between criteria and instances, which will show a serious 
flaw in Chisholms formulation of the problem of the criterion. Finally, all the results of the chapter 
are brought together in a brief summary.  
 
2.2. Levels of Knowledge 
 
It is not so clear whether Chisholms account of the problem of the criterion is directed towards our 
knowledge or our knowledge about knowledge. Many commentators interpret Chisholm in the latter 
way, taking his account of the problem as meta-epistemological. For example, Ernest Sosa writes as 
follows: 
 
Particularism and methodism are meta-epistemological positions, for they tell us which justifies which 
of two sorts of epistemic knowledge. They tell us whether our knowledge of certain epistemic 
principles is based on our knowledge that we have bits of knowledge of a certain related kind (e.g., of 
the external world, that I have two hands), or whether, conversely, our knowledge that we have bits of 
knowledge of a particular kind rests on our knowledge of certain related epistemic principles.71  
 
And another commentator, Mark Nelson, writes: 
 
It is worth noting that what Chisholm calls scepticism in the Problem of the Criterion is a second order 
scepticism, and does not entail first-order scepticism. That is, unless, some sort of high access principle 
is true, not knowing the criteria of knowledge is compatible with knowing lots of things about the 
external world, the past, other minds, etc.72  
 
If the problem of the criterion is taken as a meta-epistemological problem, it will change drastically 
our understanding of the problem and its possible solutions. In particular, the skeptic challenges our 
second-order knowledge and not directly our first-order knowledge. Accordingly, we can know 
even if we cannot know that we know. I admit that I do not even properly understand such a strand 
of skepticism, according to which we can know various things, but we cannot know that we know. 
Such a view implies that my belief, say, A pair of scissors is on the table could be true and 
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justified and hence I would have knowledge, but I could not know that my belief A pair of scissors 
is on the table is knowledge.73 As I see the matter, if I know that p, I can also know that I know 
that p et cetera, and vice versa; if I cannot know that I know that p, I cannot know that p either. 
Thus, I think that the problem of the criterion concerns equally all levels of knowledge. Hence, I see 
the whole question about on which level of knowledge the problem of the criterion operates totally 
irrelevant.74 Although the problem of the criterion concerns, arguably, equally all levels of 
knowledge, for simplicitys sake, I focus in this study mainly on the first-order knowledge. 
Therefore, we are dealing with the questions whether we know anything and if we do, consequently, 
what we know.  
 
However, I acknowledge the fact that many epistemologists, especially the so-called externalists, do 
not see any contradiction in holding that we can have knowledge, even though we cannot know that 
we have knowledge. Knowledge about knowledge would require a criterion for distinguishing bad 
from good beliefs, but even if we have not such a criterion, we can have knowledge. According to a 
rough and ready description of externalism, a belief counts as knowledge if it is true and produced 
by a reliable cognitive process. We do not have to be aware of the reliability of our cognitive 
processes, for it is enough for knowledge that our beliefs are in fact true and reliably produced. I do 
not see an externalist answer to skepticism as satisfactory; in fact, I think that externalism does not 
provide an answer at all. For example, the skeptic can grant the externalist that [o]ne may have 
knowledge without knowing or understanding what having knowledge amounts to. In fact, one may 
have knowledge even when one thinks one does not have knowledge75 and that [w]e may have 
knowledge that we cannot prove we have76. The crucial question is, however, do we know? It does 
not help at all to solemnly state that we may or may not have knowledge, for this much the skeptic 
can grant as well.77 The problem of the criterion is a problem about finding a correct procedure or 
criterion for distinguishing true beliefs from false ones, and if we cannot find such a criterion  as it 
is argued in the problem  then we do not know anything. But, to repeat, externalists hold that such 
a criterion is not necessary for knowledge, which view I simply find implausible. The externalist 
conception of knowledge will be discussed in more detail in forthcoming chapters, but, as it is 
becoming clear from here, the issue between the externalists and internalists ultimately boils down 
to differing epistemic intuitions. Furthermore, if a debate has proceeded so far that, instead of 
arguments, we are only left with differing and contrary intuitions, it is practically useless to 
continue the debate. Differing and contrary arguments can be rationally evaluated, but a rational 
evaluation of differing intuitions is much harder, since intuitions are not based on premises or 
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evidence that could be evaluated. In the end, then, it seems that we have two different and 
incomparable conceptions of knowledge  one externalist and the other internalist.  
 
The fundamental assumption guiding this study is that to know anything we should be able to 
distinguish between true and false beliefs; hence the demand for a criterion of truth. If this intial 
assumption already presupposes an internalist conception of knowledge, then this study is biased in 
favor of internalism, I admit. However, I simply cannot accept the view that we can disregard 
altogether the demand for a criterion of truth by holding that knowledge does not require such a 
criterion. If that view amounts to externalism, then I wholeheartedly reject externalism. However, 
you, my dear reader, do not have to take merely my word on it, for further arguments for and 
against externalism  as well as for and against internalism  are advanced in this study. Still, as 
already pointed out, further arguments may be useless, since the debate boils down to differing 
intuitions between the internalists and the externalists.   
 
2.3. What Is Wrong and What Is Right with Particularism and Methodism? 
 
Chisholm thinks that particularism  the view that we can derive criteria from instances of 
knowledge  is consonant with common sense. Moreover, he argues that methodism  the view that 
we derive the instances of knowledge from correct criteria  has, at least as with respect to 




It is not clear at all that particularism must be consonant with common sense. For example, we can 
construct multiple forms of particularism, and all of them do not seem to coincide with common 
sense. In fact, all forms of particularism are possible, for according to the central tenet of 
particularism, we just presuppose instances of knowledge prior to any criteria. For example, one 
could adhere to Lunatics Particularism, according to which it is perfectly acceptable to take 
propositions such as The Moon is made of green cheese, The universe is created by the Great 
Orange, a benevolent and fruity god and Politicians are mischievous demons in disguise for 
granted. Of course, an obvious objection against such Lunatics is that their samples of knowledge 
are utterly implausible. However, it seems that such an objection presupposes that we have a 
criterion of (epistemic) plausibility for beliefs in our use. And that way we are back on the skeptical 
wheel again, for we should justify our chosen criterion with a further criterion, and so on. It is 
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precisely the point of particularism that we just choose our instances of knowledge prior to any 
criteria.   
 
Particularists try to avoid the problem of the diallelus by claiming that we simply know the correct 
instances of knowledge. The problem with particularism seems to be that we can construct various 
forms of it, and adherents of each respective form could claim that they simply know that their 
chosen instances of knowledge are correct. Thus, it is also possible to adhere, for example, to 
Cartesian Particularism according to which we can know only things pertaining to our existence 
and current mental states in addition to some simple logical truths78. It seems that both camps, 
Lunatics and Cartesians, have it wrong: the former seem to have too large, whereas the latter seem 
to have too narrow, a pool of samples of knowledge. How could we reasonably exclude these 
extreme possibilities? Chisholm, arguably, sticks to his favorite, call it Common Sense 
Particularism79, but how could we justify his choice?  
 
It could be argued that a particularists choices for instances of knowledge are in an important sense 
arbitrary. With respect to Common Sense Particularism, for instance, it could be pointed out that 
what was in line with common sense a thousand years ago is not so any more80. For example, we do 
not think nowadays that the Earth is flat and the center of the universe, or that different natural 
phenomena, as well as many of our bodily diseases, are due to the workings of spirits. Moreover, 
our commonsensical beliefs about middle-sized physical objects seem to be plainly false in the light 
of current evidence acquired within quantum physics. Roughly speaking, in the context of science 
our commonsensical beliefs are the first to go, for often common sense just amounts to dogmatic 
presuppositions. So it seems that some of our commonsensical beliefs can be false. But this is bad 
news for the particularist, for to confess that ones exemplars of knowledge are fallible amounts to 
saying that one does not know after all. In other words, the alleged instances of knowledge were 
meant to be just that, viz. instances of knowledge that are exempt from the skeptics doubts. 
However, if we admit that our chosen samples of knowledge are dubious as representatives of 
knowledge, we are again vulnerable to the skeptics attack, and we should justify our alleged 
instances of knowledge with new reasons, and these with new reasons, and ad infinitum. This is all 
too familiar a problem of foundationalism: which beliefs should we choose as the foundations of 
our edifice of knowledge? Foundationalists have differed and differ with respect to what they accept 
as so-called basic beliefs, i.e. beliefs that are justified independently of any further justifying 
beliefs. On the face of it, it is an arbitrary decision which kind of foundationalism or particularism 
we happen to choose81. Cartesian, Lunatic, or Common Sense Particularists can only insist that their 
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view on the instances of knowledge is the correct one, but dogmatic insistence does not remove the 
fact that their favored form, or any other form for that matter, of particularism cannot solve the 
problem of the criterion. Incidentally, as Chisholm charges methodism of arbitrariness, the same 




If it is possible to construct a version of particularism that is consonant with common sense, what 
prevents us from doing the same thing with methodism? Amico, for example, thinks that [t]here is 
nothing about methodism that precludes the possibility of its coinciding with our common sense 
beliefs82. Noah Lemos agrees with Amico that it is, indeed, logically possible for us to know 
general epistemic criteria or principles from which we could derive common sense beliefs83. 
However, Lemos argues that in other respects Amico misses the point84. The problem with 
methodism is, according to Lemos, that if we are ignorant of relevant epistemic principles, then we 
are also ignorant of propositions such as I know that I was alive five minutes ago85. However, 
according to common sense, we know propositions such as (I know that) I was alive five minutes 
ago even if we are ignorant of general or specific epistemic principles. Thus, methodism does 
conflict with common sense.86 If we have knowledge, it is reasonable to assume that we can know 
things independently of epistemic principles. Otherwise we should say that young children, and all 
the people who are not sophisticated enough to understand or believe general epistemic principles, 
do not know things such as that they have hands, that they were alive five minutes ago, or that there 
is an external world. And that, if anything, flies in the face of common sense.87 This criticism of 
methodism seems to be externalist in character, but even though we did not accept the externalist 
conception of knowledge, there would remain further problems for the methodist.  
 
It is a real problem for the methodist that we can construct countless criteria consistent with our 
alleged instances of knowledge. In other words, for any given judgment, we can construct myriad 
criteria that are consistent with it. For instance, my belief that There is a computer in front of me 
satisfies the criteria, say Beliefs formed about computers are true, Beliefs formed on 
Wednesdays are true, and If 2+2=4, then my perceptual beliefs are reliable. Now, the question 
arises as to how we could ever pick out the correct criteria, and not to revise them according to our 
instances of knowledge.88 Moreover, all of this seems to highlight the fact that, in general, we fix 
our criteria according to instances and not vice versa. In other words, if a given criterion suggests 
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that we do not know a proposition that we think that we know, we reject the criterion and not the 
proposition, the alleged instance of knowledge.89  
 
Lastly, there is a further problem concerning the status of these criteria, namely the criteria of true 
beliefs are both general and contingent. A methodists proposed criterion, say, Beliefs produced by 
sense perception are likely to be true, is general, since it states, in effect, that all beliefs produced 
by sense perception have a sufficiently high likelihood to be true. However, the criterion is also 
contingent, since it is not a necessary truth like proposition Every triangle has three angles, 
arguably, is. But how could anyone immediately see the correct general and contingent criteria? 
Necessary and general truths as well as contingent and not general propositions such as There is a 
computer in front of me and I am now conscious are good candidates for propositions that we 
can immediately accept as true, but it is harder to find good candidates for general and contingent 
propositions that we can immediately accept as true. The criterion Beliefs produced by sense 
perception are likely to be true may have some initial plausibility, but it calls for further justifying 
reasons and it seems not be a proposition of which truth could be said to be immediately seen. Since 
the methodists proposed criteria are general and contingent, it is simply implausible to suggest, as 
the methodist does, that we can immediately see the correct criteria.90 Particularists, in turn, do not 
have this kind of a problem, since their alleged instances of knowledge are only contingent and not 
general.  
 
As we recall, Chisholm accuses methodism of arbitrariness, and above I tried to justify this 
accusation. The more one thinks about it, the more inconceivable the idea behind methodism seems 
to be, for it is hard to see how anyone could work out her way from criteria to instances of 
knowledge. The idea behind particularism, instead, seems to be much more conceivable. At least we 
can imagine what it would be to derive the correct epistemic criteria from the alleged instances, but 
the reverse procedure is almost unimaginable. It seems to be a fact of epistemology that, if we are 
not willing to be skeptics, we start from the alleged instances of knowledge and basing on that we 
formulate general epistemic principles. It is also possible that we try to figure out the edifice of our 
knowledge on the basis of both instances and criteria. This view seems to fall somewhere between 









Now we are in a position to summarize the pros and cons of methodism and particularism. To start 
with methodism, Chisholm seems to be correct after all when he claims that methodism is not a 
plausible view.91 The foremost reason I find compelling in rejecting methodism is that it seems to 
be a theory of knowledge not applicable to humans at all. Maybe some other kinds of creatures 
could perceive directly general epistemic criteria and on that basis derive particular instances of 
knowledge. Thus, if methodism is not an acceptable option, and we are inclined to reject 
skepticism, we are left with particularism. Particularists think that we can gain knowledge easily by 
trusting our particular judgments. Of course not all kinds of judgments count as knowledge, but 
certainly the intuitive and commonsensical ones do. One has not to be an epistemologist in order to 
have knowledge, for fairly young children and even animals can have knowledge. Knowledge is a 
common good, particularists claim. However, the question arises how the particularists know all 
this. The reply is that they just do. Particularism is in principle anti-skeptical; particularists just 
presuppose that skepticism is false92. But why should we follow particularists and presuppose with 
them that their chosen samples of beliefs are, indeed, true and instances of knowledge? As Paul 
Moser writes: 
 
Intuitive judgments and common-sense judgments can, and sometimes do, result from special, even 
biased, linguistic training. Why then should we regard such judgments as automatically epistemically 
privileged? Intuitive judgments and common-sense judgments certainly can be false, as a little reflection 
illustrates. Such judgments, furthermore, seem not always to be supported by best available evidence. 
Consider, for instance, how various judgments of common sense are at odds with our best available 
evidence from the sciences or even from careful ordinary perception. It is unclear, then, why we should 
regard intuitive judgments or common-sense judgments as the basis of our standards for justification.93 
 
Briefly, particularism does not seem to fare any better than methodism does; both of them fail to 
offer a warranted starting point for an anti-skeptical epistemology. We have the following dilemma 
on our hands: particularism seems dogmatic  when we are trying to clear up doubt about 
particular cases, we cannot presume that our judgment in particular cases is correct. On the other 
hand, methodism appears arbitrary  how do we select one set of criteria among many others if we 
cannot test them against known particular cases?94 In fact, both methodism and particularism can 
be said to be arbitrary and dogmatic. To explicate, both methodism and particularism are arbitrary 
insofar as they blatantly state, without any justifying reasons, that their chosen criteria or instances 
of knowledge are the correct ones. Furthermore, the dialectic built-in to Chisholms formulation of 
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the problem of the criterion implies that neither methodists nor particularists can justify their 
proposed criteria or instances. According to Chisholms formulation of the problem, both 
methodists and particularists must propose some beliefs concerning either criteria or instances as 
basic, in order to prevent the infinite regress of reasons from rising. However, exactly for the reason 
because the both camps are committed to the postulation of basic beliefs, we can accuse both of 
them of arbitrariness. Therefore, both the methodist and the particularist leave us completely in the 
dark so far as concerns what reasons he may have for adopting this particular criterion [or instance] 
rather than some other95. Furthermore, both the methodist and the particularist are guilty of 
dogmatism, since they do not   cannot  justify their chosen basic beliefs. We will see the force of 
this objection more clearly when considering the ancient formulation of the problem of the criterion 
and especially the so-called mode of hypothesis.   
 
My treatment of methodism and particularism has been rather brief, and as such it is not intended to 
be conclusive. However, my purpose has been to point out that both methodism and particularism 
are, as solutions to the problem of the criterion, infected with serious flaws. It may well be that, in 
the end, either methodism or particularism turns out be a correct epistemological theory, but, for 
now, we should be aware of their serious flaws. Furthermore, substantial epistemological theories 
are discussed in more detail in chapter 4. The current chapter is merely an overview of Chisholms 
formulation of the problem of the criterion, and not a survey of all possible anti-skeptical 
epistemologies. With regard to Chisholms formulation of the problem, our choices are not 
necessarily limited to particularism, methodism, and skepticism.  
 
2.4. The Fourth Alternative  
 
2.4.1. From Coherence to the Method of Wide Reflective Equilibrium 
 
Our anti-skeptical alternatives are not necessarily restricted to particularism and methodism, for 
[o]ther positions on the Problem of the Criterion may be possible, including a sort of coherentism, 
according to which one begins with both substantial and methodological commitments, and then 
works to bring these into reflective equilibrium96. Indeed, coherentism seems to be an option 
ignored by Chisholm.97 Coherentists deny the idea of epistemic priority built in the problem of the 
criterion. It is assumed in the problem that either our criteria are prior to instances or vice versa.98 
Coherentists simply reject this assumption and they claim, in turn, that we work out criteria and 
instances together into a coherent whole. We should balance criteria against instances and instances 
The Inevitability of Skepticism. A Study on the Problem of the Criterion 
 41
against criteria until we have a consistent and mutually supporting system of beliefs. Coherentists 
agree with the skeptic to the extent that we cannot have instances of knowledge or criteria of 
knowledge independently of each other, but coherentists assert that we can acquire them through 
their mutual interdependence. 99  
 
In the present context, coherentism is also closely linked to John Rawls idea of the method of 
wide reflective equilibrium.100 For example, Lemos thinks that we should understand the common 
sense tradition through the method of wide reflective equilibrium, in which one begins with (1) 
ones particular considered judgments, (2) ones beliefs in general principles, and (3) general 
background theories. One then seeks to achieve a coherent balance or equilibrium between these 
various elements101.102 We need not to get stuck to some particular judgments or criteria, instead 
we can abandon or revise our particular judgments in favor of criteria, or vice versa. Whether we 
abandon or revise particular judgments, general principles, or background theories in favor of 
something else in each particular occasion, depends on which option seems, on reflection, more 
reasonable103. The method is wide, indeed: 
 
[I]n wide reflective equilibrium, one does not restrict oneself to beliefs within a given domain. One 
seeks a wider harmony between ones particular judgments and general principles and whatever other 
considerations might seem relevant. So, conceptions of the person and the functioning of social 
institutions as well as principles of economic theory might be brought to bear on particular moral 
judgments and general principles. What favors the method of wide reflective equilibrium is that nothing 
that seems relevant is excluded.104 
 
Also Nicholas Rescher relies heavily on the idea of coherence in his alleged solution to the problem 
of the criterion. Rescher understands the problem, among his many other characterizations of it, as 
[a] problem how reason can legitimately sit in judgment on itself and validate its own deliverances. 
Or, to look at the issue from a somewhat different angle, how can one possibly provide a systematic 
noncircular validation for the system of our beliefs as a whole?105 Rescher cites also Chisholm, 
among others such as the ancient skeptics, as a figure giving considerable attention to the problem, 
thus, it should be warranted to take Rescher as considering the same problem as Chisholm does.106 
Although Rescher acknowledges that the problem of the criterion is a powerful argument for global 
skepticism, he thinks that it can be met  and overcome  by sufficiently careful countermoves107. 
However, it is not an easy task to track down Reschers exact solution to the problem from his 
series of books. Thus, I have decided to focus on Amicos interpretation of Reschers alleged 
solution.108  
The Inevitability of Skepticism. A Study on the Problem of the Criterion 
 42
An important part of Reschers solution is his endeavor to link pragmatic success with truth.109 
Resher proceeds by discussing certain metaphysical theses that must be taken for granted if we are 
to explain why pragmatic success should count as truth-indicative110. For example, it must be 
presupposed that the world operates in a way that is at bottom nonconspiratorial, in both the 
positive and the negative directions. That is, one must hold nature to be indifferent to our cognitive 
endeavors: neither angelic in systematically crowning our wholly unmerited and rationally 
unwarranted successes, nor demonic in systematically frustrating the deserved successes of even our 
most shrewd and rationally warranted efforts. Again, nature must be in some degree responsive to 
human intervention, for clearly, if our actions never made an impact upon it, the success or failure 
of these efforts would fail to reveal anything about its workings.111 With the help of these and 
other metaphysical assumptions we are in a position to conclude that it is effectively impossible 
that success should crown the products of systematically error-producing cognitive procedures112.  
 
Another crucial part of Reschers account is his stress on the relevance of systematic coherence 
throughout the cognitive enterprise113. What is at play here are the interconnected notions of 
pragmatic success and cognitive coherence that both are included in the evaluation and revision 
process of our theoretical and pragmatic presumptions. Rescher admits that, as an answer to the 
skeptic, his approach to epistemology is circular, but it is not viciously so114. In his rather 
metaphorical language, Rescher describes his overall system as follows: What is at issue is thus a 
pair of distinct but connected cycles (the theoretical cycle of cognitive coherence and the pragmatic 
cycle of apparent effectiveness) which both move upwards in interlocked coordination  a pair of 
interlocked ascending spirals. The present approach to epistemic validation finds a double helix 
configuration to lie at the core of human cognition even as it lies at the core of human life itself.115 
 
Despite the fact that Rescher and Lemos depict their respective theories differently, the theories 
seem to share a common feature that makes them closely related. In other words, both theories are 
in a sense hybrids of particularism and methodism. Neither Rescher nor Lemos emphasize the 
epistemic priority of particular judgments or general criteria, instead, they seem to think that all 
kinds of facts, judgments, theories, considerations, and so on might be relevant and should be taken 
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2.4.2. Objections against the Fourth Alternative 
 
Rescher and Lemos shared view, a kind of wide coherentism, invokes two general objections that 
concern, firstly, the possibility of equally coherent alternative systems and, secondly, vicious 
circularity comprised in coherentism. Both objections are familiar from criticisms raised against 
coherentist theories of justification.116  
 
The point of the first objection is to note that the coherence of ones belief system does not 
necessarily have anything to do with truth. All kinds of conspiracy theories or fairy tales can be 
perfectly coherent although they are plainly false. We can easily construct two coherent systems of 
propositions, the only difference being that the first system consists of the negations of the 
propositions comprised in the second system. Because the two systems are contradictory, they both 
cannot be true, but we cannot prefer one over another on the basis of coherence alone. Thus, 
coherence seems to be insufficient criterion or condition to link our beliefs with truth. 
Consequently, we have lost our reason to think that coherence attained through the mutual 
interdependence between our particular judgments and criteria leads to truth, and, therefore, we are 
back on the skeptics wheel again.  
 
Lemos disagrees with the first objection, for he stresses that in the method of wide reflective 
equilibrium we need not treat all coherent bodies [of belief] as being epistemically on a par. Even 
if we allow that coherence provides some boost to the epistemic status of beliefs, there are other 
factors relevant as well.117 I think that Lemos is not, unfortunately, successful in his attempt to 
refute the criticism of the possibility of coherent alternative systems. It seems that we have only 
three relevant anti-skeptical solutions to the problem of the criterion.118 If one does not want to give, 
as Lemos does not, epistemic priority to particular judgments over general criteria, nor vice versa, 
one is committed to a kind of coherentism. It is, of course, possible that Lemos wants to be a 
particularist or a methodist after all, but these views have problems of their own. If, however, as his 
words strongly indicate, he is committed to the coherentist response to the problem of the criterion, 
then his view falls prey to criticisms of coherentist theories. And as Amico points out in his 
criticism of Reschers system, on the basis of coherence we can justify just about anything. No 
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According to the second objection, coherentist theories are circular in an unsatisfactorily way, and, 
therefore, they cannot be viable solutions to the problem of the criterion. In other words, it is a 
circular procedure to justify our particular judgments and criteria by appealing to our belief 
systems coherence or the method of wide reflective equilibrium that both are justified, in turn, by 
appealing to our particular judgments and criteria. This way we are only back in square one, for one 
starts to wonder what justifies the method of wide reflective equilibrium or coherence in the first 
place.120  
 
To start with Rescher, he tries to shake off the charges of circularity by claiming that his systems 
overall justification is not based on coherence alone. For the consequences of our actions constitute 
the decisive factor when validating our epistemological theory. As a result, we cannot be content 
with coherence attained in the realm of ideas and theories only, for what is absent, is the element of 
pragmatic success.121 Pragmatic considerations bind us to the external world and block the 
prospect of a futile spinning around in reality-detached cycles of purely theoretical gyrations122. 
Rescher seems to think that because the external world and the pragmatic success of our actions are 
crucial elements in his theory of knowledge, it prevents the problem of circularity to be worrisome 
for his overall system. Although he describes the justification of his epistemological theory in terms 
of connected cycles123 and a pair of interlocked ascending spirals124, it, Rescher seems to think, 
does not render his system circular, not at least in a vicious way, for our beliefs must encounter the 
harsh realities of the external world125. Briefly, our beliefs couple with the reality.126  
 
With regard to Lemos, in turn, he tries to answer the charge of circularity in a similar way as he 
answered the first objection about the possibility of coherent alternative systems. Specifically, we 
need not hold that all coherent systems are epistemically on a par.127 Lemos seems to think that 
some coherent systems can, indeed, be viciously circular and unreliable in general. However, it does 
not imply that we should treat all coherent systems of belief as epistemically deficient.128 Moreover, 
there is a kind of circularity we all are necessarily entangled with, for, in a way, we are forced to 
assume the reliability of, say, sense perception in order to find out whether sense perception is 
reliable.129 By the same token, we cannot help but assume the reliability of reason if we are to study 
the question of whether the deliverances of reason are reliable. We cannot check the reliability of 
our cognitive faculties by any external means, so we have no choice but let them be the judge of 
their own products, i.e. beliefs. And this kind of circularity is perfectly acceptable in addition to its 
unavoidability.130 However, Lemos admits that the proponent of the method of wide reflective 
The Inevitability of Skepticism. A Study on the Problem of the Criterion 
 45
equilibrium should take critical considerations, including the criticisms discussed above, into 
account, for [t]he method is, after all, wide. Nothing that seems relevant need be excluded.131   
 
Another kind of defense of the method of wide reflective equilibrium is brought up by Markus 
Lammenranta, who claims that it is literally a method132 and not as such a competing theory of 
knowledge or epistemic justification.133 By using the method we can arrive at the correct theory of 
knowledge, but we can also fail: the method of wide reflective equilibrium is initially neutral with 
respect to skepticism.134 When we use the method, we, of course, expect that the resulting theory of 
knowledge is justified, but the starting point, i.e. the method of wide reflective equilibrium, need 
not be the source of justification of our believing that resulting theory.135  
 
However, if the method of wide reflective equilibrium is literally only a method, the question arises 
as to what makes us adopt it in the first place?136 If we do not provide any reasons for its usage, the 
method amounts to an arbitrary assumption and, it is, therefore, an unsuccessful and question-
begging attempt to answer the skeptic. It seems as if we acknowledge that providing reasons for our 
procedure throws us back into the wheel, and, therefore, we refuse to give reasons for our favored 
method. However, you cannot refute the skeptic just by turning a deaf ear to her. Moreover, neither 
Lemos nor Rescher seem to be able to refute the charges of circularity against their respective 
theories. In the first place, Rescher is blatantly dogmatic when he claims that our beliefs couple 
with the external world. If it is really so, the problem of the skepticism is solved. But skepticism 
would not be a problem at all if it could be refuted just by claiming that we have knowledge and our 
pragmatic success indicates that our beliefs are truthful. On the other hand, if our theory of 
knowledge is grounded in the consequences of our actions, and our beliefs are validated by 
pragmatic considerations, we seem to be committed to a particularist theory, not coherentist. If, 
however, we want to preserve coherence as the most crucial feature of our theory, then the charge 
of circularity is immediately warranted. Circularity seems to be that kind of an epistemic vice to 
which one just cannot turn a blind eye. 
 
Nevertheless, we can forget the charge of circularity, for the most pressing objection against 
Lemos and Reschers respective systems is yet to be presented; namely, we can grant Rescher and 
Lemos all that they want, viz. that coherence is not the only relevant criterion and all other kinds of 
considerations should be taken into account. However, now the problem is that our conception of 
knowledge or justified belief seems to be too demanding. Specifically, how can we know when our 
beliefs, experiences, and other relevant considerations are in the state of wide reflective 
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equilibrium? If mere coherence is not enough, the question arises as to what is, and more to the 
point, how can we know when the desirable state has been reached? In other words, the problem of 
the criterion rises again: we seem to need a criterion that tells us what the relevant features of the 
wide reflective equilibrium are. Only if we were equipped with the correct criterion, we could 
distinguish between belief systems that are in the state of wide reflective equilibrium and those that 
are not.  
 
On the other hand, if all kinds of considerations are to be taken into account in order for us to reach 
the state of wide reflective equilibrium, then what precludes the problem of the skepticism from 
being one of these relevant considerations? If skepticism is ruled out in advance, it needs to be 
asked on what grounds we can make such a move. What other theories, propositions, views, or 
opinions should be ruled out in advance? Moreover, how are we to decide what kinds of things 
should be precluded from the wide reflective equilibrium? The problem with the method of wide 
reflective equilibrium is that it seems to be overwhelmingly difficult to tell when our belief system 
is in that epistemically preferable state. Besides, it seems to be far too wide a starting point if 
everything, including skepticism, is taken into account. It is hard to see how we could proceed 
anywhere if we happened to consider  as the method of wide reflective equilibrium seems to 
suggest  every possible proposition and their negations even if the set of propositions were rather 
limited.  
 
In sum, the fourth alternative, whether it is understood as coherence or the method of wide 
reflective equilibrium, fails to solve the problem of the criterion. In a way, it was an expected result. 
If, as it has been argued, particularism is unacceptably dogmatic and methodism is arbitrary and 
almost impossible to carry out in practice, do we, then, expect that we could erase all the problems 
by combining the two views into a sort of coherentism? Maybe the specific problems of 
particularism and methodism are not pressing anymore, but the coherentist method creates problems 
of its own. The charge of circularity seems to remain untouched even after the proponents of the 
coherentist method have presented their defense. It is hard to deny the fact that coherence implies a 
kind of circularity, which, in turn, raises the worry that even if our belief system were perfectly 
coherent, it would not necessarily have anything to do with truth. We would happily live in a bubble 
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2.5. Amicos Dissolution of the Problem 
 
An interesting, and certainly unique, approach to the problem of the criterion is provided by Amico, 
who suggests that the problem of the criterion can be solved, or rather dissolved, for his solution 
is based on the idea that there is no real problem at all.137 The problem of the criterion is not 
intelligible, for its demands amount to that of squaring a circle.138 The problem is unintelligible and, 
therefore, impossible to solve. We need not answer the global doubt invoked by the problem of the 
criterion, instead, we can simply dispel our doubts by noting that the problem is not a real threat to 
our cognitive enterprise. Thus, [t]here is no longer any problem. The problem has been 
dissolved.139  
 
Moreover, we should note, as Amico proposes, that Chisholm formulates the problem in such a way 
that it is, in principle, impossible to provide an answer to it. To repeat, Chisholm states the problem 
with the help of a pair of questions A (What do we know?) and B (How are we to decide 
whether we know?), but answering the question A presupposes answering first the question B, and 
answering the question B presupposes answering first the question A. Therefore, answering either 
question is impossible, since we cannot both answer A before B and B before A. Thus, it should 
come as no surprise to us that the problem of the criterion cannot be solved. Furthermore, it is not 
rational to try to provide an answer to a problem that is, in principle, impossible to solve. Thus, we 
should not bother ourselves about the problem of the criterion, for its demands need not be taken 
seriously.140  
 
As a general analysis of the concept of problem, Amico suggests that problems can be always 
stated as questions, but not all questions are problems. Some questions are meaningless or trivial, 
but only those questions that raise doubt, can be said to be problems.141 For example, if someone 
were perplexed about how to solve the problem of how one squares a circle, it would be 
sufficient to demonstrate to that individual that the question asks us to do what is, in principle, 
impossible to do; and thus there is nothing puzzling about our inability to square a circle. The 
problem dissolves once one sees that the question involves no rational doubt. And so too with the 
modern problem of the criterion; when the question is fully understood, the apparent problem 
dissolves.142 These kinds of problems that are, in principle, impossible to solve, can be regarded as 
pseudoproblems.143 However, these pseudoproblems should be distinguished from logical 
paradoxes, such as the liar paradox, that seem to be impossible to solve too.144 With regard to a 
proper solution of a particular problem, the solution must be true and remove the doubt that was 
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invoked by the problem in the first place.145 Accordingly, Amico does not provide a solution to the 
problem of the criterion, but rather a dissolution that removes the doubt by showing that there 
never was a problem that requires solving.146   
 
What about Amicos dissolution of the problem of the criterion? Specifically, does it seem 
plausible? Personally, Im inclined to answer No. To start with, it must be recalled that, in the 
first place, it was the skeptic who claimed that it is impossible to provide an answer to either 
question, A or B. So it should be asked, what differentiates Amicos dissolution from the skeptics 
position, for, after all, also Amico claims, along with the skeptic, that it is impossible to provide a 
satisfactory answer to the problem of the criterion.147 The difference is, as Amico himself notes, that 
the skeptic claims, and particularists, methodists, and coherentists all agree to some extent, that the 
problem of the criterion poses a real threat for us, whereas Amico claims that there is no 
problem.148 If Amico really were right here, then we could consign the problem of the criterion and 
skepticism to oblivion. But I cannot get rid of the feeling that something is lacking here, for, as one 
commentator says, Amicos view may not be enough to persuade those epistemologists who take 
skepticism seriously.149 In my view, Amicos dissolution of the problem amounts just to its 
neglect. Surely we can choose to ignore the problem of the criterion, but that does not imply that the 
problem is solved, or dissolved, for that matter.   
 
What is exactly wrong with Amicos dissolution of the problem? For one thing, it seems to be too 
strong an argument, for it has, arguably, devastating and unwanted consequences. If we accept 
Amicos solution of the problem of the criterion, we should, by the same token, reject other 
problems of the same kind as unintelligible. For example, mathematical and logical paradoxes 
would cease to be problems and they should be treated as pseudoproblems, and, thus, they would 
not deserve our serious attention. It is true that Amico tries to distinguish between pseudoproblems 
and logical problems, but by his own lights he should treat them equally. Moreover, he blurs the 
distinction himself by explicitly saying that if a paradox is, in principle, impossible to solve, then it 
is a pseudoproblem150. Amicos solution implies that we should reject, in addition to mathematical 
and logical paradoxes, many philosophical problems too. Many philosophical problems are such 
that all proposed solutions to them have been disputed, so maybe we should then conclude, 
following Amico, that the problems are impossible to solve and thus we should not even attempt to 
solve them. For instance, the problem of free will seems to be impossible to solve too, and, thus, it 
could be dismissed as a pseudoproblem. Again, the tension between norms and facts seems to be 
impossible to resolve, and, therefore, the whole distinction could be ignored as unintelligible. And 
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the same seems to hold good for the question concerning the existence of moral values; it seems to 
be impossible to prove that there are such things as values, therefore, the initial question could be 
dismissed as uninteresting. The examples could be multiplied, but the moral of the story is that a 
number of philosophical problems could be consigned to oblivion outright.     
 
However, many of us, at least as far as philosophers are concerned, are not willing to treat a number 
of philosophical problems as pseudoproblems, or not at least on the basis of Amicos arguments. It 
may be a tenet of common sense to reject problems that seem to be impossible to solve, but it 
certainly is not the tenet of philosophy. Philosophers are not, of course, enthusiastic about studying 
whatever problems on condition that they seem to be impossible to solve. Amicos example suits to 
prove the point. Put simply, the analogy between squaring a circle and the problem of the criterion 
does not work. The former seems to be an impossible but uninteresting problem, whereas the latter 
is interesting and it challenges us, as epistemic agents, to try to solve it although at the same time 
the problem seems to be impossible to solve. The difference between the two problems might be the 
fact that in a way we seem to be committed to the premises that form the problem of the criterion, 
whereas we are not committed to the claim that we can square a circle. It strikes us as evident that 
we do have knowledge, but the problem of the criterion challenges this conviction. And in order to 
hold on to our conviction that we have knowledge, we should be able to show that the problem of 
the criterion goes amiss.151 The situation is certainly different with respect to the task of squaring a 
circle, for a very few of us, if any, have a strong conviction that we can square a circle.  
 
Still, Amicos treatment of the problem of the criterion highlights an important point; namely, 
Amico construes the dependence between instances and criteria as temporal in character. If that is a 
correct reading of the problem, then it seems that the problem is, after all, impossible to solve. 
However, even if it turned out that Chisholms formulation of the problem of the criterion is flawed, 
that would not show that skepticism in general is unintelligible. Moreover, it is still possible that we 
could replace Chisholms formulation with a better one. Next, I will examine the nature of the 
dependence between criteria and instances in Chisholms formulation of the problem of the 
criterion.  
 
2.6. Priority in the Problem of the Criterion 
 
As we stated, Chisholm understands the problem of the criterion in terms of the following skeptical 
argument: 
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Question A: What do we know? 
Question B: How are we to decide whether we know? 
1. You cannot answer question A until you have answered question B. 
2. You cannot answer question B until you have answered question A.  
3. Therefore, you cannot answer either question. 
 
The above argument relies heavily on the notion of priority, or dependence, between instances and 
criteria. The problem of the criterion is created, since we should have both criteria prior to instances 
and instances prior to criteria. Thus, we can reformulate the above argument as follows: 
 
1. Criteria are prior to instances. 
2. Instances are prior to criteria. 
3. Therefore, both criteria and instances are unattainable.  
 
Now, the central question is how we should understand the notion of priority in the argument. 
Temporal reading of priority is at least quite obvious; priority in Chisholms skeptical argument 
means nothing more than that criteria are temporally prior to instances, and that instances are 
temporally prior to criteria. As mentioned above, Amico understands the dependence between 
criteria and instances as temporal, and then he proceeds to argue that Chisholms formulation of the 
problem of the criterion is, in principle, insoluble, and thus it should be simply ignored. Indeed, 
Chisholms language strongly suggests that the temporal understanding is faithful to Chisholms 
original text. For example, he states the skeptical paradox in temporal terms  we cannot answer 
question A until we have answered question B, and we cannot answer question B until we have 
answered question A.152  
 
However, there are at least two problems with the temporal reading. Firstly, temporal reading 
precludes the possibility of coherentism as a solution to the problem of the criterion. As we have 
seen, coherentists argue that there is a mutual interdependence between instances and criteria. 
However, such interdependence is not possible if the priority between instances and criteria is 
temporal in character. In temporal reading, coherentism would amount to the impossible view that 
both instances are temporally prior to criteria and criteria are temporally prior to instances. Thus, in 
order to make coherentism even a possible solution, we should not understand priority as temporal. 
Incidentally, if Chisholm really intended that the dependence between criteria and instances should 
be understood as temporal, it explains why he does not consider coherentism at all. For, in temporal 
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reading, coherentism is not a possible view and hence it can be properly ignored. Secondly, we can 
call into question the whole idea of temporal priority between criteria and instances. In the first 
place, why should we accept the skeptics claim that criteria are temporally prior to criteria, and 
vice versa? It can be admitted that there might be some sort of dependence between criteria and 
instances, but it is not temporal in character. For instance, it could be claimed that the truth of 
instances depends upon the truth of some specific criterion; thus, the criterion is epistemically prior 
to instances. Now, in this kind of understanding of priority, the question about the temporal order of 
instances and criteria is wholly irrelevant. According to this kind of atemporal understanding of 
priority, Chisholms skeptical argument should be formulated as follows:  
 
1. Criteria are epistemically dependent upon instances. 
2. Instances are epistemically dependent upon criteria. 
3. Therefore, both criteria and instances are unattainable. 
 
However, the above argument is clearly invalid. If criteria are dependent upon instances and vice 
versa, it does not prevent us from acquiring both. For example, coherentists accept both premises 1 
and 2, but they also hold that we can attain knowledge due to the mutual interdependence between 
instances and criteria. The conclusion follows from the premises only if epistemic interdependence 
between criteria and instances is forbidden. Accordingly, the dependence between criteria and 
instances should be defined as asymmetric, i.e. it should be claimed both that (i) criteria are 
epistemically dependent upon instances, and instances do not depend upon criteria, and that (ii) 
instances are epistemically dependent upon criteria, and criteria do not depend upon instances. This 
is also the argument Cling formulates as a restatement of Chisholms account of the problem of the 
criterion. Cling holds that, in a plausible version of the problem of the criterion, priority between 
criteria and instances should be understood both as an atemporal and asymmetric relation. However, 
he does not provide any argument for this.153  
 
The implausibility of Chisholms skeptical argument, whether the priority between instances and 
criteria is understood as temporal or atemporal and asymmetric relation, is becoming visible. In 
other words, the premises of his skeptical argument are questionable. First of all, why should we 
accept the skeptics claim that criteria and instances are temporally dependent on each other? On 
the other hand, if the dependence is understood as an atemporal relation, the additional demand of 
asymmetry between criteria and instances seems to be unjustified. In fact, the whole idea that the 
dependence between criteria and instances presents us a serious skeptical problem begins to seem 
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implausible, even ridiculously so. Why cannot we admit that criteria depend, somehow, on 
instances, and vice versa, but we can still attain both? Where is the big skeptical problem supposed 
to be? In conclusion, Chisholms formulation of the problem of the criterion is flawed. Chisholms 
skeptical argument is not a paradox he intended it to be. Paradoxes are arguments that consist of 
plausible and intuitively acceptable premises, yet end up with unintuitive conclusions. As we have 
seen, the premises of Chisholms skeptical argument are not plausible. It does not matter whether 
Chisholm intended the dependence between criteria and instances to be read as a temporal or 
atemporal relation, for, as shown above, both ways are faulty. What we need is a better formulation 
of the problem of the criterion. The next main chapter will show that such a formulation can be 




Chisholm formulates the problem of the criterion with the help of the questions A, What do we 
know?, and B, How are we to decide whether we know? The skeptic claims that we cannot 
answer either question without dogmatically presupposing an answer to the other question, and, 
therefore, we do not know anything. Particularists presuppose an answer to A, on the basis of which 
they formulate general criteria, and methodists, in turn, proceed the other way around. Chisholm 
favors the particularist approach to the problem of the criterion, even though he admits that the 
problem has no answer. 
 
None of the solutions offered to the problem proved to be successful. To start with methodism, it is 
hard to see how anyone could pick out the correct epistemic principles just out of the blue prior to 
having any instances. The particularist approach  starting from alleged instances of knowledge  
seems to be more plausible than methodism, but the crucial problem is that how we could determine 
which beliefs belong to the pool of knowledge. Representatives of different forms of particularism 
can only insist on their chosen samples amounting to knowledge, but dogmatic insistence cannot 
solve anything, least the fundamental problem of the criterion. The hybrid form of methodism and 
particularism, a sort of coherentism, cannot escape from the charge of circularity, and, furthermore, 
coherence or the state of wide reflective equilibrium seem to be too demanding conceptions of 
knowledge. The problem is that it is hard to tell when we have reached the celestial sanctuary, our 
belief systems being in the state of wide reflective equilibrium. And yet, even perfect coherence is 
not truth-conferring.  
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Amico tried to solve the puzzle of the diallelus by claiming that it is a pseudoproblem, like the task 
of squaring a circle. However, Amicos dissolution fails, since it implies that various other 
philosophical problems should also be dismissed as pseudoproblems. Moreover, skepticism is a 
serious philosophical problem that certainly cannot be treated as a pseudoproblem. Nevertheless, 
Amicos discussion raised an important point about the nature of the dependence between criteria 
and instances in Chisholms formulation of the problem of the criterion. A closer look at the notion 
of dependence revealed that Chisholms account is seriously flawed. A temporal reading of the 
dependence precludes the possibility of coherentism and is implausible also in other respects. An 
atemporal reading, in turn, renders the skeptical argument considerably weak, since now the 
argument contains the questionable assumption that epistemic dependence is asymmetric. 
Asymmetricalness could be defended with further arguments, but, arguably, they could not make 
the skeptical argument as intuitive as it should be in order to be a skeptical paradox. Put simply, 
Chisholms account of the problem of the criterion has become too weak to be an interesting and 
challenging skeptical argument. However, that does not imply that skepticism is defeated, for 
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3. THE PYRRHONIAN PROBLEM 
 
In this chapter, I study the ancient formulation of the problem of the criterion. Before going into the 
details of this skeptical argument  i.e. the diallelus  I will describe at some length Pyrrhonism and 
its central features. Although I could have isolated the ancient account of the diallelus from its 
general Pyrrhonian context, I see it useful to shed light over the context too. Consequently, we are 
able to get some kind of picture of skepticism in general, which, I think, is needed, especially 
because Chisholm does not discuss the features of skepticism at all. My main source in 
understanding Pyrrhonian skepticism is Sextus Empiricus Outlines of Pyrrhonism, comprising 
three books and written sometime in the late second century154. I start by describing the Pyrrhonian 
system in general, including the Ten Modes, an ancient collection of skeptical arguments. Being 
familiar with the Ten Modes, it is easier to penetrate into the Five Modes, the heart of Pyrrhonism. 
By considering the Five Modes we are finally able to formulate and comprehend the ancient version 
of the problem of the criterion. With an understanding of the ancient version I can compare it with 
Chisholms version of the problem, bringing out the affinities and differences. The chapter is closed 
by considering some problems gnawing at skepticism.  
 
3.1. A General Introduction to Pyrrhonism 
 
3.1.1. The Historical Background 
 
The ancient Greece has given birth to two main strands of skepticism, one originating from and 
named after Pyrrho of Elis (ca.360 BC-ca.270 BC) and the other developed under Platos 
Academy.155 Pyrrho of Elis is considered to be the first genuine skeptic, and Sextus writes that 
Pyrrho appears to us to have attached himself to scepticism more systematically and conspicuously 
than anyone before him156. Pyrrho wrote nothing that we know of and little is known of him. For 
the present context, however, it suffices to note that he is the founder and eponym of Pyrrhonian 
skepticism.157 Modern understanding of Pyrrhonian skepticism is mainly dependent on the works of 
Sextus Empiricus  who lived in the second century AD  for the simple reason that he is the only 
Pyrrhonian whose works still exist today.158 Three works of Sextus have survived to the present 
day; the aforementioned Outlines of Pyrrhonism and two other, distinct works  compiled from five 
and six books  yet with the identical title, Against the Mathematicians. It is worth mentioning that 
Sextus was mostly a copyist; he was concerned to assemble and rearrange skeptical and Pyrrhonian 
material available to him. Sextus practice was common among ancient scholars, thus partly 
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explaining his habit of relying on the skeptical tradition and copying from earlier sources.159 
However, Sextus works compile and sum up the arguments of the skeptical tradition of some five 
hundred years. It is an admirable achievement, to say the least.160 
 
The most important figures behind Sextus are Aenesidemus and Agrippa. The former lived in the 
first half of the first century BC, started his philosophical career in Platos Academy, but resigned. 
Aenesidemus was, however, determined to resurrect skepticism under the name of Pyrrho. 
Aenesidemus wrote Pyrrhonian Discources that unfortunately have not survived to the present day. 
However, Discources are a direct antecedent of Sextus Outlines, and Aenesidemus can be credited 
with being the author, or the compiler, of the Ten Modes that dominate the first book of Outlines of 
Pyrrhonism.161 The other prominent figure, Agrippa, flourished after Aenesidemus approximately 
in the beginning of the Common Era. It is a widely shared assumption among the scholars that 
Agrippa is the author, or the compiler, of the most powerful skeptical weaponry to be found in the 
Outlines, the Five Modes. Although only minimal space is devoted to the description of the Five 
Modes, especially when compared to that of the Ten, as for their philosophical significance the Five 
Modes have no rival.162  
 
As Sextus draws on several sources, it affects the coherence of the Outlines, namely, the work 
contains various inconsistencies. Some of them may be only apparent and can be explained away. 
However, the common danger in interpreting historical works or compendia such as the Outlines is 
to try to see coherence where is none. Thus, we should bear in mind that if a passage in the Outlines 
does not make sense, the fault is not necessarily in our understanding but in the original text. 
Moreover, it is hard to say whether modern interpretations of Pyrrhonism are accurate 
reconstructions of the original, for the simple reason that ancient Pyrrhonism changed its form and 
content from author to author and from time to time. Sextus had his own conception of Pyrrhonism, 
Pyrrho himself had another kind, and modern interpreters form still another kind. Exegesis of 
ancient texts has its own problems, and maybe some of them can be bypassed by concentrating on a 
specific part of a text, at least that is what I will do by focusing on the Five Modes of Agrippa. Next 
I characterize the general features of Pyrrhonian skepticism, but before that I wish to quote Jonathan 
Barnes on the significance of the Agrippan forms, i.e. the Five Modes: 
 
But I claim three things for my circumscribed subject. First, and exegetically: that the forms and 
structures [i.e. the Five Modes] I discuss were among the most important aspects of Pyrrhonism, so that to 
study them is to study the soul of ancient scepticism. Secondly, and historically: that these same forms 
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and structures have had a unique influence on the subsequent history of sceptical enquiry, and hence, 
more generally, on the history of epistemology or the enquiry into the nature and scope of human 
knowledge: the Agrippan forms lie at the heart of the western philosophical tradition. Thirdly, and 
philosophically: that these forms and structures remain today among the central issues in the theory of 
knowledge; that every modern epistemologist must take notice of them; and that they still provide the 
subject of epistemology with some of its most cunning and most obdurate problems.163 
 
In my study I leave Barnes first claim as it is; if the claim is true, all the better for my study, and if 
false, it does not have an effect on the central claims of my study. As far as Barnes second and 
third claim are concerned, in turn, I hope that my study provides strong evidence in favor of their 
truth. 
 
3.1.2. The Accounts Constitutive of Pyrrhonian Skepticism 
 
The following passage from Sextus nicely summarizes the chief features of Pyrrhonian skepticism: 
 
For Sceptics began to do philosophy in order to decide among appearances and to apprehend which are 
true and which false, so as to become tranquil; but they came upon equipollent dispute, and being unable 
to decide this they suspended judgment. And when they suspended judgement, tranquillity in matters of 
opinion followed fortuitously.164  
 
The passage reveals the ultimate aim of Pyrrhonists, viz. tranquility. And that does not sound a very 
epistemological goal, to say the least. However, Pyrrhonists are driven by the hope of becoming 
tranquil165. So the question arises as to how peace of mind or tranquility and the search for truth 
are connected to each other? The logic behind this line of thought seems to be that attaining truth 
calms the mind; if we are uncertain whether certain statement or argument is true or false, this 
puzzles the mind, but truth, in contrast, has the power to calm down our perplexed souls.166 Now, 
Pyrrhonists conclude that we cannot determine which appearances are true and which false, which 
result, fortunately though, leads to the original goal of tranquility. The ideal of tranquility, i.e. 
ataraxia, is said to have been championed by Pyrrho, who achieved this freedom from disquiet with 
his total lack of commitment and, thus, by living without beliefs.167  
 
Tranquility is said to follow from suspension of judgment, i.e. epoché. Suspension of judgment is 
a central concept for skeptics, defined by Sextus as a standstill of the intellect, owing to which we 
neither reject nor posit anything168. Everyone suspends judgment about something; for example, I 
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suspend judgment about the matter of whether the number of stars is even or odd. Pyrrhonian 
skeptics, however, suspend judgment about everything. This also distinguishes them from the so-
called Dogmatists and Academian skeptics. According to Sextus, Dogmatists claim that they have 
discovered truth, whereas Academian skeptics claim that truth cannot be attained, but the real 
skeptics, that is, the Pyrrhonists, have not yet formed opinion about the matter and, thus, they end 
up in a global suspension of judgment169. Academian skeptics are dogmatic when they claim that 
we do not know anything, and, first of all, how could they possibly know such a thing? Pyrrhonists 
are skeptics in the true meaning of the word, for they open-mindedly continue the search for 
truth170, just as the Greek word for skeptic suggests, being a cognate with the word inquirer171.   
 
It is understandable, and even advisably rational, to suspend judgment about, for instance, the 
number of stars, but why suppose, as the skeptics172 seem to do, that epoché is the preferable option 
in every issue? As stated in the opening passage173 of this section, suspension of judgment follows 
from the situation of equipollence that manifests the inability to decide which appearances are true 
and which false. Now the idea is that we are faced with equipollent dispute every time we try to 
discover the truth of a matter; the reasons for and against are of equal weight, and, thus, we cannot 
decide on the matter. Sextus defines equipollence as equality with regard to being convincing or 
unconvincing: none of the conflicting accounts takes precedence over any other as being more 
convincing174. Suspension of judgment occurs through opposing of things175 that forms the basis of 
the following chief principle of skepticism: 
 
The chief constitutive principle of scepticism is the claim that to every account an equal account is 
opposed; for it is from this, we think, that we come to hold no beliefs.176  
 
The obvious problem with this chief principle is that it strikes me as simply false. I cannot see how 
to my beliefs, for example, that Two plus two equals four, The sky appears as blue to me, and 
Something exists equal accounts are opposed. Someone could definitely disagree with me and 
claim that my beliefs are false, but it is harder to see how she could provide me with opposing 
claims that would have equal evidential strength as my initial beliefs. The mistake here is, 
according to some authors, that we are interpreting Pyrrhonists as epistemologists, as theorists who 
adopt epoché out of rational caution.177 However, it could be argued that the Pyrrhonian skeptics 
end up in suspension of judgment because of their psychological disposition to be unable to settle 
the truth of any issue.178 Moreover, the skeptics are skilled in such a way that, to any presented 
account, they are always able to find an opposing account, which situation equals to equipollence 
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and, thus, induces suspension of judgment and afterwards tranquility. As Sextus writes, 
summarizing skepticism as follows: 
 
Scepticism is an ability to set out oppositions among things which appear and are thought of in any way 
at all, an ability by which, because of the equipollence in the opposed objects and accounts, we come first 
to suspension of judgment and afterwards to tranquility.179  
 
So far we have got a rather curious, even mystical, picture of the ancient skepticism of a Pyrrhonian 
sect: right from the start, they aim for the divine state of tranquility that is obtained through a 
special ability to see oppositions everywhere, thus, being unable to settle the truth of any issue. We 
can grant the sacred quest for tranquility for Pyrrhonists and their followers, but, epistemologically 
speaking, their account of skepticism seems to be rather uninteresting and trivial if it can be labeled 
as skepticism at all anymore. Moreover, their philosophy seems to be dogmatic, as they claim that 
to every account there is an opposed account, thus, a global suspension of belief follows.180 Sextus 
even has an ingenious back-up move, should it happen that a countering argument were not 
available at the time. It is after all always possible that a countering argument for the presented view 
exists even if it is not yet apparent to us. Because of the possibility of a counter-argument, we 
should not assent to now seemingly powerful argument.181 This strategy removes the bother of 
presenting an actual counter-argument, for it suffices to appeal to the claim that Possibly, to every 
argument an opposing argument exists; hence, I suspend judgment about the present matter.      
 
However, as Barnes points out182, Sextus mentions in several places that the suspension of 
judgment is valid only up to now183. Thus, nothing excludes, in principle, the attainment of 
knowledge and rebuttal of skepticism in the future. Moreover, to make Pyrrhonism philosophically 
more interesting, we should treat equipollence as an epistemic term, and not just as a psychological 
disposition that enables one to see opposing accounts everywhere. Understood epistemically, 
equipollence amounts to a principle of rational reasoning; if there are equally convincing reasons 
for and against some proposition p, then we should suspend judgment about the truth of p. An 
obvious application of equipollence is a disagreement between persons over some proposition, and 
it will be discussed more closely in section 3.2.2.  
 
In a nutshell, the skeptics claim to be open-minded inquirers willing to find the truth of matters. 
Having not yet found the truth of any issue, they suspend judgment, which, by a lucky coincidence, 
makes them tranquil. The suspension of judgment is acquired through equipollence, the situation of 
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equally convincing but opposing reasons. Nevertheless, if we cannot attain equipollence with 
respect to any and every account  that is, if we lack the ability to set out oppositions among things 
 the skeptics have other means to induce us to suspend judgment too.184 The most powerful ones 
are the Five Modes of Agrippa. Before turning to them, we must consider their kin of lesser power, 
the Ten Modes. 
 
3.2. The Ten Modes 
 
The Ten Modes, also known as the Ten Tropes, are a collection of arguments that are thought to 
induce us to suspend judgment. Thus, the Ten Modes work as general skeptical strategies. The 
arguments the modes deliver differ with respect to their plausibility, but they share some common 
features. In my opinion, the most striking feature shared by the modes is the alleged gap between 
our appearances and the reality in itself. The Pyrrhonists investigate whether existing things are 
such as they appear185. We can say how things appear to us, but not what kind of entities they 
really are. For example, honey appears sweet, but we should suspend judgment about whether it 
actually is sweet.186 The Ten Modes try to establish through various examples that, indeed, the real 
nature of things is unknown to us. We can only say how things appear to us, but merely basing on 
the appearances we cannot tell how things really are. Thus, there seems to be an unbridgeable gap 
between appearances and the reality. In my view, the Ten Modes challenge primarily our alleged 
empirical knowledge that is based on the reports, i.e. appearances, of our senses. It is only after we 
have considered the Five Modes that we begin to see the global character of Pyrrhonian skepticism. 
However, the distinction between appearances and reality is important and it is not restricted to 
senses alone. Arguably, the distinction is perfectly general and it applies to everything. For 
example, also an argument can appear valid, but we cannot tell whether it really is valid. 
Furthermore, the Pyrrhonists are not committed to postulate some kinds of mediating entities 
between observers and observed objects.187  
 
The Ten Modes consist of, as the label suggests, ten arguments and each argument contains varying 
examples aimed to establish some specific conclusion. The arguments have different subject matters 
 for example, the first mode concerns the variation among the sense organs of animals, whereas the 
fourth mode concerns the effect different circumstances have on a perceivers appearances  and 
each one of them concludes that we should suspend judgment about the subject matter. The modes 
originate from the ancient skeptics, and it is most likely that the ten arguments listed in the Outlines 
of Pyrrhonism are the most important arguments used by the ancient skeptics prior to the time of 
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Agrippa and the introduction of the skeptical compound argument known as the Five Modes. 
Usually the Ten Modes are ascribed to Aenesidemus, but it is controversial whether his list of 
arguments was the same in number and in content as Sextus.188 As Gisela Striker suggests, it is 
probable that at those times there were many lists of skeptical arguments available and most of them 
contained ten arguments, but the exact number of arguments and especially their order can be 
considered to be irrelevant189. Also Sextus notes, with typical Pyrrhonian caution, that there may be 
more modes than those he describes, and the ones given may be unsound190. 
 
Next I will examine the general features of the modes. First, I discuss the modes as establishing 
suspension of judgment on the basis of the variety of appearances among different perceivers. Then, 
it is shown that on the basis of the variety of appearances we can formulate a specific argument 
establishing also suspension of judgment; the variety of appearances leads to disagreement, i.e. 
undecided dispute, which is sufficient to establish epoché. Finally, I separately consider the eighth 
mode that is based on relativity.  
 
3.2.1. The Variety of Appearances 
 
To repeat, the Ten Modes are meant to induce us to suspend judgment, but how this should exactly 
happen, is not fully explicated. In other words, Sextus does not provide us with a specific argument 
that shows how the modes lead to epoché.191 Thus, when we are offering such arguments on behalf 
of Sextus within our interpretations, we should bear in mind that our arguments, as neat and 
coherent they can be, are not necessarily faithful reconstructions of the original text and its intended 
meanings. 
 
Most of the Ten Modes rely on the thought that different species different appearances of the same 
object conflict with the veridicality of the appearances; since the appearances are often 
contradicting each other, all of them cannot be true. However, appearances are our only evidence of 
the nature of the external objects, but if we cannot rely on the evidence of our senses, then we 
should remain silent about the real nature of the external objects.  
 
In the first mode, Sextus describes how different animals receive, supposedly, differing and even 
opposing appearances depending on the different constitutions of the animals bodies and sense 
organs.192 For example, those animals with nocturnal sight have certainly different appearances 
from those we have at night.193 In the second mode, Sextus turns to consider the differences among 
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humans.194 Some of us find, for example, wine pleasant while others do not, and some of us are not 
harmed by insects fatal to others.195 And what comes to our intellect, there are, among the 
Dogmatists, myriad disputes about infinitely many issues.196 In the third mode that will be 
examined in more detail than the previous two, Sextus considers the differences our senses produce 
of objects.197 Different senses produce differing appearances of the same object, and it is hard to say 
whether the object in question really has all or none of those qualities our senses ascribe to it. As 
Sextus writes: 
 
Each of the objects of perception which appears to us seems to impress us in a variety of ways  for 
example, an apple is smooth, fragrant, sweet, and yellow. It is unclear, then, whether in reality it has these 
qualities alone, or has only one quality but appears different depending on the different constitution of 
sense-organs, or actually has more qualities than those which are apparent, some of them not making an 
impression on us.198 
 
Senses report the same object in different ways, and even though the reports of the senses are not 
logically exclusive, the point is that the senses disagree with one another199. It is certainly 
possible that our senses report truthfully the qualities of external objects, but it is also possible that 
there is no correspondence whatsoever between our appearances and the reality.200 Again, a 
skeptical conclusion closes in on us: 
 
So if it is possible that only those qualities exist in the apple which we think we grasp, and that there are 
more than them, and again that there are not even those which make an impression on us, then it will be 
unclear to us what the apple is like. 
The same argument applies to the other objects of perception too. But if the senses do not 
apprehend external objects, the intellect is not able to apprehend them either (since its guides fail it), so 
by means of this argument too we shall be thought to conclude to suspension of judgement about external 
existing objects.201 
 
Thus, Sextus has attacked our alleged empirical knowledge. Accordingly, senses provide us only 
with appearances that can be misleading, and even reason must remain silent, for it does not 
perceive the external world and it is, therefore, dependent on the evidence of the senses. We can 
summarize the general form of the Ten Modes through the following Argument from the Variety of 
Appearances: 
 
(1) The same things produce differing appearances in us (and, arguably, in animals too).  
(2) We cannot tell which appearances, if any, are true. 
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Therefore, 
(3) We can tell how things appear to us, but we must suspend judgment about their real nature.202 
 
Sextus discussion of the Ten Modes is mostly devoted to establishing the first premise of the above 
argument. Various examples are given, all in order to show that contraries appear to hold of the 
same thing203. The first premise can be accepted as it stands, for certainly the same object can 
produce different appearances due to, for example, changing circumstances. Thus, it is the second 
premise that is crucial with regard to the plausibility of the skeptical conclusion. First of all, it is 
important to note that it is assumed in the second premise that not all of the conflicting appearances 
can be true together. Otherwise, as Sextus writes, we would be attempting the impossible and 
accepting opposed views204. As the principle of contradiction states, propositions p and ~p cannot 
be both true at the same time. Another assumption seems to be that the alleged real nature of things 
applies to them, more or less, permanently. Otherwise the changing appearances could be explained 
away by assuming respective changes in the nature of the things.205  
 
However, the second premise is problematic for the reason that it seems to be too dogmatic; it is 
biased in favor of the skeptic right from the start. As it stands now, the second premise seems to 
suggest that it is even in principle impossible to tell whether particular appearance is true. It is as if 
the dispute about the veridicality of our appearances is determined to be in principle undecidable. 
This would be quite a strong interpretation of Pyrrhonism, making it almost a form of Academian 
skepticism, in which it was commonplace to make claims about the unknowability of things. And, 
indeed, there are, as Barnes points out, passages in Sextus that support this kind of strong 
interpretation206. However, Barnes argues, and I will follow him, that the key term here, anepikritos 
diaphōnia, should be understood as an undecided dispute, implying, thus, that the dispute in 
question  for example, about the veridicality of appearances  might be resolved in the future207. 
Therefore, the second premise of our argument should be modified with the following revised 
second premise: 
 
(2*) The dispute about the veridicality of appearances is, up to now, undecided. 
 
3.2.2. The Argument from Disagreement 
 
The Ten Modes, save the eighth mode that concerns relativity, can be said to fundamentally concern 
the question of whether we can say how things really are.208 Then, various examples are offered in 
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order to show that our appearances of things differ. Now, it could be claimed that due to the 
different appearances of the same things we cannot decide what the real nature of things is. That 
was the skeptical strategy set forth as the Argument from The Variety of Appearances. 
Alternatively, it could also be claimed that since there are different appearances of the same things, 
there is a disagreement over the real nature of things. Moreover, it is claimed that we cannot, up to 
now, solve the disagreement, for the different views pertaining to the dispute are just as convincing, 
i.e. they are of equal strength. In other words, the situation equals to that of equipollence and, 
hence, suspension of judgment should follow. In a nutshell, the modes are meant to induce 
suspension of judgment through equipollence of reasons that is achieved by showing that the 
disagreement over the matter in question cannot be decided, since opposing views are equally 
convincing.209 This skeptical strategy based on disagreement or undecided dispute, can also be 
stated as the following Argument from Disagreement: 
 
(1) In a debate, if the contrary views of the disputants are equally convincing, they should suspend 
judgment about the debated matter.  
(2a) S1 claims that p with respect to the matter in question. 
(2b) S2 claims that ~p with respect to the matter in question. 
(3) Both views, p and ~p, are equally convincing and both of them cannot be true. 
Therefore, 
(4) S1 and S2 should suspend judgment about p. 
 
The above argument formalizes the simplest possible situation of controversy, that of only two 
disputants who hold contrary views. The mode from disagreement could also be applied to a 
situation of several competing claims. The mode works similarly with respect to several disputants 
as with respect to just two disputants; it is stated that all of the competing claims are equally 
convincing, and all of them cannot be simultaneously true, thus, through the equipollent situation 
the disputants should end up with suspension of judgment with respect to the matter in question.  
 
Barnes suggests that a genuine disagreement is obtained when we have competing opinions that 
consist of meaningful and incompatible propositions. The logical relation of incompatibility 
between competing propositions forms the heart of a disagreement, but the requirement that a 
disagreement is a relation between opinions, implies that the controversy is an actual dispute 
between two or more persons. Two contrary propositions are not explicitly in disagreement until 
they are brought up as rival opinions as parts of a same debate.210 However, I think that it is not 
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necessary to have two persons to bring about a disagreement. Competing propositions can conflict, 
so to say, within a single person. Actually, it is quite an ordinary situation when I have contrary 
claims over an issue, and if I find the claims equally convincing, I suspend judgment about the 
issue. Arguably most of the modes work in the same way; Sextus describes how there are differing 
opinions or appearances of some issue or object, and it is on that basis we, the unbiased observers of 
the disagreement, should suspend judgment. In other words, the equipollence of reasons is 
established by us who weigh up the competing accounts and find them equal.  
 
Finally, a word of caution is in place. To specify, there is a danger to over-intellectualize the Ten 
Modes if we interpret them as fundamentally reflecting the above two arguments, Argument from 
the Variety of Appearances and Argument from Disagreement. Especially as far as the latter 
argument is concerned, I am not sure at all whether we should interpret all of the examples in the 
Ten Modes as meant to induce suspension of judgment through equipollence of reasons. Many 
examples in the modes are quite simple and even naive, and it may be too far-fetched to claim that 
the examples share the structure of the Argument from Disagreement, or even the structure of the 
Argument from the Variety of Appearances. The most that can be safely said is that the examples 
satisfy the first premise of the Argument from the Variety of Appearances, reading The same 
things produce differing appearances in us. Of course we can interpret the examples as following 
the form of the Argument from Disagreement, but I want to point out that the text in itself does not 
explicitly determine how we ought to arrive at suspension of judgment from the variety of 
appearances that is established in the examples. Sure, pointing to the equipollence of reasons is one 
possible answer, but I am inclined to think that the Outlines of Pyrrhonism contains variety of 
methods meant to induce us to suspend judgment. Just stating naive examples of differing 
appearances of the same object can convince some of us to end up in epoché, yet others need to be 
convinced by showing that the reasons for and against the subject matter are equally convincing, 
thus, equipollence of reasons is manifested. The Ten Modes contain variety of skeptical strategies  
even the most powerful weaponry of the Modes of Agrippa is appealed to here and there211. One of 




The eighth of the Ten Modes concerns relativity, and the following passage quotes the crucial parts 
of it: 
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The eighth mode is the one deriving from relativity, by which we conclude that, since everything is 
relative, we shall suspend judgement as to what things are independently and in their nature. It should be 
recognized that here, as elsewhere, we use is loosely, in the sense of appears, implicitly saying 
Everything appears relative. 
But this has two senses: first, relative to the subject judging (for the external existing object 
which is judged appears relative to the subject judging), and second, relative to the things observed 
together with it (as right is relative to left).212 [...] 
So, since we have established in this way that everything is relative, it is clear that we shall 
not be able to say what each existing object is like in its own nature and purely, but only what it appears 
to be like relative to something. It follows that we must suspend judgement about the nature of objects.213 
 
It is noteworthy that right from the start of the eighth mode Sextus points out that the skeptics 
should not be confused with relativists. Relativists claim that everything is relative, whereas the 
skeptics only refer to their respective appearance of everythings relativity.214 Sextus refers to 
relativity also elsewhere in the Ten Modes215, and it certainly is a different method from the method 
based on disagreement, both of which are, however, meant to induce epoché. The mode of relativity 
works almost like the Argument from the Variety of Appearances; this time the variety among 
appearances leads us to say that everything appears as it appears relative to something or someone. 
Furthermore, if appearances are always relative to the subject perceiving, we cannot say how things 
really are in their nature, since there is no shared, universal, and objective point of view.  
 
In addition to relativity with respect to the unavoidable subjectivity of each individuals viewpoint, 
Sextus speaks of relativity with respect to attributes of things. For example, something is big or 
small depending on the point of comparison. Moreover, relational attributes do not tell us anything 
about the things in themselves, for the relational attributes are ascribed to things by virtue of their 
relations to other things. Relational attributes can change without a change in the thing itself. For 
instance, my hand is big in comparison to an ants leg, but small with respect to a whales fin; 
altogether, there is a change in an attribute ascribed to my hand without a change in my hand. Now 
we can formulate the following Argument from Relativity: 
 
(1) Everything perceived or apprehended is so with respect to (a) someone  which highlights the 
subjectivity of viewpoints  or to (b) something  which highlights the relativity of attributes 
ascribed to things. 
(2a) Appearances and judgments are always someones appearances or judgments, and, thus, they 
do not belong to the real nature of things.  
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(2b) Relational attributes do not belong to things in themselves. 
Therefore, 
(3) We can tell how things appear relative to us or relative to something, but we must suspend 
judgment about their real nature.216 
 
In his general introduction to the Ten Modes, Sextus claims that relativity is the most general 
mode.217 This is, however, puzzling, since Sextus also holds that equipollence is the most prominent 
skeptical strategy. Striker suggests that equipollence  manifested, for example, in the Argument 
from Disagreement  is the most important skeptical strategy in the Ten Modes, and that the mode 
of relativity is included in Sextus writings merely because it was a prevalent skeptical strategy, 
used even before the times of Pyrrho. Furthermore, the mode of disagreement is clearly more 
promising and better skeptical argument than that of relativity. The mode of relativity threatens to 
be dogmatic, since from the relativity of appearances it is straightforwardly concluded that we 
cannot know the real nature of things. The mode of disagreement seems to be more neutral, stating, 
in effect, that if there is a controversy over some matter and opposing views are equally plausible, 
then we should suspend judgment. Moreover, the mode of disagreement applies not only to the 
appearances of senses, but to conflicting theoretical views or arguments too, unlike the mode of 
relativity, witnessing to the better feasibility of the former skeptical strategy.218  
 
The burning question now is whether the modes of disagreement and relativity set forth plausible 
skeptical arguments. Objections seem pressing, for, firstly, normally we are not convinced that a 
disagreement is a mark of undecided dispute that should lead us to suspend judgment about the 
issue under discussion. Quite the contrary, usually we are convinced that one of the disputing 
parties is wrong, and we are ready to argue for the view we see as the most plausible or true. For 
example, we would not accept at face value Sextus argument that since senses disagree with each 
other, we cannot have knowledge of the external world. We could argue, for instance, that generally 
perception is a reliable source of information about the external world, and, furthermore, reason is 
capable of correcting the possible misleading information senses can provide. Secondly, we can 
grant for Sextus his view that everything appears relative, for we can oppose his view simply by 
saying that the world appears quite differently to us, namely it seems to be a fact about the world 
that everything is not relative, that we know various things, and that the Ten Modes of skepticism 
seem to be quite ridiculous. For us, skeptics about the power of skepticism, Sextus has more potent 
drugs to cure us from the serious dogmatism we are infected with219. The most powerful of them is 
the Five Modes. 
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3.3. The Five Modes 
 
The Five Modes are meant, just as the Ten Modes, to induce us to suspend judgment. Furthermore, 
these modes are perfectly general, for, as Sextus writes, every object of investigation can be 
referred to these modes220. As said before, Agrippa is presumably the author, or the compiler, of 
these modes and thus they are often referred to as the Agrippan Modes.221 The modes include those 
of disagreement or dispute, infinite regress, relativity, hypothesis or arbitrary assumption, and 
circularity or reciprocity. Sextus describes them as follows: 
 
According to [1] the mode deriving from dispute, we find that undecidable dissension about the matter 
proposed has come about both in ordinary life and among philosophers. Because of this we are not able 
either to choose or to rule out anything, and we end up with suspension of judgement. In [2] the mode 
deriving from infinite regress, we say that what is brought forward as a source of conviction for the matter 
proposed itself needs another such source, which itself needs another, and so ad infinitum, so that we have 
no point from which to begin to establish anything, and suspension of judgement follows. In [3] the mode 
deriving from relativity, as we said above, the existing object appears to be such-and-such relative to the 
subject judging and to the things observed together with it, but we suspend judgement on what it is like in 
its nature. We have [4] the mode from hypothesis when the Dogmatists, being thrown back ad infinitum, 
begin from something which they do not establish but claim to assume simply and without proof in virtue 
of a concession. [5] The reciprocal mode occurs when what ought to be confirmatory of the object under 
investigation needs to be made convincing by the object under investigation; then, being unable to take 
either in order to establish the other, we suspend judgement about both.222  
 
Arguably, the order of the modes is not relevant.223 It is common to think that they form a 
compound argument intended to establish a global suspension of judgment. Yet many 
commentators argue that not all of the modes are equally relevant. For example, Barnes refers to the 
mode of relativity as a strange beast224, a skeptical problem interesting in itself, but not related to 
the rest of the modes. Furthermore, Barnes sees the heart of the Agrippan problem as consisting in 
the modes of hypothesis, circularity, and infinite regress.225 And he is not alone, for many scholars 
reduce the Five Modes to three and the modes of relativity and disagreement are left out as 
irrelevant.226 Each of the Five Modes can be seen as independent argument-forms although, as 
many commentators see the matter, the aforementioned three of them together form the ultimate 
skeptical argument lying at the core of Pyrrhonian skepticism. Although the modes of relativity and 
disagreement are clearly represented already in the Ten Modes  thus, possibly justifying 
commentators habit of neglecting them when considering the Agrippan problem227  it should be 
noted that also the other modes occur here and there in the Ten Modes. Thus, strictly speaking, none 
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of the modes introduced in the Five Modes are novel. However, the Five Modes are special and 
unique, since they introduce the most powerful skeptical argument of Pyrrhonism, the compound 
argument of the Five Modes, that is. Furthermore, in the second and the third book of the Outlines, 
Sextus utilizes the Five Modes  never all of them at once, but some conjunctions of the quintet  
far more frequently than the Ten Modes. And that is no wonder, since, [a]s for their philosophical 
power and significance, there is no comparison: the Ten are puerile, the Five profound228.   
 
Next I will consider each of the modes of the Five Modes in turn. First, I discuss briefly the modes 
of disagreement and relativity, i.e. the so-called challenging modes, and then I move on to discuss 
the remaining three modes. 
 
3.3.1. The Challenging Modes 
 
Jonathan Fogelin suggests that the modes of disagreement and relativity challenge us to give 
grounds to our claims, opinions, or arguments.229 These challenging modes, as Fogelin calls them, 
trigger a demand for justification by revealing that there are competing claims concerning the 
nature of the world we perceive230. After the demand for justification is made, the other three 
modes enter the skeptical play by showing that all attempts to justify claims lead either to an infinite 
regress, a circular reasoning, or an arbitrary assumption.231 Thus, the challenging modes seem to be, 
after all, unnecessary, for the skeptical problem can be presented exclusively with the help of the 
three modes alone.232 Also Ernest Sosa understands the Five Modes of Agrippa as posing the 
problem of threefold choice of a beliefs justification basing on infinitely regressive reasoning, 
circular reasoning, or fundamental basic beliefs justified in themselves233. If this is the correct way 
to understand the Agrippan Modes, it is strikingly similar to the so-called regress problem. Without 
doubt, there is a connection between the Five  or three, to be precise  Modes of Agrippa and the 
regress problem, but a discussion of that relation should be postponed to the next main chapter. 
Now, however, we are interested in the problem of the criterion, and we should carefully consider 
whether the Five Modes straightforwardly lead to the regress problem or to some other kind of 
problem. 
 
To repeat, most of the Ten Modes deal with the mode of disagreement based on the variety of 
appearances that leads to the situation of equipollence. Arguably, it is exactly the same mode at 
hand here as Sextus describes the first of the Five Modes: 
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According to the mode deriving from dispute, we find that undecidable dissension about the matter 
proposed has come about both in ordinary life and among philosophers. Because of this we are not able 
either to choose or to rule out anything, and we end up with suspension of judgement.234   
 
Disagreement alone can induce epoché, but it clearly is not a necessary condition of it. In other 
words, it is surely possible to end up in suspension of judgment about some issue even if there is no 
opposing account available at that time. For example, if I read somewhere that the oldest of the 
three wise men who visited Jesus Christ was 45 years of age, I may still suspend judgment about the 
claim even though I have no opposing evidence available. It is only that I consider the available 
evidence in favor of the claims truth as remarkably weak, and, thus, suspension of judgment seems 
to be a rational cognitive act. However, disagreement is sufficient for epoché, since it is based on 
the situation of equipollence, i.e. there are equally convincing reasons for and against the truth of 
the matter in consideration. It is irrational to believe that p (or ~p) if one understands that the 
reasons for and against the truth of p are of equal strength.235 
 
Although the mode of disagreement invoked in the Ten Modes mainly with not so plausible 
examples, Sextus has, however, one interesting argument meant to invoke global skepticism with 
the mode of disagreement.236 Since there is a dispute over the criterion of truth, all of our opinions 
are called into question. In order to know some proposition, we should be able to distinguish 
between false and true propositions in general. In other words, we should be able to determine the 
criterion of truth. However, the undecided dispute about the correct criterion of truth should lead us 
to suspend judgment about the criterion, and, therefore, about everything.237 Of course, we could 
claim that in order to know, it is not necessary to know the criterion of true beliefs. This view would 
amount to particularism, and when considering the criticism of particularism we noticed that it is 
arbitrary and dogmatic to claim that we are able to pick out the samples of knowledge without use 
of any criteria.238 But pointing to flaws of particularism calls for additional and independent 
arguments, and, thus, it seems that mere disagreement over the criterion of truth does not suffice for 
invoking a global suspension of judgment. Nevertheless, the mode of disagreement has some power 
as a general skeptical strategy and it challenges us to justify any claim we make. The general moral 
of the mode of disagreement seems to be that we should take nothing for granted, for doubts might 
be raised because doubts have been raised239.  
 
Although the core of the skeptical problem found in the Five Modes can, arguably, be presented 
without the mode of disagreement, it is, historically speaking, noteworthy that the compiler of the 
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Five Modes wanted to integrate both the mode of disagreement and the mode of relativity from the 
Ten Modes to the Five Modes. This speaks in favor of the prevalence and importance of these two 
modes among the ancient skeptics.240 Even though the ancient version of the problem of the 
criterion can be stated without these two modes, it does not change the fact that the modes of 
disagreement and relativity are independent and important ways of attaining epoché.   
 
The mode of relativity appears in the middle of the Five Modes, as the third in order, and is 
described by Sextus as follows:  
 
In the mode deriving from relativity, as we said above, the existing object appears to be such-and-such 
relative to the subject judging and to the things observed together with it, but we suspend judgement on 
what it is like in its nature.241 
 
The remark as we said above refers straightly to the eighth mode of the Ten Modes, and, thus, we 
can safely assume that the mode of relativity found here in the Five Modes is the same as the one 
found in the Ten Modes. There is very little to be said about the mode of relativity with respect to 
the rest of the Five Modes, for commentators consider it as an odd chimera that just does not fit 
among the Five Modes242. But if the mode of relativity really is such an oddity, it is surprising that 
Sextus or Agrippa did not notice its peculiar nature but gullibly included it in the Five Modes. On 
the other hand, the mode of relativity is not included in Sextus discussion on the problem of 
finding the standard or criterion of truth243, suggesting, thus, that the mode of relativity was less 
crucial than the rest of the Five Modes for the ancient skeptics. Be that as it may, it is still odd that 
some scholars lump together the modes of relativity and disagreement  as kinds of challenging 
modes  considering the fact that they are most likely two separate skeptical strategies. Giving a 
common denominator for these modes, i.e. their being the challenging modes, does not remove the 
fact that scholars are still at a loss as to how to explain the relation between the two and the other 
three modes. It is common just to discard the two, not to mention them anymore, and to focus on, 
arguably, the more important modes of hypothesis, circularity, and infinite regress.     
 
3.3.2. The Mode of Infinite Regress 
 
The idea behind the mode of infinite regress is relatively simple: if someone claims to know that p, 
she should be able, then, to provide reasons for her claim that p. If she gives us a reason, say, q, that 
warrants her claim that p, she should also be able to provide reasons for her new claim q. We can 
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easily see that this procedure leads to an infinite regress of reasons, and given that no human can   
keep infinitely many reasons simultaneously in mind, the demand of justification leads to the 
conclusion that no one knows anything. Sextus describes the mode from infinite regress as follows: 
 
In the mode deriving from infinite regress, we say that what is brought forward as a source of conviction 
for the matter proposed itself needs another such source, which itself needs another, and so ad infinitum, 
so that we have no point from which to begin to establish anything, and suspension of judgement 
follows.244 
 
Barnes credits this mode as the most celebrated of all sceptical manoeuvres245, and, indeed, it 
seems that this mode from infinite regress is the progenitor of the famous regress problem discussed 
in length in contemporary epistemology.246 It is likely that Sextus did not intend that the mode of 
infinite regress would be in itself sufficient for inducing epoché. Rather, it is more plausible to 
assume that Sextus meant that we should suspend judgment about a given claim if it is based on an 
infinite regress of reasons. It is easy to see what is wrong with infinite regresses, namely no human 
can ever check all the elements of an infinite sequence of reasons. Thus, even if there were a proof 
for a given claim constituting of infinitely many reasons, it just would not be humanly possible to 
decide whether the proof is valid and sound. Therefore, it seems reasonable that infinite regress of 
reasons is not considered to be an acceptable way of defending ones claims.247 However, the so-
called infinitists disagree and they hold that beliefs can be justified via infinite regresses of reasons. 
Infinitism will be discussed more closely in section 4.4. 
 
It may seem somewhat odd that Sextus writes of the infinite regress that we have no point from 
which to begin establish anything, for it seems to be trivially clear that we start from our initial 
claim, i.e. the claim we try to defend through reasons. Thus, the problem seems to be rather that we 
have no point at which to stop.248 Usually the mode from infinite regress occurs in the Outlines as 
one among the team of other modes, witnessing to the compound nature of the Five Modes249. It 
should also be noted that the mode from infinite regress occurs already in the Ten Modes, where its 
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3.3.3. The Mode of Circularity 
 
It is widely held that circular arguments are bad arguments, and as it is already clear from the earlier 
discussion of coherentist solutions to the problem of the criterion251, circularly justified belief 
systems are not epistemically good either. The mode of circularity is already appealed to in the Ten 
Modes252, and in the Five Modes Sextus describes it as follows: 
 
The reciprocal mode occurs when what ought to be confirmatory of the object under investigation needs 
to be made convincing by the object under investigation; then, being unable to take either in order to 
establish the other, we suspend judgement about both.253 
 
In order to see what is exactly wrong with circular arguments254, let us consider an example. 
Suppose that I believe that UFOs are alien aircrafts and, when asked to state reasons for my belief, I 
answer that I have read from my own notebook that UFOs are alien aircrafts. Therefore, I believe 
that UFOs are alien aircrafts. My answer is, in a word, unsatisfactory. It is unsatisfactory because it 
is circular, for, in effect, I justify my belief with an appeal to itself. It could be said that circular 
arguments are not arguments at all, for a circular argument does not provide any reasons in favor of 
its conclusions truth and, thus, the argument proves nothing. The conclusion of a circular argument 
is supported by an appeal to itself, which is question-begging to the highest degree. Just repeating 
ones claim  although through a circular argument  certainly cannot be an acceptable way of 
defending ones claim.255   
 
It seems that circular arguments are objectionable, and similarly with respect to the mode of infinite 
regress, because they are bad arguments. If someone provides a circular argument to support ones 
claim that p, circularity is not in itself a sufficient reason to suspend judgment about the claim, but 
if the circular argument is the only reason offered for the claim that p, then we should suspend 
judgment about it. Both circular reasoning and infinite regression of reasons are rejected, because 
they represent, arguably, bad argumentation. Thus, the skeptic has definitely the upper hand if her 
opponent, when defending ones claim, is heading into a circular reasoning or an infinite regress of 
reasons.256 However, coherentists naturally claim that a belief system can be justified circularly. 
Coherentism will be discussed again in section 4.2.2.  
 
The mode of circularity can be a very powerful skeptical strategy, as illustrated in chapter 5 in 
which the problem of epistemic circularity is shown to be an extension of the mode of circularity. In 
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a nutshell, epistemic circularity comes down to the claim that the justification of the reliability of 
our cognitive faculties, such as sense perception or reasoning, is inevitably and viciously circular, 
for we cannot prove their reliability without assuming their reliability while using them. Epistemic 
circularity is one possible way of formulating the problem of the criterion, as concerning the 
validation of the reliability of our cognitive faculties. It is interesting to note that two of the Five 
Modes, the mode from infinite regress of reasons and the mode from circular reasoning, give 
impetus to two distinct and serious skeptical problems, the regress problem and epistemic 
circularity, respectively. In the Outlines, usually neither of the modes stands alone as an initiator of 
a skeptical onslaught, but they work as one among other modes, forming a team of a skeptical 
attack.257 The most powerful skeptical compound argument, the Agrippan trilemma, can be 
considered once we have examined the remaining member of the trio, the mode of hypothesis.  
 
3.3.4. The Mode of Hypothesis  
 
The central idea behind the mode from hypothesis appears already in the fifth of the Ten Modes, 
where Sextus considers the question of whether anyone is able to prefer some appearances over 
others.258 Mere statement of ones preference is not enough, for, and now the mode from hypothesis 
emerges, [i]f he makes his assertion simply and without proof, he will not be convincing259. Thus, 
the mode from hypothesis concerns the contrast between a bare assertion and offering an argument 
for ones claim; the latter can be plausible, but the former is, in principle, seriously defective. In the 
Five Modes the mode from hypothesis is described as follows: 
 
We have the mode from hypothesis when the Dogmatists, being thrown back ad infinitum, begin from 
something which they do not establish but claim to assume simply and without proof in virtue of a 
concession.260 [...] 
If to avoid this [i.e. falling prey to the Five modes] our interlocutor claims to assume 
something by way of concession and without proof in order to prove what comes next, then the 
hypothetical mode is brought in, and there is no way out. For if he is convincing when he makes his 
hypothesis, we will keep hypothesizing the opposite and will be no more unconvincing. and [sic] if he 
hypothesizes something true, he makes it suspect by taking it as a hypothesis rather than establishing it; 
while if it is false, the foundation of what he is trying to establish will be rotten.261   
 
Firstly, it seems that Sextus is claiming, in his brief description of the mode, that the mode of 
hypothesis arises only when we are already caught in the mode of infinite regress of reasons. 
However, in several other occasions Sextus uses the mode from hypothesis independently of the 
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mode from infinite regress of reasons, and, thus, it should be justified to treat the former both as an 
independent mode meant to induce epoché and as a team-member of the skeptical trilemma.262 
Secondly, and more importantly, hypotheses are epistemically useless, since we can equally 
hypothesize their opposites. If one makes the assumption that p, it is just as warranted to assume 
that ~p. Both assumptions cannot be true at the same time because they are contradictory. Thus, we 
have equally convincing but opposing accounts, and, therefore, we should suspend judgment about 
p.263  
 
It is also interesting that in the above passage Sextus uses the metaphor of foundation, for the 
mode of hypothesis offers us a powerful weapon against foundationalist theories of knowledge. 
Roughly put, foundationalists claim that some of our beliefs enjoy the status of being basic, 
meaning that they are justified in themselves and they do not require any further justification from 
other beliefs, and in addition, they form the basis, epistemic bedrock, so to say, of our belief system. 
Now, we can invoke the mode of hypothesis and assume just the opposite basic beliefs than the 
foundationalists have assumed. As basic beliefs do not need any justification, neither do our 
alternative set of basic beliefs. But now we have opposite sets of basic beliefs and, thus, we should 
suspend judgment about (which one is the correct set of) basic beliefs. If the proponent of 
foundationalism eats her words and claims that some basic beliefs are more justified than others, 
then she is offering reasons for her favorite basic beliefs, and, thus, it seems as if the basic beliefs 
need justification after all  which speaks against their being basic. Therefore, foundationalists face 
the dilemma of either falling prey to the mode of hypothesis or betraying their ideal of basic 
beliefs.264 As it became clear from the earlier discussion of Chisholms formulation of the problem 
of the criterion, both particularists and methodists propose basic beliefs in order to avoid the infinite 
regress of reasons. However, as I have already noted, both parties are guilty of arbitrariness, since 
they do not propose any reasons for their set of basics beliefs, and, therefore, any other set of basic 
beliefs is just as justified (or unjustified). Here, in this objection against particularism and 
methodism, we have the ancient mode of hypothesis effectively at work.265 Let it also be noted that 
I do not assume that the sketched objection here is decisive against foundationalist theories, but I 
think that it is, basically, a good objection. Foundationalism will be discussed in detail in section 
4.2.1.  
 
If we compare the mode of hypothesis with its fellows, the modes of circularity and infinite regress 
of reasons, we notice that the first mentioned mode is more closely connected to the goal of epoché 
than the other two. To repeat, infinite regresses and circular arguments lead to suspension of 
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judgment on the assumption that they represent bad arguments, whereas the mode from hypothesis 
does not depend on such an assumption. The mode from hypothesis works as the mode from 
disagreement, inducing suspension of judgment by a situation of equipollence. Competing 
hypotheses surely are equally strong, for they are just that, hypotheses, and, thus, they have no 
supporting arguments to back them up.266 With respect to the mode of disagreement it can be 
controversial whether the competing claims really are of equal strength, but it seems that with 
respect to the mode of hypothesis equipollence follows without question. It could be said that the 
mode of hypothesis, as it does not depend on even mildly questionable assumptions, is the most 
convincing one of the introduced skeptical modes. Moreover, the skeptical strategy of equipollence 
is prevalent and important also here in the Five Modes, as it is with respect to the Ten Modes. 
 
3.3.5. The Core of the Five Modes: The Agrippan Trilemma 
 
The philosophical core of the Five Modes is commonly thought to consist in the modes of 
hypothesis, circularity, and infinite regress of reasons. It is controversial whether this kind of 
understanding of the Five Modes does justice to the ancient Pyrrhonism, but it should be noted that 
the Five Modes occur in their original form267 nowhere in the Outlines, save the passage introducing 
them. Sometimes the modes are invoked independently of one another, but usually Sextus uses 
them in combinations, from pairs to quartets. When interpreting the Five Modes, contemporary 
epistemologists usually drop the modes of disagreement and relativity as unnecessary, and the 
remaining modes are thought to form a powerful argument for global skepticism. I interpret the 
skeptical trilemma as challenging first and foremost our claims to knowledge although the argument 
can be formulated also as concerning justified belief.  
 
The skeptical argument is purported to show that each and every one of our claims to knowledge 
falls prey either to the mode of hypothesis, circularity, or infinite regress of reasons, and, thus, we 
should suspend judgment about everything. This view equals to global skepticism. The skeptical 
argument, call it as the Agrippan Argument, is thought to work as follows:  
 
(1) If S knows that p, then S has good reasons for p.  
(2a) If S just assumes that p without supporting reasons, then the mode of hypothesis applies. 
Accordingly, it is just as justified to assume that ~p, and, thus, one has equal but opposing accounts, 
and S should suspend judgment about p.  
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(2b) If S proposes reasons for p, then either the mode of infinite regress of reasons, the mode of 
circularity, or the mode of hypothesis applies.  
(2bi) If S supports p with reasons, and these with new reasons, and so on, then one is 
being led into an infinite regress of reasons, which does not justify anything, and S 
should suspend judgment about p. 
(2bii) If S, instead, somewhere along the way in the chain of reasons, appeals to an 
already stated reason, then one is arguing in a circle, which does not justify anything, 
and S should suspend judgment about p. 
(2biii) If S supports p with a mere assumption, then the mode of hypothesis applies, and, 
again, S should suspend judgment about p. 
(3) S does not have good reasons for p, since every attempt to justify it falls prey either to the mode 
of hypothesis, circularity, or infinite regress of reasons. 
Therefore, 
(4a) S does not know that p. 
(4b) S should suspend judgment about p.268 
 
Although the above argument or some argument closely similar to it, consisting of the three specific 
modes, does not occur anywhere in the Outlines, one passage bears a close resemblance269. Under 
the heading Is there a standard of truth? Sextus discusses the problem of finding a criterion of 
truth; the passages crucial part goes as follows: 
 
Again, in order for the dispute that has arisen about standards [of truth270] to be decided, we must possess 
an agreed standard through which we can judge it; and in order for us to possess an agreed standard, the 
dispute about standards must already have been decided. Thus the argument falls into the reciprocal mode 
and the discovery of a standard is blocked  for we do not allow them to assume a standard by hypothesis, 
and if they want to judge the standard by a standard we throw them into an infinite regress. 
Again, since a proof needs a standard which has been proved and a standard needs a proof 
which has been judged, they are thrown into the reciprocal mode.271  
 
As the italicized words are meant to highlight, the passage utilizes four modes  those of 
disagreement, circularity, hypothesis, and infinite regress. However, what is of the uttermost 
importance, here we have, in the above passage, the ancient formulation of the problem of the 
criterion272. Here Sextus clearly considers the question of how to establish the criterion of truth. If 
we have knowledge, then we must possess the correct criterion of truth. The problem is that it 
seems to be impossible to show that we have the correct criterion of truth, for any proposed 
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criterion is challenged by the skeptical trilemma constituting of the modes of circularity, hypothesis, 
and infinite regress. In other words, it seems to be impossible to justify any criterion of truth we 
propose. Since we cannot establish the criterion of truth, it seems that we cannot attain knowledge 
either. Thus, again, we end up with a global suspension of judgment. However, it is important to 
note that Sextus should not be taken to be claiming that the correct criterion of truth cannot be 
found, for that would be dogmatic. As Sextus writes: 
 
You must realize that it is not our intention to assert that standards of truth are unreal (that would be 
dogmatic); rather, since the Dogmatists seem plausibly to have established that there is a standard of 
truth, we have set up plausible-seeming arguments in opposition to them, affirming neither that they are 
true nor that they are more plausible than those on the contrary side, but concluding to suspension of 
judgment because of the apparently equal plausibility of these arguments and those produced by the 
Dogmatists.273  
 
We should proceed with great care here in interpreting Sextus account of the problem of the 
criterion, for there is one specifically puzzling and unanswered question, namely it should be asked 
whether the Agrippan Argument and the passage about establishing the criterion of truth present the 
same problem or two distinct problems. I am inclined to think that we have in our hands the same 
problem so that the Agrippan Argument is the most general formulation of the problem of the 
criterion, and the passage concerning the finding of the criterion of truth is an instance of the 
Agrippan Argument. The Five Modes  or its restatement as the Agrippan Argument  challenge us 
to justify any proposition that p we claim to know. Now, the above passage concerning the 
establishment of the criterion of truth  PH II 20  challenges us to justify any criterion of truth C 
we claim to know. Furthermore, it is assumed, similarly as in Chisholms account of the problem, 
that in order to know, we must have a criterion of truth. In order to distinguish true from false 
beliefs, we should have a standard or criterion of truth. In any case, the Agrippan Argument works 
as well with respect to particular propositions as to general criteria of truth. The Agrippan 
Argument works similarly, notwithstanding whether the target of justification is a particular claim 
such as I have two hands or a general criterion of truth such as Clearly and distinctly perceived 
propositions are true. Even though this may be little trivial and unnecessary, let us restate the 
Agrippan Argument as concerning specifically the criterion of truth: 
 
(1) If S knows that p, then S has a criterion of truth C. 
(2) If S has a criterion of truth C, then S has good reasons for C.  
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(3a) If S just assumes the criterion C without supporting reasons, then the mode of hypothesis 
applies. Accordingly, it is just as justified to assume that ~C, and, thus, one has equal but opposing 
accounts, and S should suspend judgment about C. 
(3b) If S proposes reasons for the criterion C, then either the mode of infinite regress of reasons, the 
mode of circularity, or the mode of hypothesis applies. 
(3bi) If S supports the criterion C with reasons, and these with new reasons, and so on, 
then one is being led into an infinite regress of reasons, which does not justify anything, 
and S should suspend judgment about C. 
(3bii) If S, instead, somewhere along the way in the chain of reasons, appeals to an 
already stated reason, then one is arguing in a circle, which does not justify anything, 
and S should suspend judgment about C. 
(3biii) If S supports the criterion C with a mere assumption, then the mode of hypothesis 
applies, and, again, S should suspend judgment about C. 
(4) S does not have good reasons for a criterion of truth C, since every attempt to justify it falls prey 
either to the mode of hypothesis, circularity, or infinite regress of reasons. 
Therefore, 
(5a) S does not have a criterion of truth C. 
(5b) S does not know that p. 
(5c) S should suspend judgment about C. 
 
The above argument, call it as the Criterion Argument, is meant to capture the crux of Sextus 
passage concerning the finding of a criterion of truth, PH II 20. Only the mode of disagreement is 
left out as unnecessary from the above restatement of Sextus passage.274 The Criterion Argument 
is, in effect, the same as the Agrippan Argument, apart from the assumption about the necessity of 
the criterion of truth for attainment of knowledge that is made explicit in the second premise. 
Although the arguments conclusion is dogmatic  it states that we do not have knowledge  the 
Pyrrhonists would presumably defend themselves against the accusation of dogmatism in the 
following way: the Criterion Argument is meant to oppose the Dogmatists claims or arguments to 
the effect that we have knowledge and that we have a proper criterion of truth. As a result we have 
opposing arguments about the existence of a criterion of truth, and since they seem to be equally 
plausible, they cancel each other out and we should end up with a global suspension of judgment. 
Thus, the mode of disagreement is invoked again and the strategy of establishing equipollence 
manifests itself.  
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However, although the above defense may be historically faithful to Pyrrhonism275, I think that 
there is a more feasible defense available for the skeptics against the accusation of dogmatism. It 
could be said that the skeptics do not make claims of their own, for they argue purely ad 
hominem276; that is, the arguments of the skeptics are meant to be reconstructions of the 
assumptions the Dogmatists accept and are committed to. The ingenious twist of the skeptical 
arguments is that they consist of intuitive and perfectly acceptable premises yet end up with 
unacceptable conclusions. The arguments are paradoxes, for short. Thus, the denial of knowledge 
set forth in a skeptical paradox is a problem for us, the Dogmatists, who are inclined to accept the 
premises of the skeptical paradox, yet hold on to the view that we have knowledge.277 For example, 
the Criterion Argument starts from the Dogmatists  i.e. the anti-skeptics  commitment that if we 
have knowledge, we must possess some means to distinguish true from false beliefs. In other words, 
we must possess a criterion of truth. Then, it is supposed that if we have such a criterion, we should 
be able to justify it. However, the third premise that captures the crux of the skeptics argument 
proceeds to show that we cannot justify any criterion. Thus, we end up with a conclusion that we do 
not have knowledge, and we have a paradox in our hands. This is the way in which the skeptics 
refute, without making assumptions of their own, the Dogmatists purely ad hominem.   
 
In sum, the ancient formulation of the problem of the criterion, the Criterion Argument, challenges 
us to establish the criterion of truth. The problem is that all our attempts to establish the criterion 
seem to be doomed to the skeptical trilemma constituting of the modes of hypothesis, infinite 
regress of reasons, and circular reasoning. But how this ancient version of the problem compares to 
the modern, Chisholms version? 
 
3.4. Comparing the Criterion Argument with Chisholms Problem of the Criterion 
 
To repeat, Chisholm formulates the problem of the criterion with the help of the following pairs of 
questions: 
 
A) What do we know? What is the extent of our knowledge? 
B) How are we to decide whether we know? What are the criteria of knowledge?278 
 
Chisholms formulation is, I admit, quite different from the passage in the Outlines concerning the 
criterion of truth, or our reconstruction of it, the Criterion Argument. Yet there is something similar 
in the two formulations. Do we have here one or two formulations of the problem of the criterion? 
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Firstly, it should be asked whether Chisholm himself thought that his discussion of the problem is 
related to the ancient formulation of it. There is some textual evidence that he did. In his seminal 
paper on the problem of the criterion, Chisholm writes as follows: What is the problem, then? It is 
the ancient problem of the diallelus  the problem of the wheel or the vicious circle279. The 
quotation reveals that Chisholm thinks that he is dealing with an ancient problem. And what else 
could this ancient source be than Sextus? At least Chisholm is aware of Sextus writings, for in 
another context he points out that Sextus Empiricus discussed the problem of the criterion in bks. 
I and II of his Outlines of Pyrrhonism280. Moreover, Chisholm approves Montaignes formulation 
of the problem281, and Montaigne, in turn, was accused of plagiarizing Sextus account of the 
problem282. Thus, we can conclude that there is an intended link between the ancient problem and 
Chisholms formulation of it.  
 
However, the fact that the two accounts of the problem are related does not imply that they present 
the same problem. Nonetheless, at least Paul Moser explicates the ancient problem with the help of 
Chisholms formulation, for he writes as follows: 
 
In Book II of his Outlines of Pyrrhonism, Sextus Empiricus presents the problem of the criterion by 
raising two general questions: (a) what do we know and (b) how do we know anything? Question (a) asks 
about the extent of our knowledge, whereas question (b) asks about the criteria for our knowledge. These 
simple questions generate the problem that without an answer to (a) we apparently cannot answer (b), and 
without an answer to (b) we apparently cannot answer (a).283   
 
It is rather strange that Moser does not mention Chisholm at all, for clearly the above passage 
employs Chisholms formulation of the problem of the criterion to clarify Sextus respective 
account. If we follow Moser and identify Sextus account of the problem with Chisholms 
formulation of it, something seems to go amiss, namely, Chisholm formulates the problem of the 
criterion as a dilemma, rather than a trilemma that the ancient account is. More specifically, for 
Chisholm the problem amounts to the dilemma that we should have criteria prior to instances and 
instances prior to criteria, whereas the ancient account amounts to threefold choice of basing 
knowledge on an infinite regress, a circular reasoning, or an unwarranted assumption. Moreover, as 
our discussion unfolded, the notion of priority in Chisholms formulation is highly problematic, 
and, in the end, I concluded that Chisholms formulation is flawed. However, there is in the 
Outlines a similar formulation of the problem of the criterion as Chisholms account of the problem. 
The passage concerning the criterion of truth involves, at its end, a part that I have not commented 
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yet and that seems to be different from the part employing the skeptical trilemma. The yet ignored 
part goes as follows: 
 
Again, since a proof needs a standard which has been proved and a standard needs a proof which has been 
judged, they are thrown into the reciprocal mode.284  
 
I think that the above passage is outstandingly similar to Chisholms formulation of the problem of 
the criterion. The structure is the same in both accounts. In the Pyrrhonian version, proofs depend 
on standards, and vice versa, and in Chisholms version criteria depend on instances, and vice versa. 
Furthermore, it seems that Chisholms formulation of the problem of the criterion, especially the 
way he characterizes the skeptics position, equals to the mode of circularity of the Five Modes. For 
Chisholm, the problem of the criterion amounts to the dilemma that we should have criteria before 
instances and instances before criteria. The dilemma shares the structure of the mode of circularity, 
for witness in Barnes words: [i]n general, reciprocal proof requires you to do A before B and also 
to do B before A285.  
 
Even though it could be argued that the ancient account of the problem of the criterion, i.e. the 
Criterion Argument, is more complete than Chisholms formulation of it, I do not think that the two 
formulations are still that different. Specifically, Chisholm wants to find a method with the help of 
which we could sort out true beliefs from false ones286. Thus, in my view, the two accounts, the 
ancient and the modern one, of the problem of the criterion pose the same question  namely, How 
are we to distinguish true beliefs from false ones?  but in the end they formulate the problem 
differently. Although Chisholms formulation of the problem strongly resembles the mode of 
circularity, it does not mean that we can solve Chisholms problem just by assuming a criterion of 
truth or by appealing to an infinite regress of reasons. In other words, even though Chisholm omits 
from his formulation of the problem the modes of hypothesis and infinite regress of reasons, he 
seems to be implicitly assuming that neither of these modes can provide a solution to the problem. 
In fact, Chisholm mentions in passing that an infinite regress can never provide a deciding method 
for distinguishing true from false beliefs287. Secondly, his criticism of methodism resembles the 
mode of hypothesis, for Chisholm accuses methodists of that their choice of criterion is arbitrary, 
and, thus, they leave us completely in the dark288 as to why they have chosen the criterion they 
have and not some other.  
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I conclude that the Criterion Argument is a better and more complete formulation of the problem of 
the criterion than Chisholms formulation.289 Chisholms account is flawed, since the notion of 
priority involved in Chisholms formulation is problematic, which weakens Chisholms skeptical 
argument so that it is not a genuine paradox. The Criterion Argument, in turn, is, or at least seems to 
be, a genuine skeptical paradox. It starts from intuitively acceptable premises, yet ends up with an 
unintuitive conclusion (and the argument is valid).  
 
In sum, Chisholms formulation of the problem equals to the mode of circularity found in the 
Outlines. However, the other modes of infinite regress and hypothesis are, arguably, implicitly 
assumed in Chisholms account too. Thus, the two accounts, the modern and the ancient one, are yet 
quite similar. Chisholms definitive formulation of the problem  constituting of two pairs of 
questions  is relatively simple and, thus, it is maybe easier to comprehend than the more complex 
ancient account. It has now become clear that the ancient account involves a wide area of issues and 
in order to understand the passage in the Outlines concerning the criterion of truth290 we must 
already have a general grasp of the Five and the Ten Modes, and of the key concepts equipollence, 
suspension of judgment, and tranquility. Although it may be easier, as it were, to understand the 
problem of the criterion as opening from the metaphor of circle, it cannot be denied that the ancient 
account of the problem is more comprehensive than Chisholms account that presents the problem 
in the form of a circular dilemma.  
 
3.5. Solving the Criterion Argument 
 
The Pyrrhonian skeptic is concerned with whatsoever claims the Dogmatist proposes.291 For, 
arguably, the skeptic is interested in finding truth, and, thus, she is also interested in whether the 
Dogmatist can provide truth-conferring grounds for her claim that something is the case. But as 
soon as the Dogmatist gives reasons for her claim, the skeptical trilemma steps into the picture. This 
is unfortunate both for the Dogmatist and the skeptic, for the former, presumably, is not able to 
escape from the trilemma and, thus, she should suspend judgment about the claim she proposed, and 
the latter must still continue her desperate search for truth.  
 
Now the crucial question is can we, the non-skeptics, escape from the horns of the skeptical 
trilemma? It seems that escaping amounts to biting the bullet, that is, we must choose one of the 
horns of the skeptical trilemma, and insist on that it does not present such a defective line of 
reasoning as the skeptic seems to assume. To be honest, none of the three available alternatives 
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appears promising enough as a possible solution either to the Criterion Argument or the Agrippan 
Argument. It strikes me as extremely implausible to claim that we know, since (i) the criterion of 
truth (or any claim to knowledge) can be just assumed and supporting reasons are not needed; or (ii) 
criterion of truth (or any claim whatsoever) can be provided through an infinite regress of 
supporting reasons; or (iii) criterion of truth (or any claim whatsoever) can be provided within a 
circular system of reasons.  
 
If we compare the above list of anti-skeptical options to the solutions discussed with respect to 
Chisholms formulation of the problem of the criterion, we see that option (i) amounts to the 
methodist or the particularist solution and option (iii) amounts to the coherentist solution. All in all, 
it seems that all of the solutions discussed with respect to Chisholms formulation of the problem of 
the criterion can also be applied to the ancient account of the problem. It should also be clear that as 
none of the solutions was found successful in solving Chisholms formulation of the problem, the 
same holds of the ancient account. Thus, it is not necessary to repeat the problems and defects of the 
alleged solutions here. Only the option (ii), the infinitist solution, is not yet considered in our 
discussion of the solutions to Chisholms formulation of the problem. The examination of the 
infinitist solution will be postponed to the next main chapter, where the regress problem is studied.  
 
The distinction between the instances of knowledge, on the one hand, and the criteria of knowledge, 
on the other hand, is crucial for Chisholms formulation of the problem of the criterion. However, 
the ancient account does not rely on that distinction, but on the idea that trying to justify any claim 
leads inevitably to the skeptical trilemma. Of course, the ancient account works similarly with 
respect to particular knowledge claims and general criteria of truth. The Agrippan Argument 
challenges instances of knowledge as well as criteria of it. I formulated a specific argument  the 
Criterion Argument  as an instance of the Agrippan Argument as concerning specifically the 
criteria of truth, but as already said, the Criterion Argument is a trivial application of the most 
fundamental skeptical argument, the Agrippan Argument. 
 
When examining the possible solutions to Chisholms formulation of the problem of the criterion, 
we found the whole idea of methodism almost inconceivable, for it is hard to see how we could 
grasp general epistemic principles prior to any instances. However, I think that the examination of 
the ancient version of the problem sheds some light over Chisholms formulation too, for we have 
now come to see all the horns of the problem of the criterion. To repeat, Chisholms formulation of 
the problem is misguided, for he presents the problem as a dilemma of a circular form, and the 
The Inevitability of Skepticism. A Study on the Problem of the Criterion 
 84
modes of hypothesis and infinite regress are just assumed, but not stated explicitly. But the ancient 
version, the Agrippan Argument, helps us to see the complete structure of the problem of the 
criterion. The problem inherent in the diallelus is that, whether we start from an alleged instance of 
knowledge or an alleged criterion of knowledge, we fall prey to the skeptical trilemma constituting 
of the modes of hypothesis, infinite regress, and circularity. Chisholm happens to call those who 
start from instances as particularists and those who start from criteria as methodists, but now we are 
able to see that both parties face the same skeptical trilemma, namely, whether we claim to have a 
true belief or a criterion of true beliefs, we should justify our claim and thus we face the threefold 
choice of basing it on an infinite regress, a circular reasoning, or an unwarranted assumption. If we 
accept the skeptics argument, it seems that we cannot escape from it, for our choices are limited to 
biting the bullet and trying to defend the view that we have knowledge by arguing against one of the 
horns of the skeptical trilemma. But why should we accept the skeptics argument in the first place? 
 
3.6. The Problems of Skepticism 
 
In the two following sections, the standard criticisms of skepticism are discussed. According to the 
first standard criticism of skepticism, skeptics cannot argue anything, for arguing presupposes the 
validity of certain rules of logic and warrant transmission. But, the critical interlocutor notes, 
skeptics do not accept that rules of logic are true, and hence they cannot really argue for anything. 
According to the second standard criticism of skepticism, it is practically impossible to live up to 
skepticism and, hence, we should not bother about such a silly view that is not even realizable in 
practice.      
  
3.6.1. Skepticism, Argumentation, and Logic 
 
We have interpreted Pyrrhonism as a variant of global skepticism. However, global skeptics face 
the following dilemma: if they claim something, they refute themselves, and if they do not claim 
anything, skepticism does not present any problem for us, the non-skeptics. The charge of self-
refutation is as old as skepticism itself, and it states, in all its simplicity, that skeptics cannot claim 
anything, for if they do, they refute themselves since they claim (to know) that no one can know 
anything. Thus, if we cannot know anything, then we cannot even know that we cannot know. 
Therefore, we have pointed out that the skeptics thesis is contradictory, and we should not be 
worried about contradictory accounts.292  
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Two points can be brought up in skeptics defense. Firstly, as mentioned earlier, the skeptics argue 
purely ad hominem, that is, they do not assume anything, but merely show from the Dogmatists 
own commitments that the Dogmatists should suspend judgment about everything. Although the 
skeptic cannot accept her argument, e.g. the Agrippan Argument, as true, we can, and actually we 
should pay attention to the skeptics arguments and try to refute them. As the skeptic does not 
accept anything as true, she does not have any beliefs, and, thus, maybe she does not even 
understand her own words  but that does not hinder her from uttering words. Words and arguments 
that, again, we understand. Thus, skeptical arguments are our problems, not the skeptics.293 
Secondly, Pyrrhonian skeptics try to avoid all kinds of dogmatism and, accordingly, they do not 
claim that knowledge is unattainable in principle. Instead, the skeptics see that there are plausible-
seeming arguments both to the effect that we do not have knowledge and to the effect that we have 
knowledge; the situation is one of equipollence and, thus, the skeptics suspend judgment about 
whether we have knowledge. Moreover, the skeptics only report how things appear to them and 
they purport to say nothing about how things really are. This is also reflected in the so-called 
skeptical phrases that do not manifest opinions but the skeptics feelings about how things appear 
to them294. For example, Sextus writes of the phrase I determine nothing as follows: 
 
About I determine nothing we have this to say. Determining we deem to be not merely saying 
something but making an utterance about an unclear object and assenting to it. For in this sense Sceptics 
will perhaps be found to determine nothing  not even I determine nothing itself. For this is not a 
dogmatic supposition (i.e. assent to something unclear) but a phrase which shows our feeling. Thus when 
Sceptics say I determine nothing, what they say is this: I now feel in such a way as neither to posit 
dogmatically nor to reject any of the things falling under this investigation. When they say this they are 
saying what is apparent to them about the subject proposed  not dogmatically making a confident 
assertion, but describing and reporting how they feel.295 
 
However, if the skeptics just report their feelings about how things appear to them, why should we 
care about skepticism? In other words, Pyrrhonian skeptics are sliding towards the second horn of 
the dilemma presented above. In order to present an epistemic challenge for us, the skeptic should 
set forth arguments, and not just utter her inner feelings.296 But as soon as the skeptic argues 
something, she contradicts her skepticism, according to which all arguments and claims are 
epistemically equal, that is, worthless. Thus, if the skeptic proposes something, she is dogmatic and 
refutes herself, and if she does not propose anything, then skepticism equals rather to a strange cult 
than to something we should take into serious consideration. Nevertheless, I suggest that we should, 
as epistemologists, interpret Pyrrhonists as proposing some interesting skeptical arguments, instead 
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of seeing them as only reporting their feelings. The most interesting and the most powerful skeptical 
argument the Pyrrhonists have set forth is the Five Modes. We refined the Five Modes into a 
specific and general argument, the Agrippan Argument, as an instance of which the Criterion 
Argument was formulated. To clarify, it may do justice to the ancient Pyrrhonists to depict them as 
relying fundamentally on the strategy of equipollence; opposing every account with a contrary 
account of equal strength. However, from the viewpoint of epistemology, the most interesting part 
of their philosophy is the Agrippan trilemma, the core of the Five Modes, and, basically, it is the 
plausibility of this trilemma with which I am concerned in this study.  
 
Thus, if we are interested in skepticism as proposing challenging skeptical arguments, it is clear that 
as arguments they must rely on logic. For example, the Pyrrhonian mode of equipollence of reasons 
presupposes that equally convincing and opposing arguments, evidence, or reasons defeat each 
other. In other words, there is a principle of justification at play saying, in effect, that if we have 
both supporting evidence E and undermining evidence ~E for a proposition that p, and both samples 
of evidence are of equal strength, then it is rational to suspend judgment about the proposition that 
p. Clearly, then, plausible skeptical arguments presuppose general rules of inference as well as 
conditions of warrant transmission and defeat. That is not to say, however, that skeptics, or those 
whoever present the skeptical arguments, must accept those rules as true. Although rules of 
inference and conditions on warrant transmission are necessary in order for any argument to be 
presented, it does not entail that those rules are true. At least I think that a skeptic can maintain 
thoroughly consistently that she must assume the rules of inference, but must not accept them.  
 
On the other hand, it could be maintained that, metaphorically speaking, skeptical arguments 
destroy everything, including the skeptical arguments themselves297. All that matters is the global 
suspension of judgment that fortunately leads to tranquility. Dogmatism is a disease that should be 
cured, and it can be cured via skeptical arguments. After the global suspension of judgment is 
achieved, the skeptical arguments are not needed anymore. Thoroughgoing epoché can be attained 
by various means; some of us may be able to see opposing accounts everywhere, others may need to 
contemplate the Five Modes, yet others can be convinced of the necessity of the global suspension 
of judgment right from the start. The means does not matter, the end itself does, as Sextus himself 
writes:  
 
Sceptics are philanthropic and wish to cure by argument, as far as they can, the conceit and rashness of 
the Dogmatists. Just as doctors for bodily affections have remedies which differ in potency, and apply 
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severe remedies to patients who are severely afflicted and milder remedies to those mildly afflicted, so 
Sceptics propound arguments which differ in strength  they employ weighty arguments, capable of 
vigorously rebutting the dogmatic affliction of conceit, against those who are distressed by a severe 
rashness, and they employ milder arguments against those who are afflicted by a conceit which is 
superficial and easily cured and which can be rebutted by a milder degree of plausibility. 
This is why those with a Sceptical impulse do not hesitate sometimes to propound 
arguments which are sometimes weighty in their plausibility, and sometimes apparently rather weak. 
They do this deliberately, since often a weaker argument is sufficient for them to achieve their purpose.298 
 
The skeptics want to convert us to Pyrrhonism, and that does not sound very undogmatic, to say the 
least. The problem is that the skeptics cannot establish that we do not know anything, for skeptics 
cannot establish anything. But neither can we, the non-skeptics, show that we do know, for we are 
not able to break out from the Agrippan Argument. Then it seems that we should suspend judgment 
about whether we know, and we end up being skeptics, after all. 
 
3.6.2. Skepticism and Ordinary Life 
  
Second standard criticism of skepticism states that it is practically impossible to live up to 
skepticism. In other words, no one can live without beliefs. Beliefs are the medium through which 
we can program ourselves to act so as to fulfill our needs and desires. For example, if I am hungry, 
by forming a belief If I go to a grocery, I can buy some food to eat I am able to execute the 
actions required to fulfill my desire to eat. However, if I had no beliefs, I would have no reason to 
prefer bread to broken glass. Accordingly, survival would come to a matter of chance, and, 
presumably, even good luck would end fatally one day.299 Sextus is familiar with this objection and 
he answers it as follows: 
 
Thus, attending to what is apparent, we live in accordance with everyday observances, without holding 
opinions  for we are not able to be utterly inactive. These everyday observances seem to be fourfold, and 
to consist in guidance by nature, necessitation by feelings, handing down of laws and customs, and 
teaching of kinds of expertise. By natures guidance we are naturally capable of perceiving and thinking. 
By the necessitation of feelings, hunger conducts us to food and thirst to drink. By the handing down of 
customs and laws, we accept, from an everyday point of view, that piety is good and impiety bad. By 
teaching of kinds of expertise we are not inactive in those which we accept.  
And we say all this without holding any opinions.300 
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Thus, it seems that Pyrrhonists allow themselves beliefs of a sort, but not of a dogmatic sort. So it 
seems that Pyrrhonian skeptics can act and behave in ordinary ways, and they have beliefs forced 
upon them by passive everyday observances and appearances. This does not preclude them, 
however, from objecting to the dogmas of others, for it is another thing to live in accordance with 
appearances than claiming that something is really this or that. This kind of interpretation of 
Pyrrhonism may be historically plausible, indeed, and it has its advocates301. Thus, the second 
criticism against skepticism is not valid anymore, for skeptics can act and live normally. However, 
this kind of mitigating of skepticism threatens to vitiate the plausibility of skepticism. If the skeptics 
can act and believe like everybody else, then it seems that nothing distinguishes anymore the 
skeptics from the non-skeptics. And this seems to water down the significance of skepticism 
altogether. Furthermore, it seems that the skeptics should possess some kind of an epistemic 
criterion to distinguish dogmatic beliefs from the allowed, non-dogmatic beliefs. If they make 
epistemic distinctions  between forbidden and allowed beliefs  then the skeptics accept something 
as true, namely the criterion that is the basis of distinctions. Moreover, it is also hard to see how the 
skeptics could have non-dogmatic beliefs, for believing entails accepting something as true. 
Speaking about living in accordance with appearances instead of beliefs does not change the fact at 
all that the skeptics must accept something as true in order to act in the world on the basis of 
decisions to bring about this rather than that.302 This should be obvious. For example, I cannot even 
leave my house, luck notwithstanding, if I have no beliefs about the whereabouts of the door, my 
current position in relation to that door etc. 
 
On the other hand, it should be noted that the objection  that no one can live up to her skepticism  
does not engage into argumentation about the possible argumentative flaws in skeptical arguments. 
Instead, it blatantly states, on the basis of practical consequences of skepticism, that skepticism is 
unacceptable. Thus, it could be said to be a pragmatic objection. As such it misses its target, for I 
see the purpose of skeptical argument as challenging our conceptions pertaining to knowledge, 
justification, and evidence. Skeptical arguments try to show that knowledge is not so easy to attain 
as we often think it is. We should show, in turn, that skeptical arguments go amiss and that we have 
a viable theory of knowledge and justification that is immune to skeptical arguments. Thus, it is 
quite vulgar to answer skeptical arguments just by stating that no one can be a skeptic, for 
skepticism is an unliveable doctrine. Furthermore, it could be claimed that pragmatic objections are 
usually irrelevant in philosophy. For example, we do not solve the problem of free will by 
observing that most people think that they have free will and act accordingly. Or in the field of 
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metaphysics, idealistic systems are not refuted simply by stating that most of us believe that 
external and material objects exist.  
 
Still, although forming of beliefs seems to be unavoidable, it does not imply in any way that some 
of them, or even any, are true or justified. Granted, living without beliefs is impossible, but so 
what? I do not see how this observation counts against skepticism in general. Moreover, it could be 
claimed that the objection  that no one can live up to her skepticism  just assumes the falsity of 
skepticism. In other words, we cannot infer anything about the ordinary behavior and actions of 
people. For example, if we think that the behavior of people establishes that we have beliefs about 
our surroundings for the reason that external objects exist, we have merely assumed the falsity of 
skepticism, not provided an objection to it. For, according to skeptical arguments, the behavior and 
actions of people are delivered to us as appearances, and as such they can be as deceiving as 
anything else we encounter via our senses. Now, we can clearly see that the considered objection 
fails miserably. To wit, the statement It appears to me that people act in various ways as reacting 
to the external objects of the world does not even slightly support the conclusion that skepticism is 
false.   
 
In sum, skepticism cannot be dismissed simply by stating that it is either an unliveable doctrine or it 
refutes itself by relying on logic. We must take skepticism seriously. Or more precisely, we must 
take significant skeptical arguments seriously. We should not bother about such skeptics who 
counter every assertion of ours with a mere insistence to the effect Everything you claim is false 
or You could have been mistaken or No way. However, the thesis defended in this book is that 
the problem of the criterion is such a skeptical argument that must be taken seriously and addressed 




Pyrrhonian skeptics seek truth and they try to find a yardstick, an epistemic criterion, to decide 
among appearances which are true and which false. However, up to now, they have not found 
means to establish a proper criterion, and, therefore, they suspend judgment about the matter. Being 
unable to determine the criterion of true beliefs, they are unable to decide any matter. Thus, a global 
suspension of judgment follows, which, luckily for the skeptics, leads to their original goal of 
tranquility.     
 
The Inevitability of Skepticism. A Study on the Problem of the Criterion 
 90
The skeptics are also willing to cure others of dogmatism, and, thus, they introduce two general 
skeptical systems of arguments, the Ten Modes and the Five Modes, that are meant to induce a 
suspension of judgment in the Dogmatists. The Ten Modes challenge primarily our alleged 
empirical knowledge, whereas the Five Modes are global in their scope. The two systems of 
skeptical arguments are interrelated, for all the modes of the Five Modes occur already in the Ten 
Modes. Furthermore, the strategy of establishing equipollence of reasons is prevalent in the Ten 
Modes and it is invoked also in two modes of the Five Modes, namely in the mode of disagreement 
and in the mode of hypothesis. However, contemporary scholars think that only three of the modes 
of the Five Modes are relevant for the formulation of the most powerful skeptical argument of the 
ancient skeptics. Thus, the modes of hypothesis, circularity, and infinite regress of reasons alone are 
thought to constitute the heart of Pyrrhonian skepticism, the Agrippan trilemma.  
 
We formulated the skeptical trilemma into a specific argument, the Agrippan Argument, as an 
instance of which we formulated the Criterion Argument that concerns specifically the justification 
of a criterion of truth. When comparing the ancient account of the diallelus  i.e. the Criterion 
Argument  to Chisholms account of the problem of the criterion, we found that the latter comes 
down to the mode of circularity of the former. Chisholms account of the problem is a neat and 
simple way to present the difficult and complex problem of the criterion, captured fully and 
comprehensively in the ancient account. Although the two accounts of the problem are different, 
they pose the same question, namely, How are we to distinguish true beliefs from false ones? 
Furthermore, at least at first glance, it seems that there is no easy way out of the Pyrrhonian 
problem. The Agrippan Argument consists of intuitively plausible premises that we, the non-
skeptics accept. Thus, the problem of the criterion is precisely our problem, and therefore it is futile 
to object to skepticism by noting that no one can be a skeptic or that skeptical arguments must 
refute themselves. The problem of the criterion, and specifically the ancient account of it, is a 
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4. THE REGRESS PROBLEM AND EPISTEMIC JUSTIFICATION 
 
In this chapter the regress problem is studied. First, I explicate the problem and its relations to the 
Five Modes of Agrippa and the problem of the criterion. After that, differing theories of epistemic 
justification are examined in order to reveal whether any of them succeeds in solving the regress 
problem. Finally, the externalist approach to epistemology is examined in order to see in what 
respects it differs from the internalist approach and how it succeeds in addressing the regress 
problem and the problem of skepticism in general.  
 
4.1. The Regress Problem and Agrippas Five Modes 
 
As suggested in the previous chapter, the Five Modes of Agrippa and the so-called epistemic 
regress problem, also known as the regress argument or the infinite regress argument, are 
intimately related to each other. It is common to think that the two are identical with each other; that 
is, the problem presented by the Five Modes is the regress problem. What is the regress problem, 
then? There are various depictions of the problem, but the one Scott Aikin provides is simple and 
neat enough to be used to illustrate the problem here:  
 
Insofar as we strive to be rational, we strive to believe on the basis of good reasons. For those reasons 
to be good, they must not only support our first belief, but they themselves must also be believed for 
good reasons. This is where we begin to see a disturbing pattern. If that first belief is to be held on the 
basis of good reasons, it seems we are in need of a very long chain of reasons. This is a rough and ready 
picture of the regress problem. It seems endemic to the project of believing on the basis of reasons. And 
thereby, it seems endemic to the very project of being rational. 
This problem is old. Aristotle made it famous when he used it to show the necessity for 
first principles (A. Post. 72b 6-15). Agrippa and Sextus Empiricus made it infamous when they used it 
to show the inescapability of skepticism (DL II 88-90 and PH I 164-177). And the problem is not just 
old, it is deep. Children, when they understand the game of giving and asking for reasons, see its 
protean ability to manifest itself anywhere, and they easily exploit it by continuously asking why? 
And it is not just deep, it is obvious.303  
 
Our epistemic goal is to attain truth, and even if good reasons do not guarantee the truth of our 
beliefs, good reasons, arguably, make the truth of our beliefs more likely than their falsehood. Thus, 
it seems to be an intuitively plausible and rational demand that propositions should be believed on 
the basis of good reasons. And if the justifying reasons seem to be good enough, the initial 
proposition or belief could be deemed justified as well. But the problem is that the chain of 
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justifying reasons threatens to be infinitely long. So how could we simultaneously hold that the 
regress of beliefs is not infinite and that some of our beliefs are still justified? That is the challenge 
of the regress problem. To repeat, the regress problem challenges us to provide an account of a 
justified or warranted belief that is able to cut the demand of infinite chain of reasons. As stated in 
the previous chapter, the Five Modes represent us a skeptical trilemma, according to which we do 
not have knowledge, since each and every one of our claims to knowledge falls prey to the mode of 
hypothesis, circularity, or infinite regress of reasons. Whatever we claim to know, we cannot avoid 
the trilemma. Now, the Pyrrhonian trilemma works similarly with epistemic justification as it does 
with knowledge. Accordingly, we do not have justified beliefs, since each candidate for a justified 
belief falls prey to the mode of hypothesis, circularity, or infinite regress of reasons. Whatever we 
deem as justified, we cannot avoid the trilemma. 
 
In the previous chapter we interpreted the Five Modes as concerning especially knowledge. Thus, to 
make the ancient and the modern problem concordant with each other, we must reformulate the 
Agrippan Argument so as that it concerns the epistemic justification of beliefs. Accordingly, we 
have the following argument, call it the Justification Argument: 
 
(1) If Ss belief that p is justified, then S has good reasons for p.  
(2a) If S just assumes that p without supporting reasons, then the mode of hypothesis applies. 
Accordingly, it is just as justified to assume that ~p, and, thus, one has equal but opposing accounts, 
and S should suspend judgment about p.  
(2b) If S proposes reasons for p, then either the mode of infinite regress of reasons, the mode of 
circularity, or the mode of hypothesis applies.  
(2bi) If S supports p with reasons, and these with new reasons, and so on, then one is 
being led into an infinite regress of reasons, which does not justify anything, and S 
should suspend judgment about p. 
(2bii) If S, instead, somewhere along the way in the chain of reasons, appeals to an 
already stated reason, then one is arguing in a circle, which does not justify anything, 
and S should suspend judgment about p. 
(2biii) If S supports p with a mere assumption, then the mode of hypothesis applies, and, 
again, S should suspend judgment about p. 
(3) S does not have good reasons for p, since every attempt to justify it falls prey either to the mode 
of hypothesis, circularity, or infinite regress of reasons. 
Therefore, 
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(4a) Ss belief that p is not justified. 
(4b) S should suspend judgment about p. 
 
Now, if we are not willing to be skeptics, either premise (2a) or (2b) must be refuted. And this is 
where the standard accounts of epistemic justification step into the picture. Accordingly, 
foundationalists deny either  depending on the variant of the foundationalism in question  the 
truth of premise (2a) or (2biii) and defend the claim that the potentially infinite regress of reasons 
stops at the basic beliefs that are justified in themselves without further justifying beliefs. 
Alternatively, coherentists deny the truth of premise (2bii) and they defend the claim that circular 
reasoning can be justification-conferring. Finally, infinitists deny the truth of premise (2bi) and they 
hold that infinite regress of reasons can be justification-conferring. Clearly, theories of epistemic 
justification face the ancient Pyrrhonian problem, the Agrippan trilemma. To quote Robert Fogelin: 
a philosophical theory of justification must simultaneously avoid involvement in a bad infinite 
regress, in a bad form of circularity, and in a bad appeal to unwarranted assumption. The Agrippa 
problem [i.e. the problem presented by the Five Modes] poses these challenges in an evenhanded 
way.304 Accordingly, the theories of epistemic justification and the modes of Agrippa match up as 
presented in the following schema:305 
 
A Theory of Epistemic Justification                          The  Agrippan Argument                    
(1) Foundationalism               The mode of hypothesis (2a) or (2biii) 
(2) Coherentism               The mode of circularity (2bii) 
(3) Infinitism               The mode of infinite regress of reasons (2bi) 
 
These three options are meant to be logically exhaustive, but it should be borne in mind that each 
theory comes in many forms. For example, as one variant of foundationalism, the so-called 
epistemic contextualists can be seen as committed to the view that at the foundation of justified 
beliefs lie unjustified beliefs306. Furthermore, the divide between internalism and externalism calls 
for discussion of its own to clarify how both parties respond to the regress problem and how the 
responses differ from each other. All in all, each and every study on epistemic justification of 
beliefs should be studied in detail to see how each respective theory succeeds in responding to the 
regress problem. Obviously, in this chapter, I cannot study every published response to the regress 
problem. Instead, I will discuss the main three responses, i.e. foundationalism, coherentism, and 
infinitism. After discussing the aforementioned theories, I will discuss also contextualism and 
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externalism, neither of which tries to refute a premise in the skeptical trilemma, but argue for some 
other fault in the skeptics reasoning.  
 
Foundationalism and coherentism will be examined only briefly, since their standard criticisms 
were already brought out in chapter 2. After discussing foundationalism and coherentism, in that 
order, I have devoted a separate discussion for the a priori. If we can be sure that some of our 
beliefs are necessarily true and justified immediately due to their indisputable truth, then these 
beliefs are certainly capable of cutting the threat of an infinite regress of justifying beliefs. 
However, as it will be shown in this chapter, even the a priori falls prey to the problem of the 
criterion. 
 
Infinitism, in turn, is a rather recent theory and it will deserve a thorough treatment. However, a 
great deal more could be said with respect to every theory I discuss, but my foremost intention is to 
bring out the most haunting difficulties and objections with respect to each theory, which, I hope, 
warrants the conclusion that none of the theories succeeds in solving the regress problem. Fogelin, 
in his study on theories of epistemic justification, ends up with the same conclusion; the regress 
problem is not solved and [t]hings are now largely as Sextus Empiricus left them almost two 
thousand years ago307. In fact, what I do in this chapter, is virtually the same thing Fogelin has 
already done in his Pyrrhonian Reflections on Knowledge and Justification. The point in which I 
differ from him is, firstly, that I study different theories, for Fogelin does not consider, for example, 
infinitism at all. Secondly, and more importantly, for me the regress problem is an instance of a 
more general problem, the problem of the criterion. The Five Modes represent us the skeptical 
challenge of the problem of the criterion. Thus, trying to cope with the regress problem amounts to, 
in effect, trying to cope with the problem of the criterion, as applied to epistemic justification308. Of 
course, the regress problem can be and it has been discussed with no concern for skepticism or the 
problem of the criterion309. In this study, I claim, however, that the regress problem is an instance of 
the problem of the criterion and, thus, when one studies the regress problem, properly understood, 
one cannot ignore skepticism. 
 
4.2. Foundationalism and Coherentism as Solutions to the Regress Problem 
 
Foundationalists about epistemic justification claim, roughly, that justification of beliefs derives 
from basic beliefs that are justified in themselves and the source of justification for other beliefs. 
Coherentists about epistemic justification, in turn, claim, again roughly, that justification of beliefs 
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is generated by the coherence of the overall belief system. Both camps, foundationalists and 
coherentists, need assure us as to why we should think that basic beliefs or coherence of the belief 




To begin with foundationalism, its proponents think that the potentially infinite regress of justified 
beliefs comes to halt at a special set of foundational beliefs. These foundational or basic beliefs are, 
epistemically speaking, so convincing that they immediately acquire the status of justified belief. 
Some propositions just strike us as obviously true, and there seems to be no question about their 
truth, thus, these propositions can be safely believed. Propositions such as Something exists, p 
iff p, and Out of nothing comes nothing seem to warrant their own truth and we are inclined to 
accept them as true. In fact, it seems that we cannot even choose not to believe these or similarly 
convincing propositions, for their truth strikes us as immediately obvious and we cannot but believe 
them. Maybe someone of us could resist the compelling inclination to believe the Principle of 
Excluded Middle (p or ~p), but it would take exceptionally strong will power to execute such a 
mental exercise. However, if any beliefs are justified at all, beliefs directed at necessary truths seem 
to be our best candidates for the status of epistemically justified belief. Moreover, it sounds as a 
plausible suggestion that these basic beliefs do not need any further justification to be deemed as 
justified. What other reasons could I even give for, for example, the Principle of Excluded Middle 
except that it just strikes me as most definitely true? 
 
If we grant that beliefs that have as their contents necessary truths count as basic, it still seems that 
the set of basic beliefs is rather limited310. Particularly, the set is limited in quality as opposed to 
quantity. It is, arguably, impossible to infer empirical, contingent facts from necessary a priori 
truths. In other words, necessary truths cannot bridge the gap between the mind and the external 
world. It is hard to see how my belief that, for example, I see a great orange before me could 
receive its justification by way of its relation to the basic belief cogito, ergo sum. Thus, we should 
include contingent, empirical beliefs among possible basic beliefs in order that foundationalism 
could be a viable theory of empirical knowledge too. Indeed, foundationalists since Descartess 
times have constructed their respective epistemologies in such a way that the importance of sensory 
experience to empirical justification is taken into a serious consideration. In contemporary 
foundationalist theories, my belief about the great orange is basic and justified, so long as my senses 
provide me with relevant sensory experiences and certain circumstantial and other conditions are 
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satisfied (e.g. that the lighting is normal and I am not affected by drugs). Sensory experiences as the 
source of the contents of our beliefs are generally sufficient in themselves to render the beliefs as 
basic and justified, and no further justifying beliefs are needed. Of course, the basic beliefs can be 
defeated by an acquisition of contrary and convincing evidence, but usually our beliefs derived 
from sensory experience are deemed innocent until proven guilty.  
 
However, if foundationalism is moderated in the way described above, further problems arise. 
Firstly, by moving from certain and infallible basic beliefs to uncertain and fallible (empirical) basic 
beliefs, we also lose our fundamental motivation for being foundationalists in the first place. In 
other words, our selection of basic beliefs is meant to function as terminating the possibly infinite 
regress of justified beliefs to something certain. However, if we allow that the basic beliefs could be 
false, should we not give some reasons for thinking that the beliefs are more likely true than false? 
But if we give reasons for the alleged basic beliefs, then it seems that the regress continues, after all. 
Thus, as moderate foundationalists we face the dilemma of either willfully accepting something 
uncertain and ungrounded as the source of justification and knowledge or giving further reasons for 
our chosen basic beliefs. The first horn of the dilemma amounts to an arbitrary decision and 
unacceptable dogmatism and the second horn implies that the regress of reasons goes on again.  
 
However, foundationalists can alternatively hold that the regress of reasons terminates at non-
conceptual and non-judgmental perceptual states. The idea is that our (empirical) beliefs are 
grounded on our perceptual experiences that do not need any justification for themselves anymore. 
The perceptual experiences do not need further justifying reasons just because reasons need 
justifying reasons, but our perceptual experiences are not reasons; they just ground our beliefs. 
The problem for the foundationalist is to explain how something that is not itself a reason can 
confer justification upon reasons, i.e. our beliefs. Moreover, which ones of our perceptual states are 
such that they do justify our beliefs? In other words, all states cannot be justification-creating since, 
obviously, our perception can be misleading and false. A criterion for good states is called for. And 
now we face the good old Pyrrhonian question, viz. how could we decide which criteria are good? 
Furthermore, it can be pointed out, in the spirit of Sextus Ten Modes, that different animals, 
arguably, have different appearances of the same objects311. Again, different people can have 
differing appearances of the objects, and as Sextus suggests, even the senses within a single person 
can disagree with each other. So, are all appearances justified? If not, which ones are and which are 
not, and how can we determine that our chosen criterion is a good one? Of course, we can stipulate 
that some of our perceptual appearances are justified, but now the skeptic is eager to ask whether 
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any of our appearances are true or likely to be true. In fact, it should also be in our interest to 
determine whether the appearances that, allegedly, justify our empirical beliefs have any connection 
whatsoever to the reality. On the other hand, this problem  whether our appearances are in 
concordance with the reality  haunts presumably all theories on epistemic justification, not just 
foundationalism. Thus, it may be a little unfair to criticize foundationalists by appealing to an 
objection that no one can answer. However, it also seems unacceptable and dogmatic simply to 
assume as the foundationalist does that our perceptual experiences are grounded in the reality and 
they properly justify our empirical beliefs. An explanation, that is, further reasons, should be given 
as to why we should think that some of our perceptual experiences justify our empirical beliefs and 
make their truth probable. All in all, I think that, compared to the view that there are basic beliefs, 
the foundationalist gains nothing by holding that the regress of reasons terminates at non-conceptual 
and non-judgmental perceptual states.312      
 
As Peter Klein sees it, the basic problem with foundationalism is the following: 
 
[F]oundationalism is unacceptable because it advocates accepting an arbitrary reason at the base, that is, 
a reason for which there are no further reasons making it even slightly better to accept than any of its 
contraries.313 
 
Michael Bergmann does not agree with Klein. According to Klein, we should always be able to give 
reasons for our beliefs, otherwise we are irrational314. Bergmann, in turn, claims that Klein is simply 
begging the question against the foundationalist, namely, foundationalists deny the assumption that 
we should always be able to give reasons for our beliefs in order for them to be justified. 
Specifically, foundationalists hold that basic beliefs are justified without further justifying reasons. 
Bergmann accuses Klein of just taking it for granted that foundationalists are mistaken in thinking 
that beliefs can be non-inferentially justified.315 Bergmann admits that the foundationalist does not 
have a justifying reason for her basic belief b, but that does not imply that b is arbitrary. All beliefs 
with certain feature F count as basic and are, therefore, (non-inferentially) justified, even though 
they lack a justifying reason. Bergmann adds that the foundationalist can believe some proposition 
such as X that b has some feature F such that beliefs having feature F are noninferentially 
justified316, but believing X is not required for the justification of b. X has no justificatory role 
whatsoever in the justification of basic belief b, thus, X does not count as a reason for b.317  
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Klein is not buying Bergmanns defense of foundationalism. Klein argues that unless the 
foundationalist thinks that bs possession of feature F provides us with a reason to treat b as true or 
likely true, the foundationalist has not offered any reason whatsoever as to why anyone should 
believe b. Thus, b remains arbitrary unless the foundationalist is willing to offer some reason for the 
likelihood of the truth of b  for example, the proposition X  in which case the regress of reasons 
continues. Moreover, Bergmann contends that what matters is the truth of proposition X, not that 
one justifiably believes X318. But if that is so, is it not only fair to raise the question whether X is 
true. If X is true or highly likely to be true, then the foundationalist has an excellent reason for the 
basic belief b; namely, the truth or the sufficiently high likelihood of the truth of X. If X is, 
however, false or highly likely to be false, then the foundationalist has a reason for the falsity of b, 
and she should cease to believe b.319 Bergmann, as I understand him, seems to argue that basic 
beliefs are justified if they are based on external facts, i.e. if the beliefs are properly connected with 
the external world. But, oddly enough, Bergmann seems to think that we should not care whether 
our beliefs are, in fact, grounded properly in external facts. If they are, our basic beliefs are justified 
and we know most of the things we think we know, and if they are not, then, well, we do not know. 
In my opinion, this is a very unsatisfactory response to the skeptic and to the regress problem. 
Granted, it is possible that some beliefs enjoy the status of being basic and are non-inferentially 
justified, but mere possibility and good epistemic faith do not convince us that this really is the 
case.320 However, externalists side with Bergmann321 and claim that a belief does not require 
justifying reasons in order to be justified. So it seems that what is at stake here is the differing 
intuitions of the internalists and externalists, which debate will be considered later in this chapter. 
For now, it suffices to point out that what we have, in effect, done here in criticizing 
foundationalism is just a matter of reheating the good old Pyrrhonian mode of hypothesis. As noted 
in the previous chapter, if we just assume a proposition without reason, we could as well, and 
equally convincingly, assume the opposite of the proposition. Thus, the basic beliefs the 
foundationalist offers are arbitrary  since they are not backed up with further reasons  or she must 
propose reasons for her favored beliefs, in which case the regress continues.322 Hence, due to the 
ultimately arbitrary nature of the basic beliefs, our Pyrrhonian interlocutor advises us to suspend 




Proponents of coherentism hold that the regress of justified beliefs comes to an end due to the 
circular justification of a belief system. Circular reasoning alone cannot make beliefs justified, 
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coherentists tell us, but if our belief system is sufficiently coherent, then justification follows. No 
belief is secured as a foundation for all upcoming knowledge claims, and neither is any belief 
privileged as the source of justification for other beliefs. All that matters, with respect to epistemic 
justification, is the mutual coherence between all the members of a belief system. If a belief coheres 
with a persons belief system, it is justified, otherwise not. Coherentists hold that there are no 
Archimedean points, i.e. a foundationalists basic beliefs, with the help of which we could build the 
edifice of knowledge as other beliefs were derived from the foundational ones. The second best 
choice, however, is, arguably, to aim for mutual coherence between beliefs. For, clearly, a coherent 
belief system is epistemically preferable to an incoherent one.   
 
Coherentism as a theory of epistemic justification faces all kinds of problems. We have already 
considered some pressings objections against coherentism while discussing the so-called fourth 
alternative as a solution to Chisholms formulation of the diallelus323. Some additional objections 
are still worth bringing forth. Moreover, it should be pointed out that coherentism should not be 
construed as a view according to which justification is created solely by circular reasoning, for such 
a view is clearly implausible. As pointed out with respect to the consideration of the mode of 
circularity in Pyrrhonian system, circular reasoning entails that a claim is supported by an appeal to 
itself.324 Thus, if epistemic justification is circular in character, this implies that a belief b in the end 
justifies itself, via a circular detour through other beliefs. It is quite implausible to claim that 
initially non-justified belief acquires a justified status if it is just fitted into a coherent belief system, 
where it actually justifies itself.325 In that kind of view epistemic justification seems to amount to a 
conjuring trick of sorts. 
 
More plausible construal of coherentism proposes that members of a belief system are justified due 
to the overall coherence of the system. A belief is justified if it coheres with the rest of the beliefs in 
a given system. A central problem for this variety of coherentism is that even perfect coherence 
between a large number of beliefs does not make the truth of the beliefs even probable. All kinds of 
fantasies and fairy tales can be maximally coherent but still obviously false. The coherentist may 
just bite the bullet and admit the objection, but simultaneously point out that we have no choice but 
to rely on the possibility that a coherent set of beliefs containing scientifically approved 
propositions really is true, or approximately true. If we do epistemically our best to form beliefs 
according to the best available evidence, are sensitive to contrary evidence, and try to arrange all 
pieces of relevant information into a coherent whole, what else could reasonably be demanded of us 
as epistemic agents? If that is not enough for justification, what is, then? If we are prepared to 
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abandon even the seemingly most certain propositions if the overall coherence of our belief system 
demands so, we can look forward to our scientific theories, claims, and beliefs in general 
converging towards truth in the long run.  
 
The skeptic, of course, objects and points out to the coherentist that hope for knowledge does not 
equal to knowledge. We can be in the long run as dead wrong as when we started our quest for 
knowledge, despite the coherence of our belief system. Another problem for coherentism is that 
coherence seems to be too demanding a condition for justified belief or knowledge. In other words, 
if we have justified beliefs and knowledge, can we not then reasonably suppose that I can justifiably 
believe or know, for example, that I have two hands, that 2 plus 2 equals 4, and that I had breakfast 
in the morning even if my belief system is not even closely coherent. Why should we suppose that 
coherence between the beliefs of a given system is a necessary condition for justified belief and 
knowledge? Moreover, the coherentist is in trouble while trying to explain the nature of a priori 
beliefs. In fact, Laurence BonJour  once a prominent defender of coherence theory of epistemic 
justification, nowadays a solid foundationalist326  was guilty of such an arbitrary partiality327 as 
he defended coherence theory with respect to justification, except with respect to justification of a 
priori beliefs. BonJour regarded the justification of a priori beliefs as basic328, which, however, 
raises the pair of questions as (i) whether his overall theory (back then) could be characterized as 
coherence theory of justification once a priori beliefs are justified independently of coherence, 
and (ii) whether other kinds of beliefs than a priori could also be justified independently of 
coherence.  
 
In sum, coherentist accounts of epistemic justification, as well as their foundationalist rivals, do not 
seem to succeed in solving the regress problem. Firstly, it is implausible to suggest that circular 
reasoning could be justification-creating329, since that amounts just to repeating ones claim via a 
circular detour. Sure, we can argue in circles, but that does not make our beliefs justified nor does it 
give us any reason to think that the defended proposition is true. Hence, we cannot justify our 
claims via circles. Thus, the regress of reasons continues and skepticism threatens us again. 
Secondly, if coherence as such is proposed as the factor that makes the members of the belief 
system justified, the skeptic objects to and asks what makes us think that coherence enhances the 
probability of our beliefs being true? Again, we can stipulate that a coherent belief system is 
justified, but if coherence warrants the truth of our beliefs no more than their falsity, why should we 
hold that coherence is a valuable epistemic good? In fact, it can be seen quite straightforwardly that 
coherence of a belief system does not imply anything about its truthfulness. If so, sticking to 
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coherence as the criterion of epistemic justification is without any grounds, and, thus, the 
Pyrrhonian skeptic advises us to suspend judgment about coherence as a criterion of epistemic 
justification. 
 
4.3. The A Priori Justification 
 
In this section I will discuss the epistemic status and justification of the so-called a priori truths. 
Discussion of the a priori in this study is necessary, for if we have a priori knowledge, then at least 
some of our beliefs are not affected by skeptical arguments. More specifically, our alleged a priori 
beliefs are justified non-inferentially just in virtue of their being a priori. Thus, a priori beliefs do 
not need further justifying beliefs, and, therefore, the regress problem is answered once and for all. 
Traditionally, it is thought that those propositions that we know a priori, are transparent to reason 
and, thus, seeing their truth follows immediately upon understanding of them. But how is a priori 
knowledge acquired? With what our beliefs about the a priori should correspond in order for them 
to be true? Which propositions are genuine instances of a priori knowledge? To answer these 
questions, we need a full-fledged theory on the a priori. Luckily, Laurence BonJour has recently 
provided us with such a theory. 
 
4.3.1. The A Priori Justification and BonJours Moderate Rationalism 
 
In his In Defense of Pure Reason, BonJour defends a moderate rationalist account of a priori 
justification and knowledge. It is rationalist because he holds that a priori justification genuinely 
exists and it is moderate since he holds that a priori insights are both fallible and corrigible in 
character.330 According to BonJour, when we reflectively consider a putative a priori proposition, 
we are able simply to see or grasp or apprehend that the proposition is necessary, that it must be 
true in any possible world or situation331. The seeing or grasping of the truth of the proposition is 
immediate and direct, and does not depend on any sort of criterion. In the case of a priori 
knowledge, we see by way of rational intuition the necessary features of the reality. When we 
apprehend a priori propositions, we understand that the reality must be the way the propositions 
convey.332 And what could be a better reason to accept a proposition as true, than seeing that it 
reflects a necessary feature that reality could not fail to possess333? Furthermore, there is nothing 
mysterious about or ability to apprehend a priori truths, for it consists simply in our general ability 
to understand and think.334  
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BonJour seems to make quite a concession to the skeptic as he holds that our a priori insights are 
fallible. Traditionally, the rationalists have held that our rational insights are certain, that is, they are 
infallible and cannot fail to be true. However, BonJour contends that the claim of infallibility with 
respect to a priori propositions is implausible and indefensible, for there are, in the history of 
philosophy, too many examples of alleged a priori truths that have turned out to be false.335 
William Alston agrees:  
 
As for rational intuition, one would be hard pressed to find a contemporary defender of its infallibility 
or incorrigibility, and for good reason. It can hardly lay claim to complete consistency of output. To 
some philosophers it has seemed self-evident that every event is causally determined; to others it has 
seemed self-evident that humans have free choice in a sense that is incompatible with the causal 
determinism of such choices. To some it has seemed self-evident that temporally backward causation is 
impossible; to others it has seemed self-evident that it is possible. And so it goes. If the deliverances of 
rational intuition contradict each other, it cannot be that they are all correct.336  
 
Moreover, BonJour notes that the metaphysical theories of, for example, Plato, Spinoza, and 
Leibniz were all intended to be knowable a priori, but since they conflict with each other, they 
cannot all be true.337 These remarks motivate us to revise our account of the a priori in such a way 
that reason provides us only with apparent rational insights. In other words, a priori justification is 
fallible in character just like empirical justification is. However, for a proposition to count even as 
an apparent rational insight, the person must consider the proposition with a reasonable degree of 
care and she must genuinely be aware of the necessity or apparent necessity of the proposition in 
question.338 In addition to being fallible, rational insights are also corrigible. BonJour provides two 
complementary ways339 with the help of which it is possible to detect and correct mistakes in 
apparent rational insights. First, mistakes can be internally correctable; further reflection is capable 
of revealing mistakes and replacing them with correct insights. For example, these kinds of internal 
corrections are usual in arithmetic calculations. Second, we may detect mistakes in apparent rational 
insights by seeing how well or badly they fit together. This method, effectively, amounts to an 
appeal to coherence among our rational insights. Of course, we should be able to decide which 
insights are more fundamental than others, so that in case of conflicting insights we could appeal to 
coherence and reject the epistemically weaker insights. Furthermore, these two methods of 
correction can often work together. For example, initial appeal to coherence can detect an 
inconsistency among insights, and further internal reflection reveals that an apparent rational insight 
is, indeed, mistaken and it is then replaced by a correct insight.340    
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The coherence method already revealed that, according to BonJour, justification of a priori 
propositions comes in degrees, that is, some insights are more justified than others. For example, 
BonJour holds that proposition 2 + 2 = 4 is more justified than proposition 25  5 = 33, although 
they both are justified a priori. Moreover, since a priori propositions are corrigible, they are 
defeasible, and thus a priori propositions are only prima facie justified.341 An apparent, prima facie 
justified rational insight can be defeated by seeing a conflict of insights. If the other, opposing 
insight is stronger than the initial insight, the latter can be replaced by the former. In addition to 
conflicts among rational insights, also empirical considerations can be relevant to the justification of 
a priori propositions. In other words, empirical evidence can count partially against a priori 
proposition. But only partially, for other a priori insights are needed in order to see how empirical 
considerations are relevant with respect to the a priori proposition that is under revision.342    
 
BonJour also emphasizes that the seeing involved in rational intuition is non-propositional in 
character. More specifically, we directly grasp that, for instance, modus ponens is a correct form of 
inference, and that grasping is, basically, non-propositional in character. Were it not, we should 
justify modus ponens with some more fundamental or equally fundamental logical rule, and thus the 
threat of an infinite regress is created.343 Finally, BonJour admits that a priori justification has also 
externalist constraints, namely, the justification of an apparent rational insight can be undermined 
by factors of which the epistemic agent is unaware. For example, if a person suffers from severe 
cognitive malfunction, she can, even after careful reflection, mistakenly believe that a certain 
proposition is necessary and a priori, and due to her unfortunate condition, she is unable to 
internally correct her mistaken belief.344 BonJour holds that such a person does not have even an 
apparent rational insight, since the person does not satisfy a condition of cognitive sanity345. In 
summary, Bonjour holds that a priori justification is fallible, corrigible, varies in degrees, can be 
defeated by internal, empirical, or externalist considerations, and is non-propositional in character.   
 
4.3.2. The A Priori Justification and the Regress Problem  
 
As noted above, BonJours account of a priori justification as fallible makes his view vulnerable to 
the skeptics attack. In sum, if rational insight is fallible, it seems that we need a criterion to 
distinguish between genuine and apparent insights  however, the criterion calls for a further 
justifying criterion and thus the threat of an infinite regress is inevitable. BonJour acknowledges 
this objection too:  
 
The Inevitability of Skepticism. A Study on the Problem of the Criterion 
 104
If rational insight is indeed fallible, then it is natural to think that some further, epistemically prior 
criterion is needed in order to distinguish genuine rational insights from merely apparent ones, with any 
epistemic justification that results from such insight depending essentially on the fact that this criterion 
is satisfied.  [T]he need to appeal to such a criterion would deprive a priori insight of most or all of 
its cognitive value. But, at a deeper level, such an approach is in any case inherently futile: any such 
criterion or standard would itself have to be somehow justified; and only a little reflection will show 
that there is no possible way in which it could be justified without either impugning the a priori status 
of the claims that are justified by appeal to it (if it is justified empirically) or else being guilty of 
obvious circularity (if it is justified a priori).346 
 
Now we can see more clearly why BonJour refuses to call the two methods of insight correction  
internal reflection and an appeal to coherence  as criteria or standards. Instead, he speaks of 
complementary ways or re-examination347, and tries thereby to avoid the problem described 
above, the problem amounting, obviously, to the problem of the criterion and more specifically, to 
the regress problem. If a priori beliefs need be justified by further beliefs, the threat of an infinite 
regress of justifying beliefs is inevitable. However, BonJour holds that patently mistaken candidates 
for rational insights  results of, for example, bias or dogmatism  can be detected as such via 
further reflection, and no appeal to any external criterion is needed. Of course, it is possible that one 
is so biased that she is not able to detect the obvious mistake, but that does not imply that her 
mistaken belief becomes an apparent rational insight. In other words, it is a background condition 
for rational insights that ones reason not be irreparably clouded by bias or dogmatism or both, that 
one be capable of attending in an unbiased and non-dogmatic way to the rational credentials of the 
claim (or inference) in question348. Thus, reflection, additional care, and scrutiny are of utmost 
importance with respect to rational insights. However, the questions arise as to how much reflection 
is enough and how do we know that our internal corrections hit the mark?  
 
BonJour notes that the method of internal correction is frequently at work also with respect to sense 
perception. For example, my judgment that a nearby tree is a pine may be altered, due to more 
careful visual perception, to the judgment that it is a spruce.349 The example is telling, for now the 
skeptic can remark that we have only traded off an appearance for another, but the problem whether 
our appearances correspond with anything real remains. Obviously, similar skeptical remarks can be 
made against BonJours account on a priori. How do we know that our internal corrections with 
respect to rational insights are apt? Moreover, is it not possible that, due to a further reflection and 
scrutiny, we replace a genuine insight with a false insight? How do we know that any of our 
apparent rational insights are true at all? BonJour tries to suppress the doubts by holding that, with 
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respect to rational insights, mistakes are extremely rare350 and they represent an extremely tiny 
fraction of cases351. Furthermore, BonJour contends that cases of conflicting insights are similarly 
extremely rare. 352     
 
At this point of discussion, one starts to wonder whether mistakes and genuine disagreements with 
respect to a priori insights really are as rare as BonJour apparently wants us to think that they are. 
Does not the mere existence of philosophical debates prove that disagreements  and consequently, 
mistakes  are more like a rule than an exception?353 Moreover, philosophical controversies and 
disparities of insight are commonly based on a priori, rather than empirical grounds. Thus, one 
wonders on what grounds BonJour claims that mistakes are rare and that the methods of internal 
correction are reliable? And furthermore, how does Bonjour know, as he confidently proposes, that 
a priori justification is fallible, corrigible, varies in degrees, can be defeated by internal, empirical, 
or externalist considerations, and is non-propositional in character?  
 
The most crucial problem concerns, however, BonJours view that a priori justification is fallible. 
As already pointed out in our discussion on foundationalism354, if it could be shown that we have 
infallible basic beliefs, the threat of an infinite regress of reasons could be effectively eliminated. 
But if it is admitted that our basic beliefs or a priori insights are fallible, we should be able to give 
reasons for thinking that they are, nonetheless, likely to be true, i.e. justified. These reasons amount 
to criteria and, thus, the threat of regress is unavoidable. For example, it is hard not to think that the 
conditions BonJour proposes  such as reasonable degree of care, genuine awareness of the 
necessity of the proposition in question, further reflection, an appeal to coherence, and cognitive 
sanity  are nothing more than necessary criteria that an apparent rational insight must satisfy in 
order to be justified. Yet, even though the conditions were satisfied, the insight can still fail to be 
true. And the skeptic, of course, demands us to justify these further criteria; thus the inescapable 
regress.   
 
All in all, BonJours account on the a priori fails, since his account devastatingly falls prey to the 
problem of the criterion. On the one hand, the fallibility of the a priori seems to imply that we need 
criteria to distinguish apparent from genuine insights, and thus the diallelus applies as well to a 
priori insights as empirical claims. On the other hand, BonJour can deny the need for criteria, but 
since we have here pointed out various reasons on the basis of which to doubt the truth of apparent 
insights, denial to give further criteria amounts to dogmatism and accepting unwarranted 
assumptions as a priori insights. BonJour even admits that we can still doubt whether accepting 
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apparent rational insights is indeed conducive to arriving at the truth355, and that skepticism about 
a priori remains dialectically tenable356. Finally, appearing to be boxed in, BonJour concedes that 
although fallible rational insight may not be all that we could ask for, [it] is almost certainly all 
that we can ever hope to have357. In the end, the sound of reason has diminished to cautious hope, 
and the case about the a priori seems to be decided in the skeptics favor.   
 
4.4. Infinitism as a Solution to the Regress Problem 
 
According to infinitism, justification of a belief requires an infinite regress of reasons. Thus, the 
regress problem is not a problem at all, since infinite regress of beliefs can be justification-creating. 
If foundationalism and coherentism as theories of epistemic justification are at least initially 
plausible accounts, the same cannot be said of infinitism. To explicate, it strikes as counter-intuitive 
to claim that justification and knowledge of any belief depends on an infinite regress of justifying 
beliefs. 
 
4.4.1. A Characterization of Infinitism 
 
Infinitism358 is an unlikely philosophical position in the sense that proposing a view that the 
justification chain of beliefs is never-ending is rather surprising. Sextus, for one, thinks that the 
mode of infinite regress leads without a question to the conclusion that it is impossible to establish 
infinitely many proofs359. Fogelin, in turn, does not even bother to consider the infinitist theory of 
justification, for, as he sees it, [s]ince we are concerned with human knowledge, it is hard to see 
how the mode of infinite regress can be made innocent of skeptical consequences360. However, 
recently the ungrateful commission has been fulfilled as Peter Klein has taken up the bold task of 
giving a full-fledged defense of infinitism361. Thus, it may be proper to start characterizing 
infinitism by quoting Klein himself:   
 
Infinitism is the view that the answer to the regress problem is that the regress never properly ends. 
There is always another reason, one that has not already been employed, that can legitimately be 
required for each reason that is given for a belief. Only if there is an infinite set of non-repeating 
reasons available for a belief is it fully justifiable.362 
 
At this point an obvious objection is raised, namely, suppose that the justification of my initial 
belief, A, depends on the justification of a further belief, B, whose justification depends on a still 
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further belief, C, and similarly all the way ad infinitum. Now, since justification of any belief is 
dependent on the justification of other beliefs, all justification is conditional in character. Thus, A is 
justified only if B and C are justified. We cannot show that any belief is non-conditionally justified, 
for since the regress of justifying beliefs is infinite, justification of any belief is conditional upon 
other beliefs.363  
 
Klein accepts the above objection. Accordingly, he modifies his proposal of infinitism to the effect 
that beliefs can be at most conditionally  or provisionally, the term Klein prefers364  justified. 
Klein goes on to propose that, in fact, this is an advantage for infinitism. We must only first 
abandon the assumption that reasoning can and must settle issues for good. Every issue remains 
open to further reasons, pro or con, to emerge. There is no epistemic bedrock on which we could 
ultimately rely as a basis for all knowledge. Every proposition and epistemic judgment is open to 
revision, but that is merely in concordance with a true Pyrrhonian spirit, for, we are, after all, still 
investigating365 the truth of matters while avoiding all kinds of dogmatism. Our epistemic 
situations can change and we ought to recognize that it is never settled whether any proposition p is 
true. It can be, however, more reasonable to believe p than to deny p, depending on the reasons we 
have for or against p. 366   
 
Does infinitism imply that we must have infinitely many beliefs? The answer is yes, it does. 
However, an infinitist is not committed to the implausible view that we should be able to 
consciously and simultaneously entertain infinitely many beliefs. That would be an absurd demand. 
Instead of beliefs we should concentrate on our dispositions to believe. Arguably, we have 
dispositions to assert infinitely many propositions although we have never consciously entertained 
but a small fraction of those propositions. For example, most of us would assert the propositions 
Pears do not normally grow on apple trees, 61+346=407, and Chicago is east of every city in 
California. Similarly, we can formulate examples of infinitely many propositions that most of us 
would believe. In other words, we are disposed to form infinitely many beliefs. Moreover, we are 
able to produce new reasons for our beliefs. For example, for quantum physics, evolutionary theory, 
psychological explanations of human behavior, and scientific theories in general there have been 
temporary stopping points in the past with respect to the reasons available for explaining 
phenomena respective to each discipline. However, as time has passed, we have been able to 
produce new reasons, along with novel scientific concepts, and our conceptions of phenomena have 
expanded respectively. Thus, the infinitist holds that there are and will be no permanent stopping 
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points, or basic beliefs in foundationalists terms, in the regress of reasons. Instead, the chain of 
reasons continues indefinitely.367  
 
I think that Kleins theory, infinitism, is clearly motivated by the will to give an adequate response 
to the skeptic so that we accept the skeptics central claims, but do not accept skepticism. 
Specifically, Klein seems to accept the regress problem at face value and accept that we have only 
three options in responding to it: postulating basic beliefs, endorsing circular reasoning, or 
endorsing infinite regresses of reasons. Then, Klein sides with the skeptic and holds that the 
foundationalist or coherentist ways out of the regress problem are simply unacceptable. Thus, we 
are left with infinite regresses of reasons if we are to hold on to our conviction that we have 
knowledge. Infinitisms rival accounts, coherentism and foundationalism, fail since the former 
advocates a form of begging the question due to its acceptance of circular reasoning, and the latter 
advocates accepting, at the base, arbitrary reasons for which no further reasons cannot be provided. 
Both views are unacceptable. Infinitism, in contrast, does not promote accepting circular reasoning 
or arbitrary reasons, for an infinitist can always seek for further reasons. And history suggests that 
new reasons are always available or forthcoming.368 As Klein sums up infinitism:  
 
No belief is ever fully justified for any person. The process of justifying a proposition is never 
completed. That is a consequence of infinitism. But that is not because there is no infinite set of 
propositions available that could serve as good reasons for our beliefs. Rather, no belief is fully justified 
because at no point in time will we have completed the process of justifying our beliefs. All 
justification is provisional.369 
 
Before we turn to consider objections to infinitism, its central tenets should be expressed more 
clearly and precisely. Klein provides us with two specific principles that imply infinitism. These 
two principles are meant to characterize (significant) necessary but not sufficient conditions for 
justification370. The first principle is called the Principle of Avoiding Circularity (PAC): 
 
(PAC)  For all x, if a person, S has a justification for x, then for all y, if y is in the evidential 
ancestry of x for S, then x is not in the evidential ancestry of y for S.371  
 
Klein thinks that PAC expresses simply a principle of good reasoning. Accordingly, PAC bans 
circular reasoning. The second principle, the Principle of Avoiding Arbitrariness (PAA) goes as 
follows: 
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(PAA) For all x, if a person, S, has a justification for x, then there is some reason, r1, available  
to S for x; and there is some reason, r2, available to S for r1, etc., and there is no last 
reason in the series.372 
 
PAA is meant to capture two central ideas of infinitism. Firstly, justification of beliefs is dependent 
upon reasons for beliefs, as opposed to something else like the reliability of the cognitive 
mechanisms causing the belief. Secondly, every reason is in need of another reason and, thus, the 
chain of reasons cannot terminate at a reason for which there are no further reasons. This amounts 
to banning of arbitrary reasons.373 An acceptance of proposition is considered to be arbitrary if the 
proposition is accepted even if there are no better reasons for accepting it than denying it. Thus, a 
foundationalists basic beliefs are considered to be arbitrary, since they  or at least Klein argues so 
 are accepted without any reason for thinking that they are more likely to be true than false. An 
infinitist, in turn, can neither give indefinitely many reasons for her beliefs, but that does not imply 
that the last reason given must be an arbitrary one. In other words, the infinitist can have better 
reasons for believing the last proposition than denying it although she has not yet given those 
reasons.374  
 
Klein thinks that since the principles PAC and PAA are intuitively appealing, a plausible account of 
epistemic justification must be so formulated that the reasons supporting a justified belief must be 
infinite and non-repeating.375 Klein does not give an explicit formulation of an infinitist account of a 
justified belief. However, the conjunction of PAC and PAA imply the following principle that can 
be called as Kleins regress condition (K): 
 
(K)  For all r, if a person, S, has a justification for r1, then r1 is the first member in an 
infinite sequence of distinct reasons σ {r1, r2, ...} such that every member rn of σ is 
such that its successor rn+1 is available to S as a reason for rn.376   
 
As Andrew Cling notes, an infinitist needs additional conditions of epistemic justification, for, 
according to the regress condition K, any proposition whatsoever can be justified377. Klein admits 
that not just any proposition can be a reason for beliefs. Reasons must be epistemically good in the 
sense that they have a sufficient probability of being true. Infinitism is compatible with various 
accounts of what makes a reason epistemically good. K is meant to capture just one necessary 
condition of justification, and there are other conditions a belief must satisfy in order to be 
justified.378  
The Inevitability of Skepticism. A Study on the Problem of the Criterion 
 110
4.4.2. Objections against Infinitism 
 
Usually the first, and also the most obvious, objection presented against the idea of an infinite 
regress of justification appeals to our cognitive finitude. Ernest Sosa puts the objection as follows: 
It [the endless regress of justification] is incompatible with human limitations. No human subject 
could harbor the required infinity of beliefs.379 However, as stated, Kleins version of infinitism 
requires only that we are in some sense able, or disposed, to form the relevant beliefs. It should be 
trivially clear that we are, in principle, able to form infinitely many propositions. For example, most 
of us are able to calculate infinitely many mathematical propositions by a mastery of finite number 
of mathematical principles such as the rules concerning addition, subtraction, and multiplication. 
Therefore, an infinite set of beliefs is at least possible, and, for the same reasons, we should think 
that an infinite regress of justified beliefs is possible. For example, if my belief that 2 plus 2 equals 
4 is justified, then also my belief that My belief that 2 plus 2 equals 4 is justified is justified, and 
so forth. Thus, we should conclude that with respect to every theory of epistemic justification, it 
trivially follows that some infinite regresses of beliefs can be justified. An infinitist only thinks that 
all beliefs are justified by infinite regress. It is useful to quote Cling here, who neatly sums up 
Kleins view on a justified belief:  
 
In effect, Klein thinks of a justified occurrent belief as the tip of an iceberg, supported ultimately by 
dispositional beliefs beneath the surface of occurrent awareness which are themselves supported by the 
limitless ocean of reasons to which a finite number of second-order dispositions gives us access.380 
 
I find that the objection is not successful or conclusive against Kleins version of infinitism. A more 
serious objection is that an infinitist cannot distinguish between justified and unjustified infinite 
regresses381. I follow mainly Mosers presentation of the objection. Moser proceeds to show that 
infinite regress cannot be necessary or sufficient for justification. He claims that we can find out 
whether an infinite regress is justified only by appealing to some additional information that is 
external to the regress in question. Thus, infinite regress is not necessary for justification, for a 
member of an infinite regress is justified if its successors are, in fact, justified. But why should we 
think, independently of any external information, that any member of an infinite regress is justified? 
Moser concludes that unless the infinitist can answer the preceding question, we should refrain from 
thinking that infinite regress can justify its terminal member.382 Infinite regress is not sufficient for 
justification, for, clearly, not all infinite regresses are justified. But nor it is necessary, for any 
reason given for thinking that the members of an infinite regress are, in fact, justified, undermines 
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the need for the regress condition itself. Klein admits that Mosers objection would be fatal for 
infinitism if it were not relying on the assumption that the external information that explains the 
justification of the infinite regress must be some additional justified belief.383 That is not necessary, 
however. As Klein clarifies, an infinitist needs only to hold that [T]here are some facts in virtue of 
which a belief is a reason. These facts are not part of the chain of reasoning384.  
 
I find Kleins defense highly dubious when he claims that facts determine whether a belief is a 
reason. This is, in effect, the same claim Bergmann gave, in our discussion of foundationalism385, to 
the effect that basic beliefs are justified because they are grounded in external facts. This is an 
externalist maneuver and if external facts determine whether our beliefs are justified, where do we 




It is interesting to note that, in fact, infinitism is quite close to the Pyrrhonian skepticism, namely, it 
seems that the regress problem, or its Pyrrhonian counterpart, the Agrippan Argument (or more 
precisely, the Justification Argument), presupposes principles closely similar to Kleins PAA and 
PAC. The regress problems central demand seems to be, in effect, that we should be able to give 
reasons for our beliefs. If we refuse or are unable to propose reasons for our alleged knowledge 
claim, then the claim is deemed as arbitrary  which is, in effect, the crux of the Pyrrhonian mode of 
hypothesis and Kleins PAA. If we justify our alleged knowledge claim via an already stated 
reason, we are arguing in a circle, which is unacceptable; this is, in turn, the crux of the Pyrrhonian 
mode of circularity and Kleins PAC. Now, both parties accept same premises (PAA and PAC), but 
the Pyrrhonist concludes to skepticism, whereas Klein ends up with infinitism. There is something 
curios about the situation; if both parties have the same premises, how could they end up with 
different conclusions? To repeat, Klein thinks that since the principles PAC and PAA are intuitively 
appealing, a plausible account of epistemic justification must be formulated so that the reasons 
supporting a justified belief must be infinite and non-repeating. But we could just as well say that 
the Pyrrhonist thinks that since the principles PAC and PAA are intuitively appealing, there is not a 
plausible account of epistemic justification. In my view, Klein has only reformulated the 
Pyrrhonists regress problem, and, moreover, his reasons for preferring the infinitist solution are not 
satisfactory. Hence, skepticism remains the only response and outcome to the regress problem. 
Even Klein admits that in an infinitist framework the possibility of skepticism is a serious one386.  
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Kleins reason for thinking that our search for truth may end up with skepticism is that [p]erhaps, 
our capacities to form new dispositions and concepts will reach a limit387. I think that we should 
not wait that long for rejecting infinitism, for other reasons are more pressing. Infinitism faces real 
trouble in explaining how we can distinguish justified infinite regresses from unjustified. It could be 
that the endless chain of beliefs we are, in a particular occasion, examining is, in fact, justified, but 
it could also be that it is not. And it is hard to see how we could show which one is the case. But 
infinitism does not aim for showing that something is the case, for, as infinitists claim, reasoning 
cannot settle matters and our beliefs are at best provisionally justified. However, I think that we do 
not need infinitism for saying that our beliefs are provisionally justified, for that amounts to saying 
that our beliefs are justified if they, in fact, are justified. That much has been clear right from the 
start, for even the skeptic admits that either we have knowledge or we do not. But the crucial 
question is, do we?  
 
Before we are able to fully assess the plausibility of the regress problem or the Justification 
Argument, we should take a closer look at the contextualist approach to justification. Contextualists 
argue, in effect, that justification of a proposition depends on a context  the same belief can be 
justified in one context, and unjustified in another. After we have examined the contextualist 
account and are familiar with the features characteristic to internalist and externalist theories alike, 
we have a comprehensive picture of the relevant answers to the regress problem.  
 
4.5. Contextualism as a Solution to the Regress Problem 
 
Contextualism as an epistemological theory can be understood in various ways, for, during the 
history of modern epistemology, contextualism has taken many forms. In order to understand better 
how contextualism is relevant to the regress problem, we should take look at the different main 
forms of contextualism. First, I will concentrate on the so-called relevant alternatives theory, an 
early precursor of contextualism. The relevant alternatives theory gave rise to the nowadays 
standard version of contextualism that is usually referred to as semantic contextualism, yet the two 
forms of contextualism are quite different. It is only the third version of contextualism, provided to 
us by Michael Williams, that is directly relevant to the consideration of the regress problem. Thus, 
it might seem unnecessary to discuss also the two other forms of contextualism, the relevant 
alternatives theory and semantic contextualism. However, as this work is not only a study on the 
regress problem, but on skepticism in more generally, I find it useful to discuss the other types of 
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contextualists responses to skepticism as well. Moreover, I think that it is also easier to understand 
Williams strand of contextualism after the other two versions are briefly introduced.   
 
4.5.1. The Relevant Alternatives Theory 
 
Contextualism is motivated first and foremost by defending our ability to know and explaining the 
initial intuitiveness of the skeptics challenge. Contextualists, in general, can be taken to hold both 
that skeptical arguments are plausible and that we do know most of the things we usually take 
ourselves to know. At first sight, such a combination of skepticism and anti-skepticism appears to 
be contradictory. Contextualists, of course, claim that the apparent contradiction is not real. In other 
words, there is no contradiction between knowing many ordinarily made claims, such as I have 
two hands and The world has existed more than just five minutes, and not knowing that I am not 
deceived by a malevolent demon who makes me constantly go astray in all kinds of matters. How 
could all this be true? Firstly, it should be noted that we are dealing here explicitly with Cartesian or 
indiscernability skepticism, as distinct from regress skepticism that is stated in various 
formulations of the problem of the criterion, one of which is the regress problem388. Regress 
skepticism challenges us to propose reasons for our alleged instances or criteria of knowledge, 
whereas the idea peculiar to indiscernability skepticism is that our beliefs and perceptual states are 
the same whether we are deceived by a malevolent demon or not. The skeptics next step is, of 
course, to argue that in order to know any (empirical) proposition, one must be able to exclude 
skeptical possibilities. The skeptics argument can be formulated as follows:  
 
(S1) I do not know not-SH.  
(S2) If I do not know not-SH, then I do not know O. 
(S3) I do not know O.389 
 
In the above argument, SH refers to a suitable and radical skeptical hypothesis, such as that one is 
being led astray by a malevolent demon, and O refers to some ordinary proposition that we take 
ourselves to know, such as that I have two hands. An obvious anti-skeptical counter-move with 
respect to the above argument would be to reformulate it in such a way that from the fact that I have 
two hands, together with the inferential principle, I can conclude that I am not deceived by a 
demon390. This anti-skeptical strategy, made famous by G. E. Moore391, will not be considered in 
this study, for it amounts effectively to the particularist approach that has already been criticized in 
the earlier chapter392. The other strategy is to deny the premise S2 of the above argument. 
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Accordingly, it is argued that the truth or falsity of skeptical hypotheses is not relevant to 
knowledge of ordinary propositions. This idea forms the crux of the so-called relevant 
alternatives theories. As Fred Dretske, often cited as the inventor of the relevant alternatives 
approach, explicates it: 
 
What I am suggesting is that we simply admit that we do not know that some of these contrasting 
skeptical alternatives are not the case, but refuse to admit that we do not know what we originally 
said we knew. My knowing that the wall is red certainly entails that the wall is red; it also entails that 
the wall is not white and, in particular, it entails that the wall is not white cleverly illuminated to look 
red. But it does not follow from the fact that I know that the wall is red that I know that it is not white 
cleverly illuminated to look red. Nor does it follow from the fact that I know that those animals are 
zebras that I know that they are not mules cleverly disguised to look like zebras.393  
 
In effect, Dretske argues that skeptical alternatives are not relevant in everyday contexts. I can 
know, for example, that I am sitting now, and from this I can infer and know that I am not standing, 
but still I cannot infer and know that I am not deceived by a malevolent demon. Thus, the skeptic is 
wrong in arguing that ordinary knowledge requires the exclusion of skeptical possibilities.394 
Dretske characterizes this view as a sort of contextualism, namely, knowledge depends on 
circumstances of context that are beyond an epistemic agents ken. Usually, my visual perception of 
an apple tree is enough to eliminate the possibility of an orange tree disguised to look like an apple 
tree or the possibility of a deceiving demon. However, change the circumstances to an actual case of 
cunning deception, and I do not know that I see an apple tree. Thus, whether I know depends on 
circumstances of the context of which I am totally ignorant.395 Anyway, if we know, we do not have 
to know that skeptical possibilities do not obtain. It seems absurd to claim that in order for me to 
know anything  no matter how trivial and mundane thing, such as that I see an apple tree at my 
grandmothers backyard  I must be able to know that my appearances are not misleading due to 
some bizarre and thorough fraud. And how could we possibly know such things? A global 
deception is possible but not relevant with respect to ordinary knowledge claims.396   
 
4.5.2. Semantic Contextualism 
 
The relevant alternatives approach implies a bold move: a denial of the so-called principle of 
closure.397 The principle of closure says, in effect, that if I know that p implies q, and I know that p, 
then I also know that q. As noted above, Dretske explicitly denies the principle, for, according to 
Dretske, in order for me to know that I have two hands I do not have to know that I am not deceived 
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by a demon. For many, if not most, epistemologists, the denial of the closure principle is a sufficient 
reason to reject the relevant alternatives approach. Keith DeRose, for one, thinks that we should 
retain the principle of closure, for otherwise we are led to abominable conjunctions such as that I 
do not know that I am not a bodiless (and handless) soul deceived by a demon, but still I know that 
I have hands398.   
 
DeRose, however, favors another kind of contextualism. This other version concerns the usage of 
the term knowledge and, hence, it can be labeled as semantic contextualism. Semantic 
contextualism is the most dominant form of contextualist theories of today. In contrast with relevant 
alternatives approach, semantic contextualists preserve the principle of closure. The trick of 
semantic contextualism is to argue that both the skeptic and the anti-skeptic are right in making 
their respective claims. It is argued, in effect, that the standards for knowing change according to 
the conversational context in which the knowledge claim is made. Accordingly, in a context where 
skeptical hypotheses are entertained, the standards are extremely high, whereas in an everyday 
context with ordinary knowledge claims, the standards are respectively much lower.399 Incidentally, 
in Dretskes version of contextualism, one can consistently hold that standards for knowing do not 
change even if one is forced to abandon the principle of closure. Semantic contextualists are able to 
retain the principle of closure just because they hold that the standards for knowing do change. And 
as will be shown, in section 4.5.4., it is not a small price to pay for retaining the principle of closure.  
 
Let us apply the present contextualist view to the skeptics argument considered above. As a result, 
the contextualists verdict regarding the premise S2 (If I do not know not-SH, then I do not know 
O) is that it is true irrespective of the context and epistemic standards affiliated with it. However, 
the truth values of the premises S1 (I do not know not-SH) and S3 (I do not know O) depend on the 
epistemic standards of the context in question. The premise S1  saying, in effect, that we do not 
know that no skeptical hypothesis obtains  is true only at unusually high standards conducive to 
skepticism. Otherwise, and in ordinary contexts, the premise S1 is simply false and respectively the 
negation of S3 is true; that is, I know, for example, that I have hands. Thus, at low standards 
conducive to every day contexts we know that we are not deceived by a demon.400 According to the 
present contextualist view, we are able to explain the initial plausibility of skeptical hypotheses 
without conceding to skepticism or giving up the intuitively plausible principle of closure. In other 
words, when we contemplate skeptical hypotheses, the standards for knowing rise drastically, and a 
skeptical conclusion seems inevitable. However, we can still plausibly hold that we know most of 
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the things we claim to know, for in everyday contexts we do not entertain skeptical hypotheses, and 
respectively the standards for knowing are considerably lower.401 As DeRose explains: 
 
Even while were in a context governed by high standards at which we dont count as knowing that O, 
we at the same time realize that as soon as we find ourselves in more ordinary conversational contexts, 
it will not only be true for us to claim to know these very Os that the skeptic now denies we know, but 
it will also be wrong for us to deny that we know these things.402  
For the fact that the skeptic can invoke very high standards that we dont live up to has 
no tendency to show that we dont satisfy the more relaxed standards that are in place in more ordinary 
conversations and debates [or that] (...) our ordinary claims to know are in any way defective.403 
 
The central view of semantic contextualism can be clarified by an analogy. To begin with, it is 
noted that some terms are context-sensitive. For example, I may describe the table in front of me as 
flat, but somebody else, say, a scrupulous physicist, could deny that it is flat. The physicist would 
have more stringent standards for calling something flat. Thus, according to my standards, it is true 
that the table in front of me is flat, but according to the physicists standards, it is false. Now, or so 
the analogy goes, knowledge is similarly a context-sensitive term as flat; the conversational 
context and its respective standards determine what counts as knowledge in a certain situation.404  
 
4.5.3. Contextualism and Skepticism about Epistemology 
 
The last form of contextualism considered here starts, roughly, from the idea that there is something 
seriously wrong with epistemologists way of phrasing skeptical questions. In other words, 
skeptical doubts are not at all so intuitive, intelligible, and compelling as most epistemologists tend 
to think. The semantic contextualists considered above suggest that skeptical doubts are intelligible 
with respect to high standards conducive to skepticism, whereas the proponents of current version 
of contextualism suggest that skepticism is not intelligible at all. Accordingly, we should call into 
question, or be skeptical about, the skeptics project of wholly unrestricted, general doubt. By doing 
epistemology in such an unrestricted manner, we will surely succumb to global skepticism, but that 
happens only if we accept the skeptics assumption that everything is open to doubt. But what if it is 
not intelligible at all to put everything under generic skeptical doubt? These ideas can be interpreted 
as getting impetus from certain thoughts on Wittgensteins On Certainty. The following passage is 
exemplary: 
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[T]he questions that we raise and our doubts depend on the fact that some propositions are exempt from 
doubt, are as it were like hinges on which those turn. 
That is to say, it belongs to the logic of our scientific investigations that certain things 
are in deed not doubted. 
But it isn't that the situation is like this: We just can't investigate everything, and for 
that reason we are forced to rest content with assumption. If I want the door to turn, the hinges must 
stay put.405 
 
Thus, as Wittgenstein suggests, some propositions are exempt from doubt, not because they are not 
usually doubted, but rather that it does not make sense to doubt them. Moreover, Wittgenstein holds 
that we cannot give grounds for all of our beliefs; some beliefs are, and legitimately so, unsupported 
by further evidence. So Wittgenstein provides a kind of answer to the regress problem, for [a]t the 
foundation of well-founded belief lies belief that is not founded406. In other words, the regress of 
beliefs stops at unjustified belief(s). To be sure, we can justify our beliefs and distinguish between 
warranted and unwarranted propositions407. However, justifying cannot continue indefinitely, and it 
is not that the end points  or foundations, so to say  of justificatory chains are indubitable or 
necessarily true. Ceasing to give grounds for beliefs is just a kind of necessary pragmatic 
presumption on our part.408 Propositions such as I have two hands and The Earth has existed 
long before my birth are not known, for they are just taken for granted or assumed in ordinary 
circumstances, and nor are those propositions open to doubt. Such propositions are just assumed, 
although they are not, strictly speaking, grounded at all. We, as philosophers or epistemologists, 
have better get used to the idea of groundlessness of our believing409. 
 
A form of contextualism developed by Michael Williams can be seen as a further elaboration of 
Wittgensteins thoughts. In effect, Williams proceeds to show that the skeptic does not so much 
raise the standards for knowing as changes the subject. Williams thinks that semantic contextualists 
are too concessive, for they admit that the skeptic is right although only within the context of high 
standards pertaining to philosophical reflection. However, such a concession gives the skeptic all 
she ever asked for; that is, the skeptic triumphs, after all. Nothing prevents the skeptic from 
agreeing with the contextualist that the standards for knowing change along with the context. What 
the skeptic wants to emphasize, however, is that the skeptical conclusion acquired within the 
context of philosophical reflection is applicable to all contexts, including everyday circumstances. 
Of course, we do not entertain skeptical hypotheses while engaging in everyday affairs, and, thus, 
the standards for knowledge in place are definitely different from those used in a state-of-the-art 
epistemology. However, the skeptic argues that philosophical reflection reveals that, in fact, we do 
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not know, although we are willing to think that we do know a great number of things in ordinary 
circumstances.410   
 
The contextualist is committed to the view that ordinary epistemic contexts are in a way continuous 
with skeptical scenarios, the crucial difference being that the latter consider such possibilities that 
are too remote to be taken seriously in ordinary contexts. However, Williams argues that the initial 
plausibility of skeptical scenarios cannot be explained by appealing to a function of their 
remoteness and respective high standards. Consider the following example. I am going to a museum 
and I have a guidebook that tells the opening hours of the museum. Do I know when the museum 
opens? Suppose, then, that I am faced with the following skeptical defeaters411, from pressing to 
hyper-remote, that can undermine my knowledge: 
 
Pressing. The guidebook was published several years ago and is likely to contain information that is out 
of date.  
Remote. Although the guidebook is up to date, in a fit of pique the museum director has deliberately 
forwarded false information to the publisher. 
Very Remote. Companies publishing guidebooks have been infiltrated by members of an underground 
group bent on undermining the world economy. Part of their plan to disrupt tourism, the worlds 
number one industry, involves corrupting the information in popular guidebooks. As a result, most 
recently published guidebooks contain substantial inaccuracies. 
Hyper-remote. There is no guidebook; there is no museum: Im a brain in a vat.412  
 
Now, according to contextualists, the more remote the skeptical possibility introduced, the more 
severe the standards involved. If this were the case, less remote possibilities would be more 
worrisome, since they are easier to be taken seriously. However, as Williams points out, this is 
dubious. The conspiracy case (referred to as Very Remote) seems just silly, whereas the classic 
brain-in-a-vat case (Hyper-remote) can be seen as a serious and relevant defeater to our empirical 
knowledge. Thus, the peculiarity of skeptical scenarios has not necessarily anything to do with their 
seeming remoteness. On the other hand, I could implement very high epistemic standards without 
even coming close to entertaining skeptical scenarios. For example, in my research concerning 
history I could be really critical of my sources, but if I paused to wonder whether the world has ever 
existed more than five minutes, would that amount to just one more increase in my epistemic 
standards? Williams is inclined to answer in the negative, for, according to him, I have stopped 
doing history and started doing (skeptical) epistemology instead. Thus, what has happened is that 
the subject has changed and not that the standards have been raised.413  
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Skepticism is, according to Williams, a fishy enterprise due to its unusual and questionable 
generality. As soon as we undertake the general questions concerning knowledge, we are caught in 
the skeptics net. But why should we think that we could ask, not to mention answering, such 
general questions? The skeptics enterprise is dubious, since it assumes totally general and unbiased 
perspective, a sort of view from nowhere, which is not possible, not at least for humans. Skeptical 
doubts are unlike any other we confront in our epistemic affairs, and they are radically 
discontinuous with ordinary epistemic practices. Williams suggests, following Wittgenstein, that we 
cannot even understand general skepticism: Doubt requires and presupposes some basis that is not 
doubted and from which doubting is advanced. If we tried to doubt everything, we could not get as 
far as doubting anything.414 Williams is quite pessimistic about the viability of skepticism in 
general, he even tersely states that skepticism is not a well thought-out theoretical enterprise. To 
give it up would be no loss415. Thus, the only sort of skepticism we should endorse is skepticism 
about philosophy416, or more specifically, skepticism about the traditional epistemological 
project417.  
 
4.5.4. Objections I: Contextualism and Skepticism 
 
There is a mass of serious objections to contextualism, and together they quite conclusively warrant 
the claim that none of the many forms of contextualism provides us with even an approximate 
solution to skepticism or the regress problem. In this section, I examine how the relevant 
alternatives theory and semantic contextualism succeed in responding to the problem of skepticism. 
In the following section, I examine how contextualism  Williams strand of it, in particular  
succeeds in responding to the regress problem.   
 
To begin with the relevant alternatives approach, the most serious problem, as stated already above, 
concerns its rejection of the principle of closure418. Right, if we reject the principle of closure we are 
able to respond to skepticism: I know that I have two hands, and I do not know that I am not 
deceived by a malevolent demon, but there is no contradiction between the two known propositions. 
The crucial question is this: are we willing to let go of the principle of closure? I am inclined to 
answer in the negative. If I really know that, at this very moment, I am sitting at my office in Turku, 
I most definitely also know that I am not on a distant planet far from the Earth being deceived by 
evil alien scientists, whose experiments cause me to have all these vivid appearances I currently 
happen to have. Nevertheless, according to the relevant alternatives theorists, I do not know the 
latter proposition. I find their view simply unacceptable; the principle of closure is intuitively 
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extremely plausible, and the relevant alternative theorists have not provided us with sufficient 
reasons or arguments in favor of giving up the principle. Sure, defeating skepticism is quite an 
achievement, but the price is too high: abandoning the principle of closure leads to too many 
unwanted and unintuitive consequences. Finally, even if the relevant alternatives approach manages 
to deal with the Cartesian or indiscernability skepticism, it does not provide us with a successful 
answer to the regress skepticism. Even if we reject the principle of closure, how does that help us to 
answer to the regress problem? In no way, I think.  
 
Moreover, the relevant alternatives theorist should be able to justify her claim to the effect that 
skeptical scenarios are not relevant in ordinary epistemic contexts. How does she know all this? It 
seems that we need a criterion for distinguishing irrelevant epistemic defeaters from the relevant 
ones. Why, in a zoo-context, is not the possibility of cleverly disguised mule in a zoo relevant but it 
is that, in general, I am able to tell mules apart from zebras? What if I really were in a Mule Park 
that contains only cleverly disguised mules to look like other species? Surely, then, the possibility 
of a painted mule looking like a zebra would be relevant.419 
 
The semantic contextualism approach, in turn, commits us to many implausible views. To begin 
with, it is unintuitive to claim that the epistemic status of belief can change according to the 
conversational context. My belief that Dinosaurs have inhabited the Earth counts as knowledge if 
it is true and my grounds for believing it are sufficient for making the belief justified. Either I know 
that Dinosaurs have inhabited the Earth or I do not, but my knowing this cannot be a matter of a 
conversational context. Moreover, according to contextualists, as I understand them, in some 
contexts I know that dinosaurs have existed, but in some contexts I know that dinosaurs have not 
existed. For example, in the current Western context which I inhabit, my belief that dinosaurs have 
existed counts as justified and knowledge. However, in another context, with a different culture and 
different epistemic standards, my belief that there have not been dinosaurs could count as justified 
and knowledge. I find this puzzling. And I am not content with the contextualists witty rejoinder to 
the effect that I know in both contexts, since the respective epistemic standards are different in each 
context. Finally, how do we decide whether one is simply mistaken or her belief is justified 
according to her contexts epistemic standards? This is not always so clear-cut. For example, in the 
past I once believed that dinosaurs became extinct because at some point there was not enough food 
for them to digest. However, I formed my belief according to the epistemic standards of my context, 
so my belief should count as justified and knowledge. Nevertheless later on I found various theories 
about the causes of the mass extinction of the dinosaurs, and I came to realize that I was clearly 
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mistaken about the reasons why dinosaurs ceased to exist. Granted, I accept that I can have justified 
beliefs in both situations (or contexts), but, clearly, I cannot know in both cases.420      
 
We can grant to the contextualist that some people are willing to ascribe to themselves knowledge 
far more easily and loosely than others who use the term justification more stringently. But that 
was never in doubt, people can use language freely and think that their beliefs are justified or count 
as knowledge. The question is, do we have justified beliefs or knowledge? Indeed, many of us use 
epistemic concepts loosely, but what if the skeptic is right and we have never had knowledge, be the 
context-dependent standards whatever they may. Thus, the complaint is that semantic contextualism 
is simply irrelevant with respect to epistemological concerns.421  
 
As we recall, the main motivation for developing a contextualist theory of knowledge was to 
provide us with an answer to the skeptics challenge. However, an answer to the effect that both the 
skeptic and the anti-skeptic are right, is intellectually unsatisfactory. The skeptic and the anti-
skeptic have a genuine disagreement, and it seems that the contextualists account does not leave us 
any better off than before her entrance into the epistemological playground. In fact, the situation has 
changed for the worse, for I have hard times to understand how two camps, with contrary claims, 
can both be right. Does that not lead to a repugnant view that anything goes? Although the 
contextualist could say in response that there are context-dependent rules and criteria for 
determining what counts as justified belief or knowledge in particular context, does it not only raise 
a new question, namely Does not any context go?422 In hope of understanding the contextualists 
claims, I can still comprehend the claim that justification is context-dependent, but what I cannot 
comprehend, is how knowledge could possibly be context-dependent? A dilemma for the 
contextualist threatens. If all contexts are epistemically on a par, then it seems that everything could 
be known. In effect, everyone can know everything, since justification and knowledge are matters 
of conversational context. If, on the other hand, some contexts are epistemically inferior, it means 
that we need a universal, i.e. not context-dependent, criterion for distinguishing bad contexts from 
good ones. In other words, we need a universal, context-independent criterion for distinguishing 
justified from unjustified propositions and the motivation for a contextualist epistemology 
immediately vanishes. In sum, a contextualist account amounts just to an ad hoc explanation of 
skepticism at the price of making everything knowledge.   
 
Semantic contextualism seems to fall into a form of relativism, treating numerous and contrary 
contexts as epistemically on a par. On the other hand, it is not so clear what contextualists mean by 
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the term context. Do epistemologists belong to one context and non-epistemologists to other? And 
presumably, as the above discussion indicates, the context of epistemologists divides at least into 
two separate camps: that of anti-skeptics and that of skeptics. Can I belong to several contexts at the 
same time, and can one person form her own, independent context? These are tricky questions, and 
I would like to add, they are ones that are not worth pursuing. If we aim to answer to the problem of 
skepticism, it appears that the contextualist approach just multiplies our problems and does not even 
give a successful answer to the original problem.  
 
4.5.5. Objections II: Contextualism and the Regress Problem 
 
What kind of solution do contextualists have to offer to the regress problem? Although the so-called 
semantic contextualists do not direct their energies to deal with the regress problem, proponents of 
the last considered form of contextualism are explicitly interested in solving the regress problem.  
 
Williams admits that the form of contextualism he favors is, formally at least, a variant of 
foundationalism. In every context there are various background presuppositions that are exempt 
from doubt. However, these context-dependent basic beliefs are not certain or maximally 
warranted as, in contrast, the foundationalists chosen beliefs are supposed to be. Williams claims 
that this contextualist approach has profound implications for solving the regress problem.423  He 
writes: 
  
[I]n practice, the threat of regress, or even of an extended sequence of claims and challenges, is slight to 
nonexistent. Faced with renewed grounds, we soon find ourselves with nothing very specific to add. 
Asked to justify some crashingly obvious claim, we are likely to say something like I can just see 
whats happening or It stands to reason.424 
 
The important moral is that our inability or unwillingness to give reasons for each of our beliefs 
does not lead to skepticism, but rather to skepticism about epistemology. How plausible or helpful 
are these Williams views about skepticism, which Dretske unsympathetically labels as 
Wittgensteinian hocus pocus?425 Even though we do not, in practice, entertain skeptical doubts 
about the external world, does this in itself indicate in any way that our beliefs about the external 
world are likely to be true? The contextualist openly admits that context-dependent basic beliefs are 
not justified at all. But how could unjustified beliefs terminate the regress of beliefs? If we 
acknowledge that some of our beliefs are arbitrary, it means that we do not have any reasons for 
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thinking that those beliefs are true. The Pyrrhonian mode of hypothesis enters into the picture, and 
we should suspend judgment about those propositions revealed to be arbitrary, rather than be 
skeptical about epistemology!426 
 
Moreover, one could wonder how ignorance of epistemology or skeptical possibilities could 
establish our knowledge, as many contextualists see the matter. David Lewis, for one, thinks that 
we know if we are just able to ignore the skeptical possibilities427. Fogelin, for other, also calmly 
states that, for the most part, we do not let skeptical possibilities worry us428. Thus, ignorance is a 
cognitive bliss, but epistemologists and other reflective wretches are doomed to the vortex of 
skepticism where nothing is known. I object. It is a shameful result for epistemology if knowledge 
is gained via ignorance  well, of relevant skeptical possibilities  but intellectual reflection leads to 
a cognitive demise. 
 
It should be noted that, trivially, knowledge and justification of some propositions is context-
dependent. For example, the proposition I am heavier than 83 kilograms is, arguably, justified and 
knowledge for me, Krister Talvinen, today, on the 16th of October 2006, but not so for someone else 
who does not weight over 83 kilograms. Moreover, in the case of context-dependent propositions I 
can affirm a proposition and you can deny it, but still both of us can be right, for we do not have a 
genuine disagreement. Indexicals and comparative terms can make justification and knowledge of 
propositions context-dependent, which should not present a problem for epistemology. However, it 
is extremely implausible to suggest, as contextualists do, that justification and knowledge of all 
propositions is context-dependent. There are genuine disagreements across different contexts, and 
if a particular epistemology tends to dispel them, so much worse for the theory.429 Moreover, if it is 
hold, as contextualists do, that knowledge of a particular proposition depends on the context, what 
kind of theory of truth are we assuming? I suppose that not even contextualists are willing to say 
that truth of propositions depends on the context, but if that is so, I would be curious to know what 
kind of, non-relativist, theory of truth makes it possible to hold that knowledge of propositions 
depends on the context.     
 
So far I have discussed various internalist theories of justification as responses to the regress 
problem. And honestly said, neither foundationalism, coherentism, infinitism nor contextualism has 
succeeded in addressing the problem. Next I turn to consider the externalist approach in 
epistemology. First, in section 4.6., I briefly characterize externalism. Then, in the following two 
sections, I discuss whether externalism in general addresses that kind of questions I think 
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epistemology should address. Obviously, the main focus will be the problem of skepticism and how 
externalists and internalists alike try to respond to it. Finally, in section 4.6.3., I discuss how 
externalist theory of knowledge and justification succeeds in addressing the regress problem.   
 
4.6. Externalism in Epistemology 
 
What is so difficult about knowing anyway? Why should we always be able to propose reasons for 
our beliefs in order for them be justified or knowledge? If only those beliefs count as justified that 
are inferred from some sort of basic propositions, as the story is told by the foundationalists, it 
seems that a very few of us have justified beliefs. Is it not quite implausible to suggest that only 
epistemologists  and yet of the internalist kind  can have justified beliefs? What about children, 
animals, and other not so reflective kinds of creatures? All of them can have knowledge, the 
externalists say. The natural functions of a beings cognitive faculties, rather than intellectual 
reflection on the part of the being, determine whether one has knowledge. The externalists suggest 
that if our cognitive faculties function the way they should, they produce reliable information about 
our surroundings and this information we convert into knowledge. For example, if my perceptual 
faculty functions properly, my belief I see a computer in front of me is true and justified, and 
therefore counts as knowledge. Moreover, according to the externalists, we have no reason to deny 
childrens or animals ability to have knowledge. Why could it not be claimed that, say, a wolf in 
the woods in some sense knows things such as that it is hungry, that there is a tree in front of it, and 
that it has pain in the left hind limb? 
 
Externalists do not deny the fact that, occasionally, we infer propositions from other propositions 
and, thus, we can have inferential knowledge. However, what externalists do deny is that we must 
have some kind of access  reflective or otherwise  to the justificatory factors of our beliefs in 
order for us to have knowledge. And it is exactly here where the intuitions of the epistemologists 
clash, for internalists hold that we must have some kind of access  reflective or otherwise  to the 
justificatory factors of our beliefs in order for us to have knowledge.430 According to the 
externalists, knowing is as simple as being related in a proper way to the external world. As Cling 
explains the externalist account: 
 
According to such an external account, there is no sense in which a persons having a reason for P need 
be less mechanical or more self-reflectively satisfying than a supermarket doors knowing that 
someone is approaching. Whether or not I have a genuine reason for a belief is not a matter of how I 
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conduct my doxastic affairs with respect to that belief but is a matter of whether or not my affairs are 
attuned to my environment in the right sort of way.431 
 
In other words, beliefs are justified in virtue of their relationship to some external facts that are 
outside of the epistemic agents cognitive perspective. Thus, as pointed out in Clings quotation 
above, externalists hold that justification of beliefs depends on externally grounded reasons to 
which we do not have to have access.  
 
Internalists demur. According to them, knowing requires having some kind of access (reflective or 
otherwise) to the reasons that justify a true belief. Moreover, internalists may determine that the 
access to the justifying factors of beliefs must be merely potential in character; that is, we do not 
have to be actually aware of the justifying factors, but we must always be able to specify the 
justifying factors if so required, in order for our beliefs to count as justified or known. Internalists 
hold that if no access to justifying factors is required, then all kinds of true beliefs that just come 
out of the blue could qualify as knowledge. Keith Lehrers famous example of Mr. Truetemp is 
intended to clarify this internalist intuition, viz. that the mere possession of correct information does 
not suffice for knowledge. As Lehrer tells the story, Mr. Truetemp has a tempucomp implanted in 
his head. The tempucomp is a very accurate thermometer that transmits information about the 
outside temperature to Mr. Truetemps brain so that he unreflectively forms true beliefs about the 
temperature. But does he know what the temperature is?432 Surely not433, answers Lehrer. And 
externalists, of course, disagree. Externalists could point out that if the tempucomp is a reliable 
belief forming process  i.e. it has a sufficiently high truth ratio  and Mr. Tempucomp learns to 
rely on its outcomes (beliefs about temperature), why could we not say that his beliefs are justified 
or known? Moreover, is our relation to our other cognitive processes that different from Truetemps 
relation to the tempucomp? In other words, it could be claimed that we do not have any access to 
the workings of, for instance, sense perception either and therefore we should evaluate similarly the 
outcomes of sense perception and the tempucomp. If we hold that the tempucomp is not an 
acceptable belief forming process, then the same should hold of sense perception, and vice versa.   
 
It seems that internalists and externalists have simply different intuitions about knowledge. 
Internalists epistemic intuition is that knowledge requires access to the justifying factors, while 
externalists intuition is exactly the opposite. To spell out in more detail the internalist position, 
consider the following, rather lengthy, passage from BonJour: 
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When viewed from the general standpoint of the Western epistemological tradition, externalism 
represents a quite substantial departure. It seems safe to say that until very recent times, no serious 
philosopher of knowledge would have dreamed of suggesting that a persons beliefs might be 
epistemically justified merely in virtue of facts or relations that are external to his subjective 
conception. Descartes, for example, would surely have been quite unimpressed by the suggestion that 
his problematic beliefs about the external world were justified if only they were in fact reliably caused, 
whether or not he had any reason for thinking this to be so. Clearly his conception, and that of 
generations of philosophers who followed, was that such a relation could play a justificatory role only if 
the believer himself possessed adequate reasons for thinking that the relation obtained. Thus the 
suggestion embodied in externalism would have been regarded as simply irrelevant to the main 
epistemological issue, so much so that the philosopher who suggested it would have been taken either 
to be hopelessly confused or to be simply changing the subject (...).434 
 
In sum, BonJour holds that externalism is an uninteresting or irrelevant theory of knowledge. But is 
it? What is really at stake here in the debate between internalists and externalists? How could we 
resolve this conflict between the two camps? These are very good and important questions, indeed. 
To repeat, I think that, fundamentally, the conflict between externalists and internalists boils down 
to their different epistemic intuitions. And it is a tricky question how to resolve a conflict between 
intuitions, since intuitions are just intuitions and as such something non-argumentative. We have 
some kind of an idea of how to resolve a conflict between arguments, but intuitions seem to be 
categorically different entities. However, for now, let us try to flesh out the internalist intuitions 
against externalism and formulate some specific arguments as to why externalism is thought to be, 
by internalists, such a faulty theory of knowledge.  
 
4.6.1. Conditional Analyses of Knowledge 
 
A quite recent complaint against externalism is that the approach merely reduces epistemology to a 
conditional analysis of knowledge. A prominent example of an externalist theory of knowledge is 
reliabilism, according to which a belief is justified if it is a product of a properly functioning, 
reliable belief forming mechanism. Hence, knowledge amounts to a true belief that is a product of a 
reliable belief forming mechanism. To repeat, an epistemic agent need not be aware of the 
external (from the agents point of view) and justifying factors that causally produce and sustain 
her beliefs. In order for me to know that There is a table in front of me, the corresponding true 
belief must be a product of a properly functioning perceptual faculty, and not, say, a product of 
wishful thinking. BonJour, once again, objects to the externalist enterprise: 
 
The Inevitability of Skepticism. A Study on the Problem of the Criterion 
 127
No matter how much work may be done in delineating externalist conceptions of knowledge or 
justification or reliability and in investigating how those apply to various kinds of beliefs or areas of 
investigation, there is a way in which all such results are merely hypothetical and insecure as long as 
they cannot be arrived at from the resources available within a first-person perspective. If, for example, 
an epistemologist claims that a certain belief or set of beliefs, whether his or her own or someone elses, 
has been arrived at in a reliable way, but says this on the basis of cognitive processes of his or her own 
whose reliability is merely for him or her an external fact to which he or she has no first-person access, 
then the proper conclusion is merely that the belief or beliefs originally in question are reliably arrived 
at (and perhaps thereby are justified or constitute knowledge in externalist senses) if the 
epistemologists own cognitive processes are reliable in the way he or she believes them to be. ... But 
the only apparent way to arrive at result that is not ultimately hypothetical in this way is for the 
reliability of at least some processes to be establishable on the basis of what the epistemologist can 
know directly or immediately from his or her first-person epistemic perspective.435  
 
Thus, according to BonJours criticism, externalist theories of knowledge  reliabilism, for instance 
 make knowledge hypothetical or conditional: we have knowledge if our beliefs are products of 
reliable belief forming mechanisms. A similar complaint against externalist theories is made by 
Richard Fumerton: 
 
It is tempting to think that externalist analyses of knowledge and justified belief simply remove one 
level the traditional problems of skepticism. ... Perception, memory, and induction may be reliable 
processes (...) and thus ... we may be justified in having the beliefs they produce but, the skeptic can 
argue, we have no reason to believe that these processes are reliable and thus even if we accept 
reliabilism, we have no reason to think that the beliefs they produce are justified.436  
 
Fumertons complaint seems to be, in effect, that due to the conditional character of externalist 
theories they do not provide us with any answer whatsoever to the problem of skepticism. Hilary 
Kornblith, whose sympathies lie within the externalist camp, agrees that if the considered kind of 
criticism against externalism is correct, then externalism is, indeed, in deep trouble. Kornblith 
proceeds to show that reliabilism, as a representative theory of externalism, does not make 
knowledge merely conditional. He argues that reliabilism explains and shows how knowledge is 
possible, whereas internalism seems to lead inexorably to skepticism and, thus, makes knowledge 
impossible.437 Moreover, reliabilism explains how we are in possession of a great deal of 
knowledge, for [s]urely our world is a world containing creatures many of whose beliefs are both 
true and reliably produced, and surely we are among those creatures438. Incidentally, one starts to 
wonder how Kornblith knows such things, even to the extent that he is sure about them.  
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Kornbliths answer to the alleged problem of externalism is quite simple. He contends that if there 
is a problem about the conditional character of reliabilism, then the same problem applies to all 
theories of knowledge. But is there a problem for reliabilism? According to reliabilism, a person S 
knows that p if and only if her belief that p is true and reliably produced. What is exactly lacking 
here? Is it supposed to be a problem for reliabilism that according to its analysis of knowledge a 
person knows if and only if she knows? Nor is a higher level knowledge a problem for a reliabilism, 
according to which a person knows that she knows that p if and only if her belief that she knows 
that p is both true and reliably produced. Internalists, of course, proclaim that a first-person access 
to the justifying reasons for a belief is required, but externalists simply reject such a requirement for 
knowledge. So is the complaint that externalist theories do not fulfill internalist constraints for 
knowledge? A quite unfair objection thus. If the complaint is that the truth of a belief is external to 
the epistemic agent, then this problem clearly applies to all theories of knowledge. The truth of a 
persons belief is external from her first-person perspective as is the reliability of the belief 
forming mechanism in question. But, of course, the truth of a belief is external to the epistemic 
agent also with respect to the internalist account.439  
 
I am not convinced of Kornbliths answer to the conditionality objection to externalism. But maybe 
my inability to see the force of Kornbliths arguments is affected by my slightly biased thinking, 
for, I admit, my epistemic intuitions are a kind of internalist rather than externalist. However, 
despite my bias, I try to show why Kornbliths answer is not convincing. Firstly, it is not true that 
internalism makes knowledge impossible while externalism makes it possible  not at least if 
logical possibility is concerned. Obviously, internalists do not hold that knowledge is logically 
impossible any more than externalists do. Nor does internalism entail the logical impossibility of 
knowledge. If epistemic possibility, in turn, is concerned, then it may well be that internalism leads 
to skepticism, but so does externalism, or so I will argue in chapter 5.  
 
Secondly, I do not agree that all theories of knowledge are conditional in character. True, all 
theories define some conditions that must be satisfied in order for a belief to count as justified or 
known, but that does not mean that all theories are conditional in the same sense as externalism is. 
Let me explain. According to, say, an internalist foundationalist, my belief is justified if it is based 
on a (justified) basic belief. Therefore, I can see via reflection whether my belief is thus based. If it 
is, the answer to the question whether my belief is justified is Yes, otherwise No. But an 
externalist, in contrast, cannot provide us with a similar test, since my belief is justified if it is a 
product of a reliable process. Are sense perception or reasoning reliable belief forming processes? If 
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the externalist answers in the affirmative, we would like to see her reasons for so saying. But as 
soon as the externalist tries to show that our cognitive faculties are reliable, skeptical problems 
emerge. This will be shown in chapter 5, in which the topic of epistemic circularity is discussed. 
Therefore, externalism either leads to skepticism or it is incurably conditional in character. An 
incurably conditional theory of knowledge is not a true option at all, since it amounts only to a 
pathetic attempt to bypass the problem of skepticism and not to a sincere treatment of the problem. 
As soon as the externalist is forced to abandon the false haven of conditionality, she is unable to 
address properly the problem of skepticism.   
 
Finally, Kornblith appeals to the fact that truth, at least, is as external to the internalist as it is to the 
externalist. Despite the danger of being overly harsh, my initial response to Kornbliths claim is So 
what? In the first place, we were dealing with question of whether knowledge is conditional in the 
externalist account, and the notion of truth was not even mentioned. Yes, I agree that truth is as 
external to the internalist as it is to the externalist, but justification is not. An internalist can see 
upon reflection whether her belief satisfies the condition of being justified, but the externalist only 
insists that a belief is justified if the belief forming process is reliable. In sum, I find that 
Kornbliths answers to the conditionality objection to externalism are unconvincing. Moreover, I 
find that the objection is plausible and, later on, I will appeal to it in many places in this work. The 
conditionality objection to externalism is almost suspiciously simple and maybe it is wise to have 
some reservations about the objection. Thus, I do not hold that the conditionality objection is 
conclusive against externalism although it is a very good objection. My hesitancy to deem the 
objection definitive is due to the fact that the issue boils down to the contrary intuitions of the 
internalists and externalists. I happen to have rather internalist epistemic intuitions and I find the 
conditionality objection, well, intuitively plausible. But someone, like Kornblith for one, with more 
externalist epistemic intuitions holds that the conditionality objection is not convincing and, 
furthermore, the externalist conception of knowledge is very intuitive.440 Debates that take place at 
the level of intuitions are problematic, but prior to discussing intuitions in chapter 5, I will raise 
some serious, argumentative objections to externalism in the same chapter.  
 
4.6.2. Knowledge: Easy or Impossible? 
 
Arguably, there is something intellectually unsatisfactory about the externalist approach to 
epistemology, according to which we know if our cognitive apparatus is properly attuned to 
external facts. It seems that, in the externalist account, knowledge comes too easy. After all, 
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skepticism  either the Pyrrhonian variety invoking the diallelus or the Cartesian variety invoking 
malevolent demons or other similar skeptical scenarios  strikes as a thoroughgoing, deep, and 
serious problem. The externalist explanation makes us feel that something is still missing. But what 
is that we are craving for in epistemology in general?   
 
We can try to clarify what is missing in the externalist account by concentrating on Barry Strouds 
writings. Stroud has emphasized the importance of understanding our knowledge441, and this view 
can be used to illustrate what the externalists supposedly miss in their account of knowledge. 
However, it should be noted that the debate between Stroud and his externalist opponents boils 
down to differing intuitions, again. Thus, it is hard to decide who is right, after all, since ones 
initial epistemic intuitions settle the issue beforehand!  
 
Stroud holds that, in epistemology, we are not merely searching for a list of facts we think we 
know, but, instead, we want to understand how we come to know the things we know, if any. We 
are searching for a general and philosophical explanation of our alleged knowledge, and as such the 
enterprise of epistemology clearly differs from empirical sciences. In botany, for example, we 
simply can take the reliability of perception for granted and on this basis we can list the features 
characteristic of, say, spurge. With the help of the determined criteria we are able to distinguish 
spurge from other flora. However, it is hard to see how similar procedure could work within 
epistemology. If I start listing things I think I know, it does not yet amount to epistemology, but 
only to a list of things I, arguably, know. Epistemology begins when I pause to wonder whether I 
really know all those things in my list and on what grounds I assume so. More specifically, Stroud 
explains the role of epistemology as follows:   
 
What we seek in the philosophical theory of knowledge is an account that is completely general in 
several respects. We want to understand how any knowledge at all is possible  how anything we 
currently accept amounts to knowledge. Or, less ambitiously, we want to understand with complete 
generality how we come to know anything at all in a certain specified domain.442 
 
In other words, we want to have an account of knowledge that explains in a satisfactory way how 
we are able to know anything at all. Similarly, the philosophical problem of other minds cannot be 
solved by asking someone what are her current thoughts and feelings. Even if the statement, say, I 
am happy, pronounced by the interviewed person were in fact true, that would contribute nothing 
with respect to the problem of other minds. We want to understand how anyone can know whether 
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someone else is in a mental state in which one claims to be.443 Similarly for perceptual knowledge, 
as Stroud illustrates:  
 
One way I can know that my neighbour is at home is by seeing her car in front of her house, where she 
parks it when and only when she is at home. That is a perfectly good explanation of how I know that 
fact about one of the things around me. It is a different way of knowing where my neighbour is from 
seeing her through the window or hearing her characteristic fumblings on the piano. But it could not 
satisfy us as an explanation of how I know anything at all about objects around me. It explains how I 
know something about one object around me  my neighbour  by knowing something about another 
object around me  her car. It could not answer the philosophical question as to how I know anything 
about any objects around me at all.444 
 
The point here is that the externalist approach to epistemology just amounts to listing alleged 
instances of knowledge as in the example about the neighbors car considered above445. Even if we 
had a complete externalist account of knowledge that would explain in perfect details, for example, 
the neurophysiological facts responsible for my belief There is a computer in front of me, 
something would be missing.446 Stroud tries to show what is wrong with externalism with another 
example that considers divine externalist epistemology. Suppose that we have an epistemologist 
who argues that knowledge amounts to reliable workings of our cognitive faculties whose truth-
conduciveness is guaranteed by a benevolent God. Suppose further that the epistemologist does not 
try to provide us with proof showing that there is, indeed, a benevolent God who vouches for the 
reliability of our cognitive faculties. Instead, she concentrates on filling the details of her theory, 
drawing heavily on the studies of leading neurophysiologists. Finally, suppose that the 
epistemologist is in fact correct; her theory represents a true description of human knowledge 
acquisition. However, the question arises has the epistemologist provided us with a satisfactory 
account of whether we have knowledge? Stroud is inclined to answer in the negative.447 
 
According to Stroud, externalist theories in general do not give us a sufficient reason to believe the 
theories themselves.448 Reliabilism, with or without invoking the truth-conferring God, may be true 
but is it? If the externalist tried to prove her theory, we could critically examine the demonstration 
on the basis of which we could then determine whether to accept the theory. Suppose that Descartes 
and the externalist agree to the extent that we have knowledge if our cognitive faculties work 
properly. However, the two differ in the respect that Descartes tries to prove that our faculties, in 
fact, work properly and produce true beliefs, whereas the externalist offers us no proof, only repeats 
her mantra We have knowledge if our cognitive faculties are reliable. Now, there is something 
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very odd about the situation as to where Descartes is blamed for the circularity of his alleged proof 
of reliability of reason, the externalist gets away with giving no proof at all, and is even praised for 
her account of knowledge in some circles. How can reluctance to prove ones account be a virtue in 
epistemology? 
 
Commenting on Strouds criticism of externalism, Sosa points out that Strouds conception of 
knowledge is a far too demanding. Sosa asks us to consider such a situation in which our cognitive 
faculties are reliable, the externalist description we have given of the mechanisms of our cognitive 
faculties is accurate and true, and we believe that our cognitive faculties are reliable, and that belief 
is also a product of a reliable cognitive process.449 Now, Sosa asks, What could possibly be 
missing? How could we possibly improve our epistemic situation?450 These are very good 
questions, indeed. However, Stroud emphasizes that the problem with externalism is that it is 
always possible to construct a competing externalist theory of knowledge that can yield seemingly 
strange beliefs as justified or known. For example, one could claim and believe that crystal ball 
gazing is a reliable belief forming mechanism, and if it, in fact, were reliable, the externalist account 
 of crystal ball gazing, to be specific  would be as good as it can get.451 Sosa acknowledges this 
problem of externalism and is forced to conclude that it is discomfort we must learn to tolerate452. 
Our attempts to formulate a comprehensive theory of knowledge will always suffer from a form of 
circularity, for we must suppose the truth of that very theory when formulating it453. It is another 
question whether this kind of circularity  epistemic circularity, as it has become to be known, the 
topic of the next main chapter  is necessarily vicious. However, if circularity is the inevitable 
outcome of our epistemological enterprise, as Sosa seems to think, then the skeptic seems to have 
the upper hand, after all. We have to wait and see whether the examination of the topic of epistemic 
circularity gives us the means to defeat the skeptic.   
 
But even if externalists are in trouble with defending their account of knowledge, it is neither easy 
to see what Stroud is exactly after in stressing the importance of understanding in epistemology. 
What does it even mean to achieve a general understanding of human knowledge? Maybe we are 
trying to attain something that is in principle beyond our reach. Perhaps Stroud is right in claiming 
that externalist accounts of knowledge can never be fully satisfactory, but it seems that the same 
applies to all theories of knowledge, externalist or internalist in character  at least if we accept 
Strouds ideal of knowledge. The following passage from Stroud reveals how unattainable the goal 
of epistemology is:   
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The philosophical problem of knowledge of the [external] world might well be an expression of an 
aspiration we can all appreciate and sympathize with: a desire to understand ourselves in a certain way, 
to get into a certain position with respect to human knowledge and perhaps the human condition 
generally. It takes the form of a desire to get outside that knowledge and that condition, as it were, 
while somehow retaining all the resources needed to see them as they are. Who can say what 
illumination might be gained into human beings and human reflection by understanding better how and 
why such a detached position can seem so tempting while remaining forever unavailable to us?454 
 
Of course we can simply refuse to accept Strouds view about the goal of epistemology. But then it 
seems that we come close to the externalist approach to epistemology: that we have knowledge is 
simply a matter of fulfilling certain nomological conditions pertaining to the workings of our 
cognitive faculties and their relation to the external world. But are those conditions fulfilled? The 
externalists brief rejoinder is that the conditions are fulfilled and we can know that they are if our 
cognitive mechanisms work properly. Is the externalist answer satisfactory? Stroud denies that it is. 
But if we want something more from epistemology than externalism is able to provide, we soon 
find ourselves in the unbearable situation to which Stroud constantly refers to: we are trying to 
attain something that, as a matter of human condition, cannot, even in principle, be reached. If this 
alternative way of thinking about epistemology amounts to internalism, as I am inclined to think, 
then we face the dilemma of choosing between externalism and internalism, where the former tends 
to make knowledge too easy and the latter impossible455. The skeptic, of course, suspends judgment 
about both views and, well, about everything. 
 
4.6.3. Externalism, Internalism, and the Regress Problem 
 
At first sight, it seems that the externalist approach is effective against the regress problem456. As 
stated, the regress problem arises when we are asked to provide epistemically good reasons for our 
beliefs. And once the regress of reasons starts off, it is extremely difficult to block in a satisfactory 
way. Circular reasoning or proposing some basic beliefs that somehow  abracadabra!  are not in 
need of further justification just seem implausible solutions to the Pyrrhonian skeptics challenge. 
However, externalists simply reject the assumption that all beliefs should be grounded by further 
reasons. If we accept the externalist proposal, it seems that the regress problem is nullified. It is 
enough for knowledge that our beliefs are, in fact, formed in accordance with the externalist norm 
of reliability, and are, thus, true representations of the external world. For example, my 
unreflectively formed belief There is a computer in front of me amounts to knowledge and there 
is no question about the regress of reasons.  
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Now, of course, the crucial question is whether we accept the externalist proposal as a satisfactory 
answer to the problem of skepticism. Here discordant notes arise; some accept and some reject the 
externalist way out of skepticism. I am inclined to think that externalism is not a successful solution 
to skepticism or to the problem of the criterion. This will be shown in more detail in the next main 
chapter. For now, it suffices to quote Fogelin who writes as follows: the externalist seems to 
change the subject by saying that the possession of good reasons is not a necessary condition for 
knowing something457. In other words, when we wonder how we could avoid the horns of arbitrary 
assumption, circular reasoning, and infinite regress while providing reasons for our beliefs, the 
externalist seems to suggest that we can simply dismiss the regress problem altogether. Surely we 
can choose to ignore the problem, but then it is hard to resist the feeling that we have not addressed 
the problem properly. 
 
Internalists reject the externalist account and hold that justification is a matter of having access to 
the justificatory factors of our beliefs. Numerous variations of internalism have been proposed, and 
some of them hold that a belief is justified only if a person actually has access to the justifying 
reasons, whereas others hold that justification requires that the justifying reasons are somehow, in 
principle, accessible to the person. But as soon as we admit that justification demands some kind of 
subjective awareness of the justifying reasons for a belief, the threat of regress is inevitable. In fact, 
none of the discussed internalist theories  foundationalism, coherentism, and infinitism  succeeds 
in solving the regress problem. Each of the mentioned three theories grabs one of the horns of the 
Pyrrhonian trilemma and tries to fight against the skeptical outcome of that particular horn. Their 
efforts are in vain, I think. Furthermore, it seems that internalists are committed to an unrealistic 
assumption of the transparency of mind and justification-conferring properties. Alvin Plantinga 
characterizes this internalist motif, as he likes to call it, as follows:  
 
In a large, important and basic class of epistemic cases a properly functioning human being can simply 
see (cannot make nonculpable mistake about) whether a proposition has the property that confers 
justification upon it for her.458   
 
Thus, internalists tend to assume that we can simply see whether a belief is justified and what makes 
it justified. This is quite a heavy assumption, namely, it seems to be obvious that we can err in what 
we think makes beliefs justified. That is precisely what the externalists are eager to point out, viz. 
there is no necessary connection between truth and internalist standards for justification.459 In the 
end, it appears that internalists and externalists have played themselves to the skeptics hands, for 
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the former have given us good reasons to reject externalism, and the latter have given us good 
reasons to reject internalism. Thus, skepticism remains at the top of the game. Not all see the 
situation as hopeless, for, for example, Williams argues that the Pyrrhonian skeptics argument  be 
it the Agrippan Argument or the Justification Argument  establishes at most that there are limits 
to our capacity to give reasons or cite evidence460. So true, but that is all the skeptic ever wanted to 
show. In other words, it is quite severe limitation with respect to our cognitive enterprise to realize 
that we are not able to justify properly any of our beliefs. This amounts to saying that we have no 
reason to think that any of our beliefs is true. It is hard to imagine what could be more severe blow 




The regress problem is effectively the same problem as the one presented by Agrippas Five Modes 
that calls into question the reasons we have for our beliefs. The threat of infinite regress can be tried 
to be neutralized by the foundationalist maneuver of proposing justification-terminating basic 
beliefs or by the coherentist maneuver of adhering to circular justification. Both approaches were 
found wanting as well as the view that some of our beliefs are justified a priori, independently of 
any empirical evidence. The third approach, infinitism, suggests, somewhat surprisingly, that the 
potentially infinite regress of beliefs does not lead to skepticism, but, instead, is the source of 
justification for beliefs. Infinitism as a theory of epistemic justification is both an unintuitive 
account and in several other respects implausible. Thus, none of the three mentioned theories 
succeeds in solving the regress problem, that is, the Agrippan Argument as applied to concern the 
epistemic justification of beliefs. 
 
Still, a fourth proposal of epistemic justification, viz. contextualism, was examined. Contextualism 
has taken different forms, but, in effect, contextualists claim that skeptical alternatives or skepticism 
altogether can be simply dismissed in ordinary epistemic contexts. Contextualists tend to think that, 
in the end, our beliefs rest on unjustified context-dependent assumptions that are not open to doubt. 
However, if it is admitted that our beliefs rest on an unjustified basis, it entails that there is no 
source of justification in the first place. And that, if anything, is conceding to skepticism. Moreover, 
some contextualists argue that, in a way, both the skeptic and the anti-skeptic are right. However, it 
is hard to understand such a truth-relativizing view, and it is almost a worse option than skepticism.      
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The regress problem seems to arise from an internalist conception of knowledge that demands that 
we are somehow aware of the reasons for our beliefs. However, the alternative, externalist 
conception of knowledge states that being aware of reasons is not necessary for knowledge. Instead, 
we have knowledge if our cognitive faculties are properly attuned to the external world. If we 
accept the externalist approach to epistemology, it seems that the regress problem is solved and 
skepticism is not a threat any more. But the critics of externalism claim that the externalist approach 
simply begs the question against skepticism and it tends to make knowledge too easy to attain. At 
this stage of study, it seems that the skeptic has the upper hand, for internalism is unable to show 
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5. EPISTEMIC CIRCULARITY  
 
In this chapter, the topic of epistemic circularity is studied. Briefly, epistemic circularity concerns 
the inevitable circularity we face when trying to justify the reliability of our cognitive faculties. 
Thus, the problem in epistemic circularity is, obviously, the (epistemic) circularity within our 
enterprise of justifying our belief sources. We think that we have knowledge through belief sources 
such as memory and sense perception, but when we are asked to show whether we really have such 
knowledge, we encounter, as Stewart Cohen notes, a version of the problem of the criterion461. 
Epistemic circularity highlights the epistemic problem with the sources of our alleged knowledge: 
in a sense, we cannot investigate the reliability of certain cognitive sources without taking for 
granted their reliability. Thus, our epistemic enterprise is flawed with a vicious kind of circularity 
and skepticism threatens, again. In a recent article, Baron Reed depicts epistemic circularity as 
follows: 
 
No customer would ever ask a used car salesman if he is honest. An affirmative answer would 
obviously be worthless: the need one had to ask about the salesmans honesty in the first place would 
arise for the answer as well. (Of course, a negative answer would be even worse, as it would lead us 
right into a paradox.) The problem with believing the salesman to be honest just on his say-so is 
typically thought to derive from the epistemic circularity of the belief. Epistemic circularity occurs 
when a subject comes to believe that a particular source of knowledge is reliable through the use of that 
very source.462 
 
Of course, we could check the salesmans reliability by relying on some external and independent 
evidence relevant to his reliability. But, as the above parable illuminates, when the question is about 
the reliability of our cognitive faculties, we quickly run short of any external and independent 
checks and we must rely on those very faculties whose reliability is questioned. Thus, it seems that 
the sort of circularity in question is, epistemically speaking, serious and deep. In this chapter, my 
first task is to clarify the definitive nature of epistemic circularity and examine whether and how it 
is related to the problem of the criterion. Not all epistemologists see epistemic circularity as a 
problem, and that is the second task  to examine whether epistemic circularity can plausibly be 
held as a benign kind of circularity, or could the skeptical consequences be otherwise avoided. 
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5.1. Alston on Epistemic Circularity 
 
5.1.1. Alstons Characterization of Epistemic Circularity 
 
As far as I can tell, William Alston is the inventor of the term epistemic circularity. And even if he 
had not been the first to introduce the concept, his discussion in the article Epistemic 
Circularity463 certainly is most influential with respect to the topic of epistemic circularity. Thus, it 
is apt to begin the discussion on epistemic circularity by concentrating on what Alston means by the 
term.  
 
The issue before us, Alston tells us, is whether we are rational in trusting our basic sources of belief 
such as perception, introspection, memory, testimony, and reasoning. Instead of sources of belief, 
we could also speak of belief forming dispositions, habits, or mechanisms. Whatever the labels, the 
idea is that we respond to certain psychological inputs  they are either experiential or doxastic in 
character  with corresponding outputs, i.e. beliefs. Of course, what we want to know is whether 
the beliefs that are the outcomes of our various psychological processes are true. It seems that if the 
psychological processes responsible for our beliefs are reliable, then many of our beliefs are true. 
Accordingly, to take an example, perceptual beliefs would provide us with accurate information 
about our surroundings. The processes need not be infallible, for although they were reliable, 
misrepresentations and errors would occur. However, if the processes are reliable, it implies that, 
under normal conditions, the beliefs generated as the outputs of those processes would generally be 
true.464 For the sake of concreteness, Alston pauses to ponder over the following general reliability 
claim: 
 
(I) Sense experience is a reliable source of perceptual beliefs.465 
 
Now, what kind of evidence could be used in favor of or against the truth of (I)? Firstly, it could be 
claimed that (I) is self-evident. However, Alston rejects that suggestion as implausible, for (I) 
simply does not seem to be a kind of proposition that cannot be believed without its being true or 
justified. Certainly, most of us are strongly inclined to accept (I), but that does not render it self-
evident. Thus, it seems that we need adequate reasons for being epistemically justified in accepting 
(I).466 As Alston notes, pragmatic arguments for the reliability of sense perception are popular. 
According to these arguments, we are able to predict and control various events in nature, since 
sense perception is reliable. Moreover, most scientific experiments are repeatable and the resulting 
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observations are in relevant respects the same. Again, our survival as a species evidences the point 
that our cognitive faculties are reliable to the effect that they have provided us with useful and 
accurate enough information about our surroundings. What is wrong with these kinds of pragmatic 
arguments? For one thing, they are blatantly circular, that is, all kinds of scientific experiments take 
the reliability of sense perception for granted. We cannot rely on any observations unless we 
assume that sense perception is, in general, reliable. Thus, particular observations support the 
conclusion that sense perception is reliable only if it is, in fact, reliable.467  
 
The bottom line is that we cannot help but being involved with a kind circularity with respect to 
some of our faculties. For example, with respect to sense perception, it seems that we cannot 
present any cogent argument for the reliability of sense perception without presupposing its 
reliability in the premises of the argument. The situation is similar with respect to other basic 
sources of belief. Alston suggests that memory, introspection, and deductive and inductive 
reasoning are such basic sources of belief. They are basic, since any argument purported to show 
their reliability must rely on the premises drawn from those very sources.468 Alston proceeds to 
suggest that we can, after all, support (I) with the alleged record of success of sense perception. In 
other words, we can present a sufficiently large, carefully chosen selection of perceptual beliefs and 
report in each case that the respective belief is true, which inductively supports the reliability of 
sense perception.469 As a result, we have the following track record argument, as Alston calls it:  
 
(TR) 1. At t1, S formed the perceptual belief that p, and p. 
2. At t2, S formed the perceptual belief that q, and q. 
                                   . . . . . . 
Therefore, sense experience is a reliable source of belief.470 
 
Alston argues that the circularity involved in argument (TR) is not logical in character. In other 
words, an argument is logically circular if the conclusion of the argument already appears in the 
premises, and that is not the case with the argument (TR). So, what is wrong with it, then? Well, 
clearly, knowledge of the conclusion of the argument (TR) is presupposed in knowing the premises. 
I must assume that I know the reliability of sense perception in order to be entitled to assert any of 
the premises of the argument (TR). I have no reason think that any of my perceptual beliefs is true 
unless I, implicitly at least, presuppose that sense perception is reliable.471 As Alston puts it: I 
proceed as if (I) is true. I manifest an acceptance of it in my practice.472 A related point is that if 
one doubts whether sense perception is reliable, the argument (TR) cannot rationally convince her 
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of the reliability of sense perception. The premises of the argument (TR) have no justificatory force 
unless it is already assumed that the conclusion of the argument (TR) is true. Alston sums up the 
preceding discussion as follows:  
 
What all this comes down to is that in using or taking this argument to establish (I), one is already, 
implicitly or explicitly, taking (I) to be true. In this way we might say that the argument presupposes 
the truth of the conclusion, although the conclusion does not itself appear among the premises. Note 
that the necessity of this presupposition does not stem from the logical form of the argument, or from 
the meaning of the premises. It is not a syntactical or a semantic presupposition. It stems rather from 
our epistemic situation as human beings. Beings of another sort might have some nonsensory way of 
ascertaining these premises, but we do not. Thus the presupposition falls into the large basket called 
pragmatic. More specifically, we might call it an epistemic presupposition, since it depends on our 
epistemic situation vis-à-vis singular propositions concerning middle-sized physical objects in ones 
immediate environment. In parallel fashion we might term the kind of circularity involved epistemic 
circularity.473 
 
Thus, epistemic circularity seems to amount to a skeptical problem. The form of the problem 
appears to be familiar, for epistemic circularity states, in effect, that we should know that our 
faculties are reliable before we can trust in their deliverances, but, on the other hand, we should 
know that some of the deliverances are true before we can trust in the faculties that produce them. 
In short, this is the form of the problem of the criterion as stated by Chisholm. Moreover, track 
record arguments such as the argument (TR) seem to be totally ineffective against skepticism. 
However, Alston does not think that epistemic circularity necessarily leads to skepticism. Let us see 
why he thinks so.  
 
5.1.2. Alstons Way Out of Epistemic Circularity 
 
Alston claims that a track record argument such as the argument (TR) can confer justification upon 
the conclusion that the source of knowledge in question is reliable. In other words, if, for example, 
sense perception is reliable, particular instances of its reliable functioning, as manifested in the track 
record argument (TR), inductively support and justify the conclusion that sense perception is 
reliable.474 Again, one who doubts the reliability of sense perception, cannot be convinced of its 
reliability by the track record argument (TR). However, that does not prevent the track record 
argument (TR) from being justification-affording for those who already accept the reliability of 
sense perception.475 This kind of an answer to the problem posed by epistemic circularity resembles 
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the externalist maneuver studied in the previous main chapter476. As noted, externalists emphasize 
that it suffices for knowledge if our cognitive faculties are, in fact, reliable, and thus the threat of 
regress of reasons, with which internalist theories are infected, is not a problem for externalism.  
 
I can shed more light on Alston solution by briefly summarizing James van Cleves discussion on 
epistemic circularity, for also he defends the view that epistemic circularity does not pose a problem 
for externalist theories.477 Van Cleve holds that an argument is viciously circular for knowledge 
acquisition only if knowledge of the conclusion is a precondition for knowing the premises. 
However, according to externalist theories such as reliabilism, we need not know that our cognitive 
faculties are reliable in order to know some of their deliverances. It suffices that the faculties are, in 
fact, reliable and no knowledge of the reliability is required. Accordingly, epistemically circular 
arguments are not viciously circular for knowledge acquisition on externalist views. Thus, track 
record arguments are perfectly adequate ways of acquiring knowledge of the reliability of our 
cognitive faculties.478 I think that van Cleves solution to the problem in epistemic circularity is 
remarkably similar to Alstons. Both of them seem to think that what matters is the actual reliability 
of our cognitive faculties, not whether we can somehow show their reliability. 
 
However, Alston acknowledges that if one is unsure about the reliability of, for example, sense 
perception, it does not help at all to state that we can use track record arguments to establish its 
reliability if sense perception is, in fact, reliable. Furthermore, we can use track record arguments to 
establish the reliability of almost any belief forming practice. For example, we could claim that 
crystal ball gazing is a reliable way of forming beliefs, and to silence doubts, we could formulate an 
epistemically circular track record argument to establish the reliability of crystal ball gazing. And if 
crystal ball gazing is, in fact, reliable way of forming beliefs, the epistemically circular track record 
argument is perfectly adequate way of showing its reliability, at least according to externalists 
lights. Alston affirms that this cannot be right. We are interested in distinguishing reliable ways of 
forming beliefs from unreliable, and, clearly, epistemically circular arguments fail to make such a 
discrimination.479  
 
Nevertheless, we must take something for granted to have a starting point for doing epistemology. If 
we critically reflect on our beliefs and our reasons for them and exempt no belief from our critical 
scrutiny, we end up with skepticism. For, every reason for any belief should be supported by further 
justifying reasons, and these reasons, in turn, with further reasons. To cut off the threatening infinite 
regress we must either argue in a circle or appeal to an unjustified base assumption, both of which 
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are unacceptable ways of justifying beliefs in the enterprise of critical reflection.480 The problem is 
that our epistemological reflection is too thoroughgoing, for [a]ll is well so long as we rely on 
justification that obtains in fact and do not insist on demonstrating it481. 
 
However, even if we cannot establish the reliability of any belief forming practice without 
conceding to epistemic circularity, it could be claimed that it is practically rational to continue to 
engage in some belief forming practices. Alston suggests that it is (practically) rational to employ 
those belief forming practices that are firmly socially established.482 In other words, we have to start 
from where we are. Alston holds that there is no alternative (practically rational or otherwise) to 
using in an investigation what we accept at that point as reliable belief forming practices and 
probably true beliefs, remembering again that any one of them can be critically evaluated as long as 
we continue to employ some doxastic practices and take some beliefs as at least probably true483. 
To argue against Alston, an obvious alternative to his suggested approach is skepticism. If we 
cannot defeat skepticism, and, thus, cannot show that we have knowledge, should it not mean a 
victory for the skeptic? At least it is harder to see how this, epistemically speaking, miserable 
situation should lead, instead of skepticism, to Alstons suggested form of anti-skepticism, 
according to which we should stick to what we have. 
 
5.1.3. Problems with Alstons Way Out 
 
It seems that Alston has pointed out a deep problem in epistemology, and it also appears that his 
suggested solution to it simply does not work. Definitely, the problem of establishing the reliability 
of our cognitive faculties  that is, the problem of epistemic circularity  is a serious problem, for, 
as Alston himself admits, in the end we are not able to distinguish reliable from unreliable belief 
forming practices. This result in itself suggests that skepticism is the inevitable outcome of the 
challenge posed to us by epistemic circularity. However, as we saw, Alston tries to wriggle out of 
that unfortunate outcome.  
 
Alvin Plantinga has strongly criticized Alstons thought that it is practically rational to continue to 
engage in those belief forming practices in which we in fact do. Plantinga maintains that Alstons 
suggested solution is trivial and, thus, epistemologically uninteresting. In other words, of course we 
consider it (practically) rational to form beliefs according to, for example, sense perception, because 
we happen to consider it a reliable belief forming practice. But if we happened to judge some other 
doxastic practices as rational, we would think that those practices are rational instead. The crucial 
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question, clearly, is which practices are, whether actual or not, reliable, and thus, rational to engage 
in.484 Furthermore, as Ernest Sosa notes, and Alston accepts485, appealing to practical rationality is 
as guilty of circularity as are track record arguments meant to establish the reliability of certain 
belief forming practices. It is practically rational to engage in certain belief forming practices if it is, 
in fact, rational to engage in those practices. When we are gathering evidence for the rationality of 
those practices, we are tacitly assuming their rationality.486 Hence, there is no escape from 
circularity.  
 
Let us move on to consider Alstons claim to the effect that we have no alternative but to rely on 
those doxastic practices we, in fact, do. To begin with, the meaning of Alstons term doxastic 
practice is far from obvious. Alston clarifies the notion as follows:  
 
We engage in plurality of doxastic practices, each with its own sources of belief, its own conditions of 
justification, its own fundamental beliefs, and, in some cases, its own subject matter, its own conceptual 
framework, and its own repertoire of possible overriders. There is no one unique source of justification 
or knowledge, such as Descartes and many others have dreamed of.  What is natural to count as distinct 
doxastic practices are by no means wholly independent. We have to rely on the output of memory and 
reasoning for the overriders of perceptual beliefs. Apart from what is stored in memory, and used in 
reasoning, concerning the physical world and our perceptual interactions therewith, we would have 
nothing to go on in determining when sensory deliverances are and are not to be trusted. Reasoning [in 
turn] is beholden to other belief-forming practices for its premises.487     
 
The above passage reveals Alstons pluralistic approach to epistemic justification. Accordingly, 
Alston thinks that a viable epistemology should count various epistemic desiderata  externalist 
and internalist alike  as possible sources of justification. Furthermore, different epistemic 
desiderata are salient in different contexts, which should be borne in mind when evaluating the 
epistemic status of beliefs.488 However, what is pressing here, is that Alston admits that there are 
affinities between his epistemological theory and contextualism, for the views are at one in 
denying the need to validate modes of belief formation before using them489. Alstons theorys 
resemblance to contextualism is brought up here for the reason that now we can raise the standard 
criticism of the latter towards the former too, namely, if we need not validate the belief forming 
practices we use, there is the danger that anything goes490.  
 
As the objection goes, we should be able to somehow exclude lunatics and such ones doxastic 
practices. However, such an exclusion seems to amount to the use of a double standard. 
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Specifically, we cannot show without epistemic circularity that our practice of appealing to reason 
is reliable, and surely madmen can give a similar circular argument for their belief forming 
practices. Because of epistemic circularity involved, we should treat the two doxastic practices 
similarly: whether we condemn or approve them, we should do the same to both. In fact, Alston 
uses similar argument to argue for the reliability of the doxastic practice of perceiving God491. 
Clearly, something has gone amiss, namely, if we open the gate for, in principle, the reliability of 
Christian doxastic practice, how could we prevent the followers of other religions, sects, and cults 
from doing the same? In fact, we cannot and the gate is open for anything. Therefore, our original 
question about the right and reliable belief forming practices remains unanswered. 
 
Speaking of gods, it is interesting to note that Plantinga contends that even an omnipotent and 
omniscient God cannot escape from epistemic circularity. For God cannot give a noncircular 
argument for the reliability of his doxastic practices, whatever they are. Gods ideas or beliefs 
constituting the premises of the argument, purported to show that his belief forming mechanism are 
reliable, would be formed by those very ways whose reliability is in question. Hence, epistemic 
circularity prevails.492 As Plantinga puts it, God himself is trapped inside the circle of his own 
ideas493. However, the moral of the story is, according to Plantinga, that we should not be worried 
about epistemic circularity, since not even an omniscient being can avoid it. Every doxastic agent is 
necessarily infected with epistemic circularity, for no one can give a good, noncircular argument for 
the reliability of ones doxastic faculties.494 In sum, Plantinga argues that epistemic circularity is not 
only unavoidable but also uninteresting. Therefore, skepticism is not a problem, and we have 
knowledge as long as our cognitive faculties function as they should (and as long as we believe in a 
benevolent Christian God, Plantinga would add495).  
 
However, although Barry Stroud also entertains the thought that skeptical problems (the problem of 
epistemic circularity among others) apply to all kinds of creatures, from this he concludes just the 
opposite than Plantinga. Stroud holds that although we cannot know that we are not being deceived 
by a malevolent demon, neither can the possible deceiving demon.496 We, whether humans or 
cognitively superior deities, cannot get outside our ideas to check whether they correspond to 
something real and sufficiently isomorphic with our ideas. Neither is it easy to imagine what would 
be such a creature that could perform such a reality check. However, Stroud concludes, pace 
Plantinga, that although epistemic circularity is unavoidable, it is also deeply troubling. We should 
be able to show that our cognitive faculties are reliable  although it seems to be impossible  
otherwise skepticism threatens. In other words, Stroud encourages us to address the skeptical 
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problem properly, not to dismiss it as uninteresting.497 However, it should certainly give us an 
impetus to have a second thought about the plausibility of skepticism if it seems to be an insoluble 
problem even if we had among us an omniscient being to report how things really are. Or more 
precisely, if we happened to be omniscient, skepticism would still remain undefeated. On the other 
hand, Plantingas solution  i.e. since also God is vulnerable to the problem of epistemic circularity, 
we can dismiss the problem altogether  is unsatisfactory, since it makes knowledge too easy and it 
does not address the problem of skepticism at all.    
 
5.2. Epistemic Circularity and the Problem of the Criterion  
 
Clearly, the problem highlighted by epistemic circularity is a version of the problem of the criterion. 
Also Chisholm pointed out that the problem of the criterion can be understood as concerning the 
proper sources of knowledge498. If thus understood, we are dealing with the problem posed by 
epistemic circularity, viz. that in order to know that our cognitive faculties are reliable, we must rely 
on those very faculties whose reliability is in question. As shown, Alston, among many other 
authors, argues that epistemic circularity can be a perfectly acceptable form of reasoning. In order 
to evaluate whether epistemic circularity can be acceptable, we should be able to formulate 
precisely the skeptical problem inherent in epistemic circularity. I have already stated that the 
problem posed by epistemic circularity comes down to the dilemma that, on the one hand, we 
should know that a particular cognitive faculty is reliable in order to have knowledge of its 
deliverances, and, on the other hand, we should know that most of the deliverances of that particular 
faculty are true in order to have knowledge of its reliability. This dilemma is strikingly similar in 
form to Chisholms formulation of the problem of the criterion which is the reason why we will 
utilize the form of Chisholms account here. Of course, if we so wanted, we could also utilize the 
Agrippan Argument  the Pyrrhonian account of the problem of the criterion, derived from the Five 
Modes  for as shown in chapter 3,499 Chisholms account and the Pyrrhonian account are closely 
related. Specifically, Chisholms account of the diallelus comes down to the form of the mode of 
circularity of the Pyrrhonian account; and the other modes of infinite regress and hypothesis are 
also implicitly assumed in Chisholms account.  
 
According to Chisholm, knowledge of instances depends upon knowledge of a criterion of truth, 
and knowledge of a criterion of truth depends upon knowledge of instances. Moreover, the 
dependence between instances and criteria is asymmetric in character. This means, again, that (i) 
criteria are epistemically dependent upon instances, and instances do not depend upon criteria, and 
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that (ii) instances are epistemically dependent upon criteria, and criteria do not depend upon 
instances.500 Here we have a reformulation of Chisholms skeptical argument: 
 
(1) We know a proposition only if we have knowledge of a criterion of truth. But  
(2) we know a criterion of truth only if we have knowledge of some proposition. Therefore, 
(3a) we do not know any proposition and  
(3b) we do not know any criterion of truth.501 
 
Now, we can reformulate the above argument so as to concern the sources of knowledge, i.e. our 
cognitive faculties. As a result, we have a version of the problem of the criterion, the following 
argument  call it the Epistemic Circularity Argument: 
 
(1) We know that a deliverance of cognitive faculty F is true only if we know that F is reliable. But 
(2) we know that a cognitive faculty F is reliable only if we know that some sufficient amount of 
the deliverances of F are true.502  
Therefore, 
(3a) we do not know that a deliverance of F is true and   
(3b) we do not know that F is reliable.503 
 
The above argument is meant to capture the problem of epistemically circular arguments, and as can 
be easily seen, according to the above argument, all epistemically circular arguments are logically 
circular too. As my consideration of Chisholms account of the diallelus made clear, the possible 
and at least initially plausible solutions to the problem are particularism, methodism, and a kind of 
combination of the aforementioned two, a sort of coherentism. Supposedly, the three alternatives 
are also available with respect to the current version of the problem that concerns knowledge of the 
reliability of our cognitive faculties. Accordingly, particularists hold that knowledge of the 
reliability of a certain cognitive faculty can be derived from particular, true deliverances of that 
faculty. That is exactly how Alston thinks we could have knowledge of the reliability of, say, sense 
perception: we can formulate a track record argument, and although the argument is epistemically 
circular, it can provide us with knowledge of the reliability of the cognitive faculty in question, and 
without logical circularity. Methodists, in turn, hold that we can have knowledge of the reliability of 
a cognitive faculty independently of knowledge of its deliverances truth. Most of them think that 
we just know, self-evidently and non-inferentially, the reliability of our cognitive faculties. 
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Followers of this strand of thought often mention Thomas Reid as their inspirer, who writes about 
first principles, i.e. a kind of a priori truths, as follows: 
 
Another first principle is, that the natural faculties, by which we distinguish truth from error, are not 
fallacious.504 
 
Again, it is still possible to hold that we know the reliability of our cognitive faculties and the 
deliverances truth due to their mutual interdependence. According to this coherentist or holistic 
view, knowledge of the reliability of a cognitive faculty is not prior to knowledge of its 
deliverances truth, nor vice versa. Instead, knowledge of deliverances truth and knowledge of the 
reliability of a cognitive faculty are mutually supported by each other, so that they attain the status 
of knowledge together. 
 
All of the three approaches  particularism, methodism, and coherentism  were already criticized 
in the two preceding main chapters. Thus, it is not necessary to repeat the criticism here. As we saw 
when considering the regress argument, the criticism against particularism and coherentism could 
also be applied to epistemic justification theories, foundationalism and coherentism, respectively. 
However, we also witnessed that foundationalism and coherentism as theories of epistemic 
justification invite criticism of their own. Moreover, we found that consideration of such theories as 
infinitism, contextualism and epistemological externalism in general proved to be relevant with 
respect to the regress problem, although they were not seen as relevant with respect to Chisholms 
account of the problem of the criterion. Similarly, the topic of establishing the reliability of our 
cognitive faculties creates alternative solutions peculiar to the topic, although we are, still and 
again, considering a version of the diallelus. In what follows, I will, first, study what is wrong with 
the view that we can acquire knowledge of the reliability of our cognitive faculties via track record 
arguments. Arguably, such a view creates a tricky case to handle, the so-called problem of easy 
knowledge. After examining that problem, I move on to consider other possible solutions to the 
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5.3. Coping with Epistemic Circularity 
 
5.3.1. Roxanne, Bootstrapping, and the Problem of Easy Knowledge 
 
Jonathan Vogel has given an example that poses, he thinks, a problem for reliabilist epistemologies. 
Actually, as will be shown next, it poses a problem virtually for all kinds of epistemologies. What is 
the problem, then? Basically, the problem is about using track record arguments to establish the 
reliability of ones cognitive faculties. Vogel proceeds to show that epistemically circular 
arguments make knowledge of the reliability of ones cognitive faculties too easy. As an example, 
Vogel asks us to imagine a car driver, Roxanne, who has a reliable gas gauge and believes, 
implicitly, what the gauge says without knowing that it is reliable. However, Roxanne undertakes 
the procedure of looking at the gauge often and forming a belief about how much gas there is in the 
tank. In addition to that, Roxanne also forms a belief about the state of the gauge itself. For 
example, when the gauge reads F, she believes both that the tank is full, F, and that the gauge 
reads F. Thus, Roxanne believes the proposition that  
 
(1) On this occasion, the gauge reads F, and F. 
 
Vogel holds that Roxannes belief in (1) is a result of reliable processes, and, thus, according to 
reliabilism, Roxanne knows the proposition (1). From (1), Roxanne deduces the following 
proposition: 
 
(2) On this occasion, the gauge is reading accurately. 
 
If Roxanne is credited with knowledge of (1), it seems that we must credit her also with knowledge 
of (2), since deduction certainly is a reliable process.505 Now, Roxanne repeats this procedure over 
and over again, and on these various occasions she comes to know that the gauge is reading 
accurately. Then, Roxanne puts together her knowledge regarding the gauge, and concludes by 
induction that 
 
(3) The gauge reads accurately all the time.  
 
Reliabilists generally hold that induction is a reliable process, and, accordingly, Roxanne knows the 
proposition (3). From (3), Roxanne further deduces that 
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(4) The gauge is reliable.   
 
Therefore, Roxanne has arrived at knowledge of the reliability of the gauge. Furthermore, she can 
practice a little more the art of deduction and come to know that her belief forming practice in 
question is reliable. In short, Roxanne has used a reliable process to acquire knowledge of the 
reliability of the very same process.506 So, what is the moral of the story? Let Vogel himself tell us: 
 
This extraordinary procedure, which I shall call bootstrapping, seems to allow one to promote many, if 
not all, of ones beliefs that were formed by reliable processes into knowledge that those beliefs were 
formed by reliable processes. I assume that bootstrapping is illegitimate. Roxanne cannot establish that 
her gas gauge is reliable by the peculiar reasoning I have just described.  On the face of things, it 
[reliabilism] does improperly ratify bootstrapping as a way of gaining knowledge.507   
 
Vogel suggests that Roxanne misses proper reasons or justification for her knowledge of the 
reliability of the gauge. If we endorse the view that justification is necessary for knowledge, 
bootstrapping fails to be knowledge-generating.508 However, bootstrapping, or epistemically 
circular track record arguments, is not a problem only for externalist epistemologies, but also 
internalist epistemologies are committed to this fallacy, namely, any internalist must permit that 
there are sources of justification whose reliability or truth-conferring character need not be known, 
or otherwise an infinite regress threatens509. It is exactly here where we enter the problem of easy 
knowledge. Cohen states that the problem is generated for any epistemology that denies the 
following principle (KR): 
 
(KR) A potential knowledge source K can yield knowledge for a subject S only if S knows K is 
reliable.510  
 
In other words, theories denying the principle (KR) imply that some knowledge (of particular 
instances, not general epistemic principles concerning the reliability of cognitive faculties) is basic, 
that is, they hold that a belief source can deliver knowledge prior to (i.e. independently of) ones 
knowing that the source is reliable.511 For example, Roxanne establishes on the basis of her basic 
knowledge that the gas gauge is reliable. However, Cohen holds that once we allow basic 
knowledge, we can come to know the reliability of our cognitive faculties far too easily, thus the 
rubric the problem of easy knowledge.512 Moreover, this challenges our initial assumption that we 
had the basic knowledge in the first place.513 If we, instead, do accept the principle (KR), we end up 
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with a version of the problem of the criterion514, as shown above with the Epistemic Circularity 
Argument. To make it all clear, those who allow the existence of basic knowledge deny the premise 
(1) of the Epistemic Circularity Argument and could thus be called as particularists, to use 
Chisholms terminology.   
 
Incidentally, I am not so sure whether Vogels example about Roxanne adds anything new when 
compared to Alstons discussion of epistemic circularity and, especially, formulation of a track 
record argument. In other words, already Alstons discussion made it perfectly clear that it is 
problematic to infer from the alleged truth of certain outputs (i.e. beliefs) of a particular belief 
forming mechanism that the mechanism in question is reliable. Thus, I think that Vogels example 
about Roxanne merely highlights the point, already made by Alston, that bootstrapping (or using 
track record arguments to establish the reliability of a cognitive faculty) is highly problematic. And 
the real moral of the story about Roxanne is this: Roxannes faulty reasoning about the reliability of 
the gas gauge is analogous to our reasoning about the reliability of our cognitive faculties.   
 
5.3.2. Basic Knowledge: For and Against 
 
Peter Markie argues that theories that allow basic knowledge do not face any problem; that is, the 
problem of easy knowledge is not a problem at all. In a nutshell, Markies solution is that 
epistemically circular arguments can provide us with knowledge even though we cannot help 
begging the question against the skeptic. We cannot convince the doubters, but, nonetheless, we can 
still have (basic) knowledge with the help of which we can establish the reliability of our cognitive 
faculties.515 This is, in effect, the same answer Alston provides with respect to epistemic circularity. 
What is new is that Markie suggests that it is perfectly acceptable to beg the question against the 
skeptic. Let Markie explain: 
 
It is quite possible to give an argument in which we know the premises and as a result know the 
conclusion, but also beg the question against someone who doubts whether the conclusion is true. Our 
reasoning begs the question by, first, involving a premise the other party doubts, and, second, failing to 
provide the other party with a reason to believe that premise. How can we fail to provide the other party 
with a reason to believe our premise if we ourselves know it? One way this can happen is if the premise 
is an instance of basic knowledge so that we know it through an experience the other person either lacks 
or does not acknowledge as a basis for belief.516  
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If we think about Roxanne again, Markie seems to suggest that her reasoning is perfectly acceptable 
and, furthermore, provides her with knowledge of the reliability of the gas gauge. Roxanne can have 
knowledge even though the skeptic doubts the premises of her argument, and consequently, the 
conclusion. Bootstrapping or the usage of epistemically circular track record arguments is a way to 
proceed from justified premises to a warranted conclusion, and if the premises are actually true, 
bootstrapping has provided us with knowledge. The only shortcoming is, according to Markie, that 
we just need to remember that easy knowledge does not enable us to address the skeptics 
concerns517.  
 
Also Frederick Schmitt contends that bootstrapping need not be a problem. In other words, if I lack 
a legitimate doubt about the reliability of a given belief source, epistemically circular arguments can 
provide me with knowledge of the reliability of the belief source in question. For example, 
arguably, no one would be convinced of the reliability of crystal ball gazing if presented with an 
epistemically circular argument for the conclusion that crystal ball gazing is reliable. We would 
have a legitimate doubt about the reliability of crystal ball gazing and, thus, the premises of the 
epistemically circular track record argument would be undermined.518 However, if we are 
concerned with the reliability of, for example, sense perception, we have, Schmitt declares, no 
good reason to suspect the reliability of the source519. So, bootstrapping is allowed with respect to 
those belief sources whose reliability we do not have any good reason to doubt, and bootstrapping is 
of no use with respect to those belief sources whose reliability we have good reasons to doubt.    
 
Cohen has explicitly answered Markies objections, and the answers can be applied to Schmitts 
arguments as well. Cohens answer is simple but, I think, effective, namely, the problem is not that 
the skeptic does not accept our epistemically circular reasoning, but the point is rather that 
bootstrapping should bother us. Does an epistemically circular track record argument strike us as a 
piece of cogent reasoning? No. And that is precisely the problem. If we accepted bootstrapping as a 
form of good reasoning, we would have a cogent argument for the reliability of, for example, sense 
perception. This, of course, could be used effectively against the skeptic. But in order for our 
arguments to have any force against the skeptic, the arguments should strike us as plausible. In 
other words, we are not primarily interested in whether we can convince the skeptic of the 
reliability of our cognitive faculties, but whether we have any epistemically good reason to think 
that our cognitive faculties are reliable.520 Now, it seems that at least bootstrapping does not provide 
us with a good reason to think that our cognitive faculties are reliable. Consequently, the skeptic has 
the upper hand in claiming that we do not know whether our cognitive faculties are reliable or 
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unreliable, and, thus, we should suspend judgment about their reliability and the truth of any 
deliverances of our faculties. So we should seek for other plausible arguments for the reliability of 
our cognitive faculties.  
 
Furthermore, as a comment pertaining to Schmitts arguments, even if we do not have a good 
reason to doubt the reliability of a particular cognitive faculty, it does not imply that we have a 
reason to think that the faculty is reliable. To repeat, we should be able to give a good argument for 
the reliability of our faculties to warrant the claim that we can have and do have knowledge. We 
can, of course, refuse to doubt the reliability of our cognitive faculties, but, as already noted with 
respect to our discussion on contextualism521, reluctance to doubt that we have knowledge does not 
imply that we have knowledge. Moreover, I think that it is simply false to claim, as Schmitt does, 
that we do not have any good reason to suspect the reliability of sense perception. Firstly, we have 
learned from experience that sometimes our judgments based on sense impressions are mistaken. 
For example, what seems to be a snake at first glance turns out to be a crooked twig. Thus, we have 
a reason to doubt the general reliability of sense perception. Secondly, many skeptical arguments  
like the ones Sextus discusses in the Ten Modes522 try to establish that there is a gap between our 
appearances and the reality. These arguments give us a reason to doubt the veridicality of our sense 
experiences; that is, whether they correspond to anything real in the external world. As we are 
aware of these two general considerations  and more could be generated with ease  it would be 
desirable if we could dispel the doubts with a good argument establishing the reliability of, for 
example, sense perception. So far we have only managed to produce epistemically circular 
arguments for the reliability of our cognitive faculties. This gives us a third reason to be worried 
about the truth of our beliefs.    
 
As already pointed out in our discussion concerning Alston523, the fundamental problem with 
epistemically circular arguments is that they fail to discriminate between reliable and unreliable 
ways of forming beliefs. Thus, bootstrapping via track record arguments is epistemically worthless 
which explains our spontaneous reaction that, at least at first glance, epistemically circular 
arguments seem to be totally unconvincing. We have already conceded that epistemic circularity is 
a problem not only for externalist epistemologies, but also for internalist epistemologies. However, 
it certainly is an obvious problem for externalist epistemologies. As soon as the externalist proposes 
that the epistemic status of a belief is a function of the reliability of cognitive faculties that have 
produced it, it is only natural to ask how we know that our cognitive processes are reliable. As 
Richard Fumerton puts the matter, in a form of objection524 against reliabilism: 
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But how, the skeptic asks, would one justify ones belief that, say, perception is a reliable process? The 
answer, of course, is that if reliabilism is true, and if perception is reliable, we could perceive various 
facts about our sense organs and the way in which they respond to the external world. How could we 
justify our belief that memory is reliable? Well, again, if reliabilism is true, and if memory is reliable, 
we could use memory, in part, to justify our belief that memory is reliable. And so for the other 
traditional skeptical problems []. 
All this will, of course, drive the skeptic crazy. You cant use perception to justify the 
reliability of perception! You cant use memory to justify the reliability of memory! You cant use 
induction to justify the reliability of induction! Such attempts to respond to the skeptics concerns 
involve blatant, indeed pathetic, circularity.525  
 
To repeat, the problem is not merely that the skeptic is driven crazy by our epistemically circular 
arguments, but that we are not convinced of those arguments either. We should look for other ways 
than bootstrapping to argue for the reliability of our cognitive faculties.  
 
5.3.3. Bergmann: The Reidian Way Out of Epistemic Circularity 
 
The previously formulated argument, the Epistemic Circularity argument, highlights the fact that 
there are three immediately available solutions to the problem posed by epistemic circularity. Those 
who espouse bootstrapping are the so-called particularists whose views were found wanting above. 
Alternatively, we could stick to the methodist strategy and deny the premise (2) of the Epistemic 
Circularity Argument by holding that we can know the reliability of our cognitive faculties 
independently of any arguments526. That is precisely the position of Michael Bergmann which will 
be examined next.    
 
As Bergmann notes, the problem of epistemic circularity is not removed simply by forming a belief 
about the reliability of ones cognitive faculties without an argument. For example, if I form the 
non-inferential belief that reasoning is a reliable way of forming beliefs, the formation of that belief 
is dependent upon my usage of reason, i.e. reasoning. Therefore, I am still infected with epistemic 
circularity.527 However, Bergmann argues that epistemic circularity is not necessarily a bad thing, 
for epistemically circular beliefs can be justified. We must distinguish between malignant and 
benign contexts; in the former epistemic circularity is vicious, whereas in the latter it is perfectly 
acceptable.528  
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In malignant contexts a person has a good reason to doubt the reliability of her cognitive faculties. 
For example, skeptical arguments can persuade a person that sense perception is not reliable 
cognitive faculty. Now, if the person considers an epistemically circular track record argument for 
the reliability of sense perception, she can see that the argument is absolutely of no help at all. Since 
the context in question is malignant, the person has a reason to doubt the truth of deliverances of 
sense perception, and thus, epistemically circular arguments cannot restore her lost confidence in 
sense perception. However, not all contexts are malignant. Bergmann contends that if a person has 
no doubts about the reliability of, for instance, sense perception, the context is benign. The person 
can justifiable believe that sense perception is reliable, and even if she comes to see that her belief 
about the reliability of sense perception is infected with epistemic circularity, it need not bother her. 
Specifically, epistemic circularity does not undermine her justified belief that sense perception is 
reliable. Thus, epistemic circularity involved in this unquestioned context is benign in character.529      
 
Are epistemically circular track record arguments, then, acceptable in unquestioned or benign 
contexts? Surprisingly, Bergmann answers in the negative, for two reasons. Firstly, he contends that 
epistemically circular reasoning or bootstrapping is totally unconvincing. Typically, a good 
argument is convincing, that is, if there were any doubters, the argument would be effective at 
persuading those who doubted the arguments conclusion. In that respect, epistemically circular 
track record arguments are, in a word, pathetic.530 And clearly, as Bergmann concludes, it is 
difficult to imagine a context in which it would be a good thing to depend upon a pathetic 
argument531. Secondly, Bergmann argues that actually most people do not believe that their 
cognitive faculties are reliable on the basis of arguments. Instead, most of us just take it for granted, 
without any arguments or inferences, that our cognitive faculties are reliable. Thus, even in benign 
contexts, the status of epistemically circular track record arguments is severely diminished, for 
almost no one relies on such arguments  and that is not surprising, considering that such arguments 
are so pathetic that they should not be relied on any context whatsoever.532  
 
Bergmanns solution to the problem of epistemic circularity is that we can have justified beliefs 
about the reliability of our cognitive faculties by believing non-inferentially and without arguments 
that our sources of belief are trustworthy. Bergmann notes that Reid is the source of inspiration for 
his proposed solution.533 According to Reid, we can know non-inferentially that our faculties are 
reliable534. Just as, for example, some foundationalists propose that beliefs formed via sense 
perception are justified immediately without further justifying beliefs, so similarly for our beliefs 
about the reliability of our cognitive faculties. We know the trustworthiness of our faculties, and 
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other such first principles, via the faculty of common sense, as Reid calls it. The faculty of 
common sense is akin to the faculty of a priori intuition, for also the former delivers us knowledge 
of necessary truths; for example, of mathematical and logical truths such as that 2+2=4 and that 
modus ponens is a valid mode of inference. However, in addition to necessary truths, via the faculty 
of common sense we can come to know also some contingent truths. The reliability of cognitive 
faculties is such a contingent truth, as are, for example, the propositions that I have some degree of 
control of my actions and that the thoughts I am conscious of are my thoughts.535  
 
According to Reid, then, we can come to know, for example, the reliability of sense perception via 
the faculty of common sense. Thus, the reliability of sense perception is established without circular 
dependence on sense perception. However, what comes to the faculty of common sense, knowledge 
of its reliability is delivered to us via the faculty itself. Therefore, our alleged knowledge of the 
reliability of the faculty of common sense is epistemically circular, and, thus, our knowledge of the 
reliability of sense perception  gained via common sense  is infected with epistemic circularity in 
the end. However, Bergmann holds that as long as one does not have any doubts about the 
reliability of common sense, the context is unquestioned and, thus, epistemic circularity involved 
with respect to our belief that common sense is reliable, is benign in character.536 
 
Bergmann argues that his suggested Reidian solution to the problem of epistemic circularity is an 
improvement over the track record argument or bootstrapping approach for two reasons. Firstly, 
Bergmann thinks that his account is more realistic than the bootstrapping approach for the reason 
that we do not seem to believe that our faculties are reliable on the basis of arguments, as the 
bootstrapping approach suggests. Rather, we just seem to take it for granted that our faculties are 
reliable.537 Secondly, the Reidian solution is neatly concordant with the fact that bootstrapping 
strikes us as a piece of poor argumentation. However, even if we tend to think poorly of track 
record arguments, it does not prevent us from justifiably believing, without arguments, that our 
faculties are reliable.538 
 
5.3.4. Against the Reidian Account 
 
Baron Reed criticizes Bergmanns solution to the problem of epistemic circularity. Firstly, Reed 
points out that Bergmanns distinction between malignant and benign contexts is irrelevant, for 
what matters is the doubts we ought to have, not the doubts we actually happen to have. Thus, even 
if we do not actually doubt the reliability of, for example, sense perception, we ought to be aware of 
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the skeptical doubts pertaining to sense perception. Reed holds that a beliefs justification can be 
defeated by actual contrary beliefs or actual doubts, or by normative defeaters, that is, beliefs or 
doubts one should have. Furthermore, we have normative defeaters for most of our beliefs, 
including the belief that our cognitive faculties are reliable. Thus, in Bergmanns terms, we are in a 
questioned or malignant context and we have a good reason to doubt the reliability of our faculties. 
In sum, Reed holds that we should have skeptical doubts and that a benign kind of epistemic 
circularity is a pipe dream.539  
 
Secondly, Reed emphasizes that appeals to first principles  alleged general truths, known non-
inferentially  should be exposed to a critical scrutiny. Similarly as Reid holds that we know as a 
first principle that our faculties are trustworthy, one could claim that we know as a first principle 
that telepathy or crystal ball gazing is a reliable source of belief. Thus, once again, we should have a 
criterion with the help of which we could distinguish genuine first principles from spurious first 
principles. Nevertheless, even if a plausible criterion could be provided, a question about the 
criterions trustworthiness would be raised, and so on. Moreover, many of the first principles Reid 
mentions are so complex or have so complex truth conditions that it is extremely implausible to 
suppose that we could know such truths non-inferentially.540 As Reed puts the objection: 
 
Consider, for example, the first principle that our faculties are reliable: its truth conditions would 
include facts about human psychology and physiology, principles of logic, the physics of light and 
sound, etc. It is simply incredible that human mind could be noninferentially related to all of these facts 
in a way that would make it self-evident that our faculties are reliable. This would be just as absolutely 
mysterious as the charlatan magicians purported ability to see into the minds of others.541 
 
Reed ends his criticism of Bergmann by pointing out that the Reidian maneuver of appealing to first 
principles opens the door to every breed of dogmatism, for, on pain of consistency, alleged 
knowledge of the reliability of strange faculties cannot be excluded.542 As a response, Bergmann 
argues that we can still distinguish between malignant and benign contexts; in the former we doubt 
or should doubt the reliability of our faculties, and in the latter we do not doubt or should not doubt 
the reliability of our cognitive faculties. Again, Bergmann holds, contra Reed, that we can 
justifiably believe that our faculties are reliable. In other words, it is possible that we are, with 
respect to epistemic circularity, in a benign context where we do not entertain nor should entertain 
any doubts about the reliability of our cognitive faculties.543 If Reed were right, then it would never 
be acceptable to not have serious doubts about the reliability of ones belief sources. This view, 
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Bergmann holds, is implausible. Furthermore, it seems that Reeds criticism stems from internalist 
commitments, for it is the internalists who emphasize the importance of epistemic obligations, i.e. 
what we should and should not believe. Externalists, in turn, think that satisfaction of certain 
externalist conditions is sufficient for justification and knowledge. Thus, Reed seems to take the 
falsity of externalism for granted and, hence, his criticism against the Reidian position could be said 
to rest on a biased and unfair basis.544 Thus, the controversy between Reed and Bergmann seems to 
boil down, once again, to differing intuitions of externalists and internalists. However, I do not 
agree with Bergmann that from Reeds views it follows that it would never be acceptable to not 
have serious skeptical doubts. Quite the contrary; if we had a convincing argument to the effect that 
we have knowledge and our cognitive faculties are reliable, then we would have a good reason to 
cease entertaining skeptical doubts. However, so far such an argument has not been found, and thus 
skeptical doubts are perfectly legitimate.         
 
The criticism of the Reidian approach, discussed above, resembles criticism pointed towards 
methodism, according to which it is simply implausible to suppose that we could know general 
epistemic principles prior to particular instances of knowledge545. Also Bergmann acknowledges 
that not all are willing to accept the claim that we can immediately know, without arguments, the 
reliability of our faculties546. Answering to the skeptics challenge would be a great deal easier if 
the reliability of our faculties really were so obviously true. But, however, it is far from obviously 
true, and claims to contrary just seem to amount to sheer dogmatism. But do we have a choice? We 
should examine in detail what would follow were we to accept the Reidian view that we can non-
inferentially know the reliability of our faculties.  
 
5.3.5. Epistemic Circularity and a Leap of Faith 
 
Epistemic circularity poses a challenge that seems to be impossible to solve. On the one hand, if we 
accept that reason is our most fundamental faculty  one that is able to correct and complete the 
deliverances of other faculties  it seems obvious that it is impossible to show that reason itself is 
reliable. The premises of each argument depend on the reliability of reasoning. As Laurence 
BonJour puts the matter: obviously, no argument can be used to show that reasoning is trustworthy 
without implicitly begging the question547. Thus, in so far as we rely on reason, we cannot avoid 
epistemic circularity involved within. On the other hand, if we refuse to give arguments and still 
continue relying on reason, does this not amount to sheer faith for our part, and to the skeptics 
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triumph in the end? Let us see what Reid thinks of these matters; of proving the reliability of reason 
and other cognitive faculties, and of the skeptics position: 
 
Another first principle is, that the natural faculties, by which we distinguish truth from error, are not 
fallacious. If any man should demand a proof of this, it is impossible to satisfy him. For suppose it 
should be mathematically demonstrated, this would signify nothing in this case; because, to judge of a 
demonstration, a man must trust his faculties, and take for granted the very thing in question.   
If a mans honesty were called in question, it would be ridiculous to refer to the mans 
own word, whether he be honest or not. The same absurdity there is in attempting to prove, by any kind 
of reasoning, probable or demonstrative, that our reason is not fallacious, since the very point in 
question is, whether reasoning may be trusted.   
If a skeptic should build his skepticism upon this foundation, that all our reasoning, and 
judging powers are fallacious in their nature, or should resolve at least to withhold assent until it be 
proved that they are not; it would be impossible by argument to beat him out of this strong hold, and he 
must even be left to enjoy his skepticism.548  
 
In the above quotation, the first two paragraphs show the pointlessness of trying to prove, through 
an argument, the reliability of reason. The third paragraph, in turn, seems to make strong 
concessions towards skepticism. It seems as if Reid is suggesting that we cannot defeat skepticism 
by arguments.549 However, instead of giving arguments, we must simply trust in reason. By 
appealing to trust in reason, we can also dodge the skeptics charges: we do not have to give 
arguments for our view, because we cannot give non-question-begging arguments, as pointed out 
above. Bergmann agrees, for he states that we cannot convince the skeptic of the falsity of 
skepticism, but that is as it should be, for also Reid is clear that philosophy, arguments and logic 
are of no use in delivering someone  from her skepticism550. But if arguments are of no use 
against skepticism, are we epistemically any better off if we execute a sort of leap of faith by 
trusting in reason independently of any arguments or evidence? 
 
René Descartes is widely known of his attempt to prove the reliability of reason. His epistemology 
culminates in the proof of the existence of a benevolent God who vouches for the reliability of 
reason.551 Again, ever since Descartess times it has been brought out that his strategy is viciously 
circular  Descartes must assume the reliability of reason, or specifically, the truth of clear and 
distinct perceptions, in his proof. Thus, Descartess proof relies on the knowledge of the proofs 
conclusion, and hence, vicious circularity follows.552 Nowadays epistemologists are aware of the 
circular reasoning Descartes is found guilty of, and supposedly no one is willing to repeat his 
mistakes. For example, Plantinga in his externalist epistemology  that rests also on the assumption 
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that a benevolent God guarantees the reliability of reason  tries to avoid the Cartesian fallacy, and 
with approval of Reid refuses to give any argument for the reliability of reason.553 Instead of giving 
arguments, Plantinga reasons as follows: 
 
Suppose, therefore, you find yourself with the doubt that our cognitive faculties produce truth: you can't 
quell that doubt by producing an argument about God and his veracity, or indeed, any argument at all; 
for the argument, of course, will be under as much suspicion as its source. Here no argument will help 
you; here salvation will have to be by grace, not by works.554  
 
Here we are leaving the fields of epistemology and entering into the supernatural realm of faith. The 
implications of this move are grave. If arguments are useless, then what prevents us from accepting, 
as a matter of faith, telepathy or crystal ball gazing as reliable faculties? If it is acceptable to rely on 
reason by faith, why not other  no matter how silly  faculties? In fact, Plantinga goes on to 
propose that we have a special faculty, sensus divinitatis, with the help of which we can know the 
truth of Christian belief555. Now, if that is an acceptable move, as Plantinga clearly thinks it is, 
could we not, by the same token, propose the existence of any kind of reliable cognitive faculty? 
Just pick your favorite god and assume the existence of respective mystical cognitive faculty. 
Plantinga even admits, reluctantly though, that, in principle, followers of Judaism, Islam, some 
forms of Hinduism, some forms of Buddhism, [and] some forms of American Indian religion556 
could defend their respective creeds through the externalist move of assuming the existence of a 
mystical faculty. Bergmann agrees: 
 
Its true that permitting noninferentially justified beliefs in the reliability of our faculties  in the way 
externalists do if such a belief satisfies their proposed conditions on justification  makes it difficult to 
prevent clever defenders of silly and strange beliefs (such as telepathic beliefs or belief in the Great 
Pumpkin) from offering parallel externalist defenses of their positions.557 
 
The externalist seems to be in stalemate. In answering to the above objection, Plantinga just insists 
that the weird beliefs of the practitioners of voodooism or the followers of the Great Pumpkin are 
simply false, while Christian belief is not558. Also Sosa makes a similar move when considering the 
objection that his externalist epistemology allows postulating crystal ball gazing as a reliable 
cognitive process559. Sosa compares the alleged reliability of sense perception and crystal ball 
gazing as follows: [T]he crystal gazers differ from the perceivers in that gazing is not reliable 
while perceiving is.  So the perceivers have a good source or basis for their knowledge, but the 
gazers, lacking any such source or basis, lack knowledge.560 To start with, this kind of answer does 
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not seem to be an answer at all, it is rather dogged insistence on the alleged truth of ones own 
preferred view. Furthermore, the dogmatic response of the externalists throws us back to square 
one, for we are left to wonder how the externalist knows that her proposed reliable cognitive 
faculties or processes are reliable. Presumably, the externalist is forced to epistemically circular 
reasoning, and she can either appeal to track record arguments or insist that she knows the 
reliability of the proposed faculties immediately, independently of further justifying arguments. But 
that kind of defense is also available to the voodoo epistemologist and suchlike. Thus, the 
practitioners of voodoism and the followers of the Great Pumpkin can defense the reliability of their 
mystical beliefs and occult faculties similarly as Plantinga defends the reliability of Christian belief 
and the special faculty sensus divinitatis561.   
 
Bergmann still tries to save his fellow externalists from the above criticism. Or, more precisely, he 
advances to point out that the consequences of the above objection need not be as severe as they 
seem at first blush. Firstly, Bergmann notes that the same objection can be raised against internalist 
accounts too. In other words, whatever our cherished internalist conditions of justification happen to 
be, it could always be claimed that the crazy beliefs of all kinds of cultists can satisfy the proposed 
conditions. The cultists occult beliefs can, for example, cohere with the rest of her beliefs, or be 
indubitable and immediate basic truths for her, or fit neatly with all available evidence she has for 
her beliefs. Thus, Bergmann concludes, internalists are not any better off than externalists.562 
Secondly, if we take the externalist path in defending the reliability of our faculties and, on pain of 
consistency, we must admit the application of a similar move for defenders of occult faculties, it 
does not follow that we must deem their views as respectable and sensible. We should not expect 
that we could resolve serious religious disagreements  for example, between theists and atheists  
just by referring to the conditions of justification in our favored epistemological account. We can 
still think that the practitioners of voodoism are badly mistaken in their views although we cannot 
specify exactly what is, philosophically or epistemologically speaking, wrong with their views, save 
the apparent falsity.563   
 
In my opinion, the two above responses of Bergmann just amount to biting the bullet and a refusal 
to see the failure of externalism. First, we were considering the plausibility of externalism, not 
internalism; and thus it does not help at all to point out, as Bergmann does, that internalists are no 
better off than externalists564. Secondly, if a particular epistemology entails that all kinds of crazy 
and occult beliefs are justified, it is a sufficient reason to think about a serious revision of that 
epistemology. In a nutshell, it is quite clear that the considered Reidian account with respect to 
The Inevitability of Skepticism. A Study on the Problem of the Criterion 
 161
epistemic circularity fails. It is simply too implausible to claim that we could know a priori the 
general reliability of our faculties. This is, in effect, the same worry we raised with respect to 
methodism when considering Chisholms account of the diallelus565. Moreover, our excursion in 
voodoo and Great Pumpkinian epistemology was meant to highlight that the price is too high were 
we to accept the methodist solution with respect to establishing the reliability of our cognitive 
faculties. In other words, if we can just assume without any arguments that our faculties are reliable, 
then, as a consequence, we fail to discriminate between reliable and unreliable cognitive processes. 
And again, the skeptic has the upper hand.  
 
As far as Bergmanns suggestion is concerned that epistemic circularity is not necessarily a bad 
thing, this much the skeptic can also accept. For, what Bergmann means comes down to the claim 
that if we have knowledge, then epistemic circularity is benign, as Bergmann likes to call it, in 
character. But, again, do we have knowledge? It is possible that we have knowledge, and, 
consequently, it is possible that epistemic circularity is not always malignant in character, but in so 
far as we do not know what the actual case is, it is preferable to suspend judgment about the 
reliability of our faculties. So far I have examined the particularist and the methodist approach to 
the problem posed by epistemic circularity. I have found both accounts faulty, for both of them 
imply that, in the end, we cannot distinguish between reliable and unreliable belief forming 
practices without begging the question.  
 
5.3.6. The Two-levels Solution to Epistemic Circularity 
 
In addition to the particularist and methodist solutions to epistemic circularity, it could also be hold 
that the problem of epistemic circularity is solved due to the mutual interdependence between 
knowledge of the reliability of our cognitive faculties and knowledge of their deliverances truth. 
This coherentist view is endorsed, for example, by Keith Lehrer, who suggests that we should begin 
the doing of epistemology with the following principle (A): 
 
 (A) I am trustworthy in what I accept.566  
 
The principle (A) is not a foundation, but rather a keystone that provides support for our coherent 
set of beliefs and is supported by them in return. The principle (A) within our coherent system of 
beliefs gives us a reasonable starting point to dump the doubts of the skeptic.567 Also Noah Lemos 
suggests that we should defend the reliability of our faculties in a coherentist manner, or more 
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precisely, through the method of wide reflective equilibrium. Incidentally, Lemos solution to 
epistemic circularity relies heavily  as does Lehrers568  on Reids views.  
 
The coherentist account has already been criticized in two previous chapters, and the criticism is not 
repeated here569. However, introducing the coherentist account serves as a jumping-off point to our 
last alleged solution to the problem of epistemic circularity, namely the two-levels solution570. To 
clarify the nature of the two-levels solutions I must repeat the premises of the Epistemic Circularity 
Argument, the argument purported to show the problem inherent in epistemic circularity: 
 
(1) We know that a deliverance of cognitive faculty F is true only if we know that F is reliable. But 
(2) we know that a cognitive faculty F is reliable only if we know that some sufficient amount of 
the deliverances of F are true. 
 
Now, an assumption shared by the above premises is that the term know is used univocally 
throughout the both premises. The two-levels solution attacks precisely that assumption and 
advances to distinguish between two kinds or levels of knowledge. The epistemology Sosa has 
developed features such a bi-level structure of knowledge. Sosa distinguishes between unreflective 
and spontaneous animal knowledge and a kind of self-aware reflective knowledge. Animal 
knowledge amounts, roughly put, to reliable true belief that unreflective beasts could be said to 
have. Reflective knowledge, in turn, amounts to awareness of how one knows. If a person has 
reflective knowledge of a proposition p, then the subject also knows that the source of her belief in 
p is reliable. However, as Sosa notes, [n]o human blessed with reason has merely animal 
knowledge571. That is, reason is always checking the deliverances of our faculties, not so that we 
were always conscious of the workings of the reason, as reasons very silence also contributes to the 
outcomes of our cognitive faculties. Now, we can break the vicious circle of the Epistemic 
Circularity Argument by holding that we work our animal knowledge into reflective knowledge. 
We can have unreflective animal knowledge of the reliability of our faculties, which is, together 
with the animal knowledge of the truth of the faculties deliverances, converted into reflective 
knowledge of the reliability of the faculties and their deliverances truth. Thus, Sosa can hold that 
both premises of the Epistemic Circularity Argument are true, but the required epistemically prior 
knowledge in both of them is animal knowledge in character. Thus, in Sosas account, the premises 
are as follows: 
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(1) We know (i.e. reflective knowledge) that a deliverance of cognitive faculty F is true only if we 
know (i.e. animal knowledge) that F is reliable. But 
(2) we know (i.e. reflective knowledge) that a cognitive faculty F is reliable only if we know (i.e. 
animal knowledge)  that some sufficient amount of the deliverances of F are true. 
 
However, Sosa holds that the above premises do not pose a problem for his theory, since we have 
animal knowledge that is asked for in both premises. In sum, Sosas account is that reflective 
knowledge is compounded of animal knowledge which enables us to break out of the problem of 
epistemic circularity and the diallelus in general.572    
  
I must admit that I am not sure whether I understand the two-levels solution at all. It strikes me as a 
conjuring trick of sorts. In the first place, what kind of knowledge is animal knowledge anyway? If 
it amounts to reliable true belief, cannot we doubt that we have it? What does exclude animal 
knowledge from the skeptics doubts? Again, if we have animal knowledge, then all the better for 
us, but should we not show that we actually have it? If it is legitimate to stipulate that animal 
knowledge is exempt from the skeptics doubts, why cannot we then, by the same token, stipulate 
that knowledge and our beliefs in general are exempt from the skeptics doubts? Secondly, I do not 
understand how our knowledge shifts from being animal knowledge to being reflective knowledge. 
Finally, if my knowledge of a proposition that p happens to be that reflective sort of knowledge, 
how does it then avoid the problem of epistemic circularity? Do my reasons for the proposition that 
p not also attain the status of being reflective knowledge, and if so, a little more reflection reveals 
that epistemic circularity devastatingly haunts my knowledge of the proposition that p. In other 
words, reflection would reveal that my knowledge of the truth of the proposition p is dependent on 
the reliability of my cognitive faculties, and that the reliability of the faculties is dependent on the 
truth-ratio of their deliverances. Or maybe the point of the two-levels solution is rather that after I 
have attained reflective knowledge, I should not reflect the reasons of my knowledge, otherwise I 
lose it. Thus, reflective knowledge seems to paradoxically perish under reflection.  
 
On the other hand, Cohen argues that on Sosas two-levels account the problem of easy knowledge 
remains573. We are again able to convert our (animal) knowledge too easily to (reflective) 
knowledge of the reliability of our cognitive faculties. If we think that Vogels gas gauge example 
poses a problem for externalism, then it does the same also for the two-levels account. Recall the 
story of Roxanne and modify it according to two-levels solution  now Roxanne acquires at first 
animal knowledge of the gauges readings and its reliability until at some magical point Roxannes 
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knowledge converts to reflective knowledge. While we considered the original Roxannes 
bootstrapping as an illegitimate method of gaining knowledge, does the revised, two-levels 
bootstrapping strike us as acceptable? No, it does not.574 The stories of the two Roxannes are 
virtually identical, the two-levels account only adds a further layer of complexity to the story. As 
often in philosophy, additional complexities create additional problems. For starters, we could ask 
how we know when our animal knowledge is converted to reflective knowledge. Or how could I 
distinguish animal knowledge of a proposition p from reflective knowledge of the same proposition 
that p? Again, how do we know that knowledge is constituted of these two kinds, animal and 
reflective knowledge? Are there further levels of knowledge? Briefly, I am not sure whether the 
two-levels account solves any problems, but it certainly creates more of them.  
 
5.3.7. Closing the Circle 
 
My study on epistemic circularity is coming to close. All the examined solutions were found 
unsatisfactory and unable to solve the version of the diallelus posed by epistemic circularity. Of 
course our cognitive faculties can be, in fact, reliable, and thus track record arguments could be 
acceptable ways of establishing it. However, from our perspective, it seems to be only a matter of 
luck whether our faculties are reliable or not. Our epistemic situation is worrisome, as illustrated by 
the following simile of Sextus: 
 
Let us imagine that some people are looking for gold in a dark room full of treasures. It will happen that 
each will grasp one of the things lying in the room and think that he has got hold of the gold. But none of 
them will be persuaded that he has hit upon the gold even if he has in fact hit upon it. In the same way, 
the crowd of philosophers has come into the world, as in a vast house, in search of truth. But it is 
reasonable that the man who grasps the truth should doubt whether he has been successful.575 
 
Now, it is tempting to say that externalists are like those searchers of gold who insist that they have 
found gold  regardless of the fact that they cannot establish it.576 To be clear, there is nothing 
inconsistent as such to hold, as most externalists do, that knowledge amounts to true and reliably 
produced belief. However, the externalist conception of knowledge strikes me as intellectually 
unsatisfactory. According to externalism, our actual possession of knowledge is, in a sense, just a 
matter of pure luck, which I cannot accept as a satisfactory or plausible account of knowledge. 
Internalist accounts try to exclude the possibility that possession of knowledge is  again, from our 
perspective  in the end just a matter of luck, but they fall prey to the problem of the criterion and 
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thus succumb to skepticism. Although the internalist approach to epistemology fails to deal 
satisfactorily with the problem of skepticism, I find it philosophically more interesting and plausible 
than its externalist counterpart. For one thing, internalists try to address fairly and openly the 
problem of skepticism, solving of which I see as the foremost and main goal of epistemology in 
general. Externalists, in turn, seem to bypass the problem of skepticism altogether, which 
constitutes my chief reason in rejecting the externalist conception of knowledge.  
 
As a matter of fact, the skeptics can grant for the externalists their conception of knowledge and 
approach to epistemology to the effect that we may have knowledge, i.e. reliably produced, true 
beliefs. However, what the skeptics want to press is that from our perspective it seems to be just a 
matter of luck whether we have knowledge or not.577 Whilst seeking for gold in the dark and hitting 
something hard, it does not console much if you are told that you may have found gold although it 
is also as possible that you have not. Similarly, whilst pondering whether any of your beliefs are 
true, the externalist solution just seems to amount to worthless sophism. The skeptical challenge 
as highlighted, for example, by the Agrippan trilemma is to provide reasons for thinking that some 
of our beliefs are, in fact, true, and in this task the externalist account does not help a bit. We should 
be able to show, so to say, that we are not completely in the dark with respect to our search for 
truth.  
 
5.4. Skepticism and Intuitions  
 
In this study, I have shown that the problem of the criterion is a plausible skeptical argument that 
must be taken seriously. We have seen that none of the studied solutions is successful in solving the 
problem of the criterion. Thus, it strongly seems that skepticism is an inevitable outcome of the 
problem of the criterion. But we still cannot get rid of our intuition that we have knowledge and 
that, thus, skepticism is false. Most of us, particularly non-philosophers, take it for granted, for 
instance, that external objects exist and that we perceive them more or less reliably, that future 
events will resemble past events, and that natural sciences provide us with reliable information 
about the world and its law-like regularities. In short, it is obvious that we have knowledge. 
However, have the skeptical arguments not just established that our ineradicable intuition that we 
have knowledge amounts to nothing more than an unwarranted assumption that we have no reason 
to take as true? Personally, I am inclined to answer Yes. And, obviously enough, many disagree. 
For example, John Greco thinks that our pre-theoretical intuitions should form the basis on which to 
build a viable theory of knowledge578. Thus, if a particular theory runs up against our intuition that 
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we know that objects in the world exist, then that counts strongly against the theory in question579. 
Greco admits that maybe a skeptical theory could also provide an explanation of our intuitions and 
of why we think that we know. However, Greco continues as follows: 
 
But still, it seems to me that a non-skeptical theory that explains our intuitions remains overwhelmingly 
preferable [to a skeptical theory], other things being equal. This is because a non-skeptical theory 
accounts for our common sense intuitions about what we know by showing that they are for the most 
part true. A skeptical theory accounts for those intuitions only by showing that they are false, and by 
adding an explanation about why we do not normally realize that they are false. Only a non-skeptical 
theory, therefore, explains the majority of our intuitions in a sense that preserves them. But if such a 
theory is preferable, then the methodological assumption that radical skepticism is false is warranted.580 
 
As Greco openly acknowledges, this is an utterly particularist method of doing epistemology581. 
And if it, indeed, is the correct way, then skepticism ceases to be a problem and, actually, it has 
never been one.  However, there is something appealing about the thought that our pre-theoretical 
intuitions should have some importance in philosophical debates. This is pressing particularly with 
respect to skepticism, for no matter how convincing an argument for skepticism is presented, we are 
still inclined to retain our intuition that we have knowledge. As Greco points out, there are no real 
skeptics582 and there is no one who actually lives out the skeptical position, or who even believes 
it outside the study or classroom583.  
 
We simply cannot let go of our conviction that we have knowledge. This is reflected in the opinions 
of even those philosophers who hold that no epistemological theory has succeeded in solving the 
problem of skepticism, or who hold that skepticism is the most plausible view in epistemology. In 
other words, even those sympathetic to skepticism are inclined to propose that still, in a way, we do 
know.584 For example, Robert Fogelin holds that no theory of epistemic justification has succeeded 
in solving the regress problem highlighted by, for example, Agrippas Five Modes. Is Fogelin, then, 
a skeptic? No, for he holds that philosophical reflection raises our level of scrutiny and we will be 
disinclined to think we know things or are justified in believing things that we normally accept 
without hesitation585, but [w]hen we return to practical affairs of life, our standards will return to 
their normal moderate level and this disinclination will fade586. Similarly, Thomas Nagel holds that 
our search for knowledge is inescapably subject to skepticism and cannot refute it but must 
proceed under its shadow587. This sounds quite, so to say, skeptical, but still Nagel refuses to 
accept skepticism.  
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However, it seems contradictory to hold simultaneously that skepticism is correct on the one hand, 
and that we know things on the other. And if not inconsistent as such, at least we are sliding into the 
repugnant pit of contextualism588. What must be realized is that our pre-theoretical intuitions can be 
blatantly false even though we cannot so much as abandon them. Why should we think, as Greco 
seems to do589, that we should preserve most of our pre-theoretical intuitions? What if the intuitions 
result merely from our doxastic carelessness and laziness, or from cultural prejudices, bias, and 
dogmatism? Of course, we think that we have knowledge, since in the rush and buzz of the ordinary 
life we could not care less whether our beliefs are true or supported by epistemically good reasons. 
It is only after a philosophical analysis that we come to realize that most of our pre-theoretical 
intuitions amount to not much more than arbitrary hunches.590    
 
What seems obvious  even intuitive, for that matter  to me is that we cannot solve the problem of 
skepticism simply by appealing to our pre-theoretical intuition that we have knowledge. That kind 
of strategy just strikes me as utterly unacceptable. Similarly, we do not solve the problem of free 
will by appealing to our pre-theoretical intuition that we have free will. Nor is the problem of 
induction solved by appealing to our intuition that future events will resemble past events. Or as far 
as the problem of continuity of personal identity over time is concerned, I cannot solve it by 
appealing to my ineradicable intuition that I have been the same person throughout my existence. In 
short, our pre-theoretical intuitions do not have a great deal of epistemic value in solving 
philosophical problems.  
 
But here comes the final twist, viz. most plausible skeptical arguments consist themselves of 
intuitions. Exactly for that reason skeptical arguments are so challenging to refute: they are based 
on intuitive premises but end up with unintuitive conclusions. Thus, the whole problem of 
skepticism  as well as the problem of the criterion  culminates to a conflict between different 
epistemic intuitions. Specifically, the problem of the criterion is created, in effect, on the basis of 
the intuition that our beliefs and claims should be supported by good reasons. Then, in the skeptical 
argument it is further specified what does not count as a good reason; viz. circular reasoning, 
infinite regression of reasons, or dogmatic assumptions are not accepted as good epistemic reasons 
that could justify our beliefs. These premises in the skeptical argument are also intuitively plausible. 
But, as we have seen, foundationalists, coherentists, and infinitists demur and hold that some of the 
premises in the skeptical argument are not so intuitive after all. Contextualists, in turn, try to solve 
the skeptical argument by holding that there is not actually a conflict between our intuition that we 
do have knowledge and the skeptical arguments  consisting of intuitively plausible premises  
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conclusion that we do not. Finally, externalists have a different tale to tell. But is skepticism 
inevitable, then? I think that it is; skepticism is the inevitable outcome of the problem of the 
criterion. However, the problem of the criterion as a skeptical argument consists of intuitive 
premises. But why we should prefer exactly these intuitions and not some others that could include, 
e.g., the foundationalist intuition among them and then the skeptical conclusion would not follow 
anymore. I hope that, in this study, I have shown via plausible arguments why we should not accept 
the aforementioned anti-skeptical theories. And if no anti-skeptical theory succeeds in solving the 
skeptical argument  the Agrippan Argument is the one I have foremost in my mind  then we are 
left only with skepticism, and there should be no quarrel about that. However, a further study on the 
epistemic status of our intuitions and on how to resolve conflicts between them could prove to be 
useful in building an anti-skeptical theory of knowledge. A study on intuitions could show us a way 
to break the skeptical argument consisting of intuitively plausible premises. Of course, that study 




In closing, my discussion on epistemic circularity repeats the conclusions of the previous three 
chapters: viz. that the problem of the criterion is an intelligible problem, that it remains unsolved, 
and that, thus, thoroughgoing skepticism seems unavoidable.    
 
The chapter began with an examination of Alstons characterization of epistemic circularity and 
what is problematic about it. Epistemic circularity concerns, in effect, the justification of our 
doxastic faculties and the inevitable circularity involved with it.  
 
I claimed that epistemic circularity poses a version of the problem of the criterion, which was 
shown by formulating a specific argument, the Epistemic Circularity Argument. After that, three 
alternative solutions to the problem were considered. The advocates of the first option  reminiscent 
of Chisholms particularism  suggest that we can come to know the reliability of our faculties on 
the basis of the so-called track record arguments. The advocates of the second option  reminiscent 
of Chisholms methodism  hold that we can come to know the reliability of our faculties 
immediately, without any arguments. Still, the advocates of the third option postulate a specific 
theory of two levels or kinds of knowledge in order to solve the problem of epistemic circularity. 
However, all three suggested solutions were found faulty, and I concluded that there is no escape 
from the circularity involved in justifying our cognitive faculties.  
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Epistemic circularity seems to be a part of our human condition, for we cannot get outside ourselves 
in justifying our cognitive faculties. Thus, we must proceed from within, which, however, reveals 
our miserable epistemic situation  namely, the truth of our beliefs and the reliability of our 


































In the introduction of this work, the following pair of questions was set forth: 
 
(i) What is the problem of the criterion? What kinds of different formulations of the problem are 
there and how should the problem be formulated? 
(ii) How has the problem of the criterion been tried to solve? What are the pros and cons of each 
solution? Could the problem of the criterion be refuted on the basis of its unintelligibility? 
 
Now, it is time to summarize the answers to these questions. In chapter 2 I examined Roderick 
Chisholms formulation of the problem of the criterion. Chisholm formulates the problem as 
consisting of the questions A What do we know? and B How are we to decide whether we 
know? However, it is argued that we cannot answer either of the questions without dogmatically 
presupposing an answer to the other question  a view which also amounts to the skeptical position. 
Particularists object to the skeptical position and hold that we can presuppose an answer to A, on 
the basis of which we can determine general criteria of true beliefs. Methodists, in turn, hold that we 
can presuppose an answer to B, on the basis of which we can then determine the instances of 
knowledge. Both the particularist and methodist approach were found unacceptable, since it is 
implausible that we could simply assume either instances or general criteria of knowledge. I also 
examined a hybrid form of methodism and particularism, a sort of coherentism, according to which 
there is a mutual interdependence between instances and criteria; however, this theory was found to 
unacceptably circular and unable to distinguish between good and bad systems of belief. Finally, I 
studied the notion of dependence between instances and criteria, and I found that Chisholms 
account is not a genuine skeptical paradox.  
 
The examination of the ancient account of the problem of the criterion, which was undertaken in 
chapter 3, proved to be useful in understanding the complete structure of the problem and in 
formulating an argument that is a genuine skeptical paradox. The heart of the problem of the 
criterion consists in the so-called Agrippan trilemma. The trilemma states, in effect, that we cannot 
show that any our beliefs is likely to be true, since every attempt to justify our beliefs leads either to 
an infinite regress of reasons, circular reasoning, or an unwarranted, dogmatic assumption. Since we 
have no reason to deem any of our beliefs true, we should suspend judgment about everything. 
Moreover, the Agrippan trilemma works similarly with respect to particular claims such as the 
proposition I have two hands and general criteria of truth such as Clearly and distinctly 
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perceived propositions are true. The trilemma was also given a form of a specific argument, the 
Agrippan Argument. The Agrippan Argument consists of intuitively plausible premises that we, the 
non-skeptics accept. Thus, the problem of the criterion is precisely our problem, and therefore it is 
pointless to object to skepticism by noting that no one can be a skeptic or that skeptical arguments 
must refute themselves. The problem of the criterion, and specifically the ancient account of it, 
represents a genuine skeptical paradox to us.  
 
The Agrippan Argument can also be applied to concern specifically epistemic justification of 
beliefs, and not merely knowledge. Accordingly, we are dealing with the regress problem, the topic 
of chapter 4. The structure of the regress problem suggests immediately three alternative answers to 
it; viz. foundationalism, coherentism, and infinitism. However, all three theories were found 
burdened with serious difficulties and thus are unable to provide a solution to the regress problem. I 
also examined the contextualist solution to the regress problem, but contextualism was deemed, due 
to its truth-relativizing character, to be an even worse option than skepticism. Nevertheless, the 
externalist approach to epistemology seems to be effective against the regress problem. Externalists 
propose, roughly, that we have justified beliefs if our cognitive faculties are properly attuned to the 
external world. Thus, the problem of regress of reasons does not even arise. However, even if it 
could be concluded that externalism is effective against the regress problem, the externalist 
approach would not solve the problem of the criterion, which was shown particularly in chapter 5.  
 
The regress problem seems to arise from an internalist conception of knowledge that demands that 
we are somehow aware of the reasons for our beliefs. However, the alternative, an externalist 
conception of knowledge states that being aware of reasons is not necessary for knowledge. Instead, 
we have knowledge if our cognitive faculties are properly attuned to the external world. But which 
of our faculties are attuned in such a way; in other words, which faculties are reliable? Answering 
this question is challenging, since we must take the reliability of at least some faculties for granted 
in order for us to examine the reliability of our cognitive faculties  a condition that is known as 
epistemic circularity, the topic of chapter 5. Epistemic circularity of our faculties is most obvious 
with respect to reason; we cannot question the validity of reason without assuming it. I examined 
various ways of dealing with epistemic circularity, but none was found to be successful in solving 
this particular form of the problem of the criterion. In the end, if we are not willing to be skeptics, 
we can only provide circular track-record arguments, also known as bootstrapping, for the 
reliability of our faculties, or we can execute a sort of leap of faith and merely trust that our 
faculties are reliable. The problem is that now all kinds of faculties  say, clairvoyance or 
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perception of God  can be warranted similarly via a leap of faith or via bootstrapping. 
Furthermore, the externalist approach to epistemology is especially vulnerable to the problem of 
epistemic circularity. In other words, as soon as the externalist proposes that the epistemic status of 
a belief is the function of the reliability of cognitive faculties that have produced it, it is only natural 
to ask how we know that our cognitive processes are reliable. Externalists cannot provide an answer 
to that question without vicious circularity, but neither can the internalists, for that matter. Thus, 
chapters 4 and 5 together warrant the conclusion that the problem of the criterion is a plausible 
skeptical argument and no one, up to now, has provided a successful refutation of it.   
  
I finished the study by briefly considering the status of intuitions in epistemology. The skeptical 
argument  the Agrippan Argument, specifically  consists of intuitively plausible premises that we, 
the non-skeptics, accept. However, why should we prefer exactly these intuitions instead of some 
others that do not lead to a skeptical conclusion? In this study, I have shown via arguments why 
none of the studied anti-skeptical epistemologies is successful and why, therefore, the respective 
epistemic intuitions supporting these theories are not acceptable. However, it was suggested that a 
further study on intuitions could provide us with a proper solution to skepticism. But until that study 
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Notes 
                                                 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
1 Nichols, Stich & Weinberg (2003), however, try to capture the relevance of different epistemological intuitions by 
asking ordinary people's opinions about, e.g., Gettier cases.   
2 Lewis (1996), 560. It must be noticed that Lewis does not endorse skepticism, instead he offers a contextualist 
solution to it. However, as Fogelin (2003) points out, Lewis account is, nonetheless, quite close to skepticism.  
3 Cf. Nagel (1986). 
4 Greco (2000), 83. 
5 Cf. ibid., 67, 83, 86; Nagel (1997), 81, 94. 
6 Stroud (1984), 117-118, emphasis in original. 
7 Nagel (1986), 67. 
8 Sextus considers the problem on several occasions, and the most extensive treatment is given in the so-called Five 
Modes, see PH I 164-177. PH is the standard abbreviation used to refer to Sextus Empiricus book Outlines of 
Pyrrhonism, followed by the volume number (I, II, or III) and the section number. 
9 See Chisholm (1982). 
10 See Fogelin (1994). 
11 For example, James van Cleve (1979, 55) points out that the infamous Cartesian Circle is an instance of the problem 
of the criterion. Furthermore, the structure of the problem of the criterion is so general that it can be applied to various 
philosophical issues, as Michael Steup (1992, 380) notes: [t]he problem of the criterion is not restricted to epistemic 
justification and knowledge but is posed by any attempt to formulate general principles of philosophy or logic.  
12 Cling (1994), 261. 
13 In this study, I understand paradoxes as arguments that consist of plausible and intuitively acceptable premises, yet 
ending up with unintuitive conclusions. 
14 Cling (1997), 110-111. 
15 Ibid., 111. 
16 Chisholm (1966), 57, emphasis in original. 
17 Cf. Plato (1961), Theaetetus, 200d-201d. 
18 The argument is developed, for instance in Radford (1966). See also Lehrer (1990), chapter 2. 
19 However, Crispin Sartwell (1992) defends the view that knowledge is merely true belief. See also Stephen 
Hetheringtons (2001) recent book, where he defends the theses that mere true beliefs can count as minimal knowledge 
and that we can distinguish between degrees of knowledge as well as good and bad forms of knowledge.   
20 Fumerton (1998a), 905, emphasis in original.  
21 Cf. Gettier (1963). For discussion on the general structure of Gettier examples and different solutions of the problem, 
see Hetherington (2006).  
22 BonJour (1985), 8. 
23 For the standard reference pertaining to the connection between justification and truth, see Cohen (1984). 
24 For example, Alvin Plantinga espouses the view that justification, or warrant as he calls it, comes in degrees. 
Plantinga (1993a, 4) writes: Finally, warrant comes in degrees. Some of my beliefs have more by way of that quantity 
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for me than other. Thus my belief that I live in Indiana has more by way of warrant, for me, than my belief that 
Shakespeare wrote the plays commonly attributed to him ... warrant is a normative, possibly complex quantity that 
comes in degrees, enough of which is what distinguishes knowledge from true belief.   
25 Cf. Alston (1989a). 
26 Again, this view is endorsed by Plantinga. See, for instance, Plantinga (1993b), 9. 
27 For a discussion on relevant features of beliefs, including discussion on the strength of belief, see Swinburne (2001), 
chapter 2.  
28  Aristotle (1984), Metaphysics 1011b26. 
29 Reid (1969), 631. 
 
2. RODERICK CHISHOLM AND THE PROBLEM OF THE CRITERION 
 
30 Cling (1994), 261. 
31 Chisholm (1957), see chapter 3. 
32 Chisholm (1966), see chapter 4. See also the third edition of Theory of Knowledge, where Chisholm briefly discusses 
the problem of the criterion  (Chisholm 1989, 6-7).   
33 Chisholm (1982). For the specific dates pertaining to the temporal order of Chisholm's formulations of the problem of 
the criterion, see Amico (1993), 73. 
34 Chisholm (1982), 61. 
35 Ibid., 62, emphasis in original. 
36 Cf. ibid. 
37 Ibid., 64, emphasis in original. 
38 Ibid., 65, emphasis in original.  
39 Ibid. 
40 Cf. ibid., 65-66. 
41 Ibid., 66, emphasis in original. 
42 Cf. ibid. 
43 Ibid., 69. 
44 Incidentally, it has been claimed that methodism is neutral with respect to skepticism: see, for example, Sosa (1980a), 
558 and Lammenranta (1996), 115. The idea is that methodists just state the criteria of knowledge and our beliefs may 
or may not satisfy the criteria, thus, methodism is consistent with skepticism. I cannot agree with this view, for 
methodists presuppose that they know some criteria of truth and are, therefore, anti-skeptical in principle in a similar 
way as particularists are. As Cling writes: Chisholm thinks that there are only two possible anti-skeptical responses to 
the problem of the criterion: particularism and methodism (Cling (1994), 272, my emphasis). To press the point, 
methodists think that they can solve the dilemma presented by the skeptic  You cannot know the instances without 
knowing the criteria, and you cannot know the criteria without knowing the instances, thus you cannot know at all  by 
proceeding from criteria to instances, and, therefore, they deny the skeptics claim that we cannot know the criteria 
without knowing the instances. 
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45 It should be noted that, clearly, empiricists are not compelled to be methodists, as Chisholm seems to think. For 
empiricists might as well be particularists and claim that their favored criterion  for example, that sense experience is a 
reliable method for acquiring true beliefs  is validated by and derived from particular (empirical) beliefs; cf. Cling 
(1994), 284-285. 
46 Cf. Chisholm (1982), 66-67. 
47 Ibid., 67. 
48 Cf. ibid. 
49 Ibid., emphasis in original. 
50 Cf. ibid., 67-68.  
51 Ibid., 69. 
52 Cf. ibid., 68. 
53 Ibid., 69. 
54 Cf. ibid. 
55 Cf. ibid., 69-70. 
56 Ibid., 70. 
57 Cf. ibid., 70-75. 
58 Chisholms full-blown epistemological theory is presented, for example in his Theory of Knowledge (1966). 
59 Chisholm (1982), 75, emphasis in original. 
60 Cf. ibid., 69. 
61 Cf. ibid., 70. 
62 Cf. ibid., 61. 
63 Cf. ibid. 
64 Ibid., 75. 
65 Chisholm (1988), 234, emphasis in original. 
66 Ibid., 232. 
67 Cf. ibid. 
68 Chisholm (1982), 75, emphasis in original.  
69 BonJour (1985), 13.  
70 Amico (1993), 83. 
71 Sosa (1980a), 558, emphasis in original. 
72 Nelson (2003), 74n27.  Also Robert Amico interprets Chisholms problem as meta-epistemological, cf. Amico 
(1993), 87-88. 
73 See also Moran (2001). 
74 However, see Clings paper (1994), in which he discusses in detail the question about the level on which Chisholms 
account of the problem of the criterion operates. 
75 Landesman (2002), 59, my emphasis. 
76 Ibid., 202, my emphasis. 
77 The externalist responses to skepticism will be dealt in detail, for instance, in section 4.6. Externalism in 
Epistemology. 
78 The example of Cartesian Particularism is borrowed from Lemos (1998), 83. 
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79 Again, the term Common Sense Particularism is borrowed from Lemos (1998), 82. 
80 Cf. Amico (1993), 83. 
81 Foundationalists are most naturally interpreted as representatives of particularism. 
82 Amico (1993), 84. 
83 Cf. Lemos (1998), 88. 
84 Cf. ibid. 
85 Cf. ibid., 88-89. It should be noted that Lemos interprets particularism and methodism as meta-epistemological 
positions, i.e. they concern knowledge about knowledge (see, for example, Lemos (1998), 81). However, as I pointed 
out in section 2.2., we can understand Chisholms formulation of the problem of the criterion as challenging directly our 
ability to know, rather than our ability to know that we know. Accordingly, particularism and methodism are theories  
or so I will assume throughout this study  concerning what we know, rather than theories concerning what we know 
about what we know. 
86 Cf. Lemos (1998), 89. 
87 Cf. ibid., 84. See also Rosen (1968), 413. 
88 Cf. Steup (1992), 379-380. This criticism of methodism resembles the so-called generality problem of reliabilism. A 
reliabilist must identify the relevant reliable processes that lead to true beliefs. However, the problem is that there seems 
to be indefinitely many reliable processes, and it is problematic to state which processes are the correct ones. With 
respect to methodism, in turn, the problem is that epistemic criteria seem to be useless, as for any given proposition we 
can construct countless criteria that are consistent with the proposition in question. For more on the generality problem 
for reliabilism, see Conee & Feldman (1998). 
89 Cf. Rosen (1968), 415. 
90 Cf. van Cleve (2003), 50-51. 
91 Cf. Chisholm (1982), 69. 
92 Cf. Lammenranta (1996), 115.  
93 Moser (1998), 364. 
94 Shogenji (2000), 506. 
95 Chisholm (1982), 67, emphasis in original. 
96 Nelson (2003), 74n26. 
97 For example, Michael DePaul (1988) argues for the view that methodism and particularism do not exhaust the field of 
non-skeptical alternatives to the problem of the criterion. DePaul goes on to defend coherentism as the most plausible 
starting point. Although he is mainly concerned with theory construction in ethics, his points can be applied to 
epistemology as well.    
98 Here the dependence between instances and criteria is understood as an epistemic and not temporal relation. 
However, both the epistemic and temporal understandings of dependence are rife with problems, as will be shown in 
more detail in section 2.6. 
99 Cf. Cling (1994), 270, 274. 
100 See Rawls (1971). 
101 Lemos (2004), 9. According to Lemos, at least Thomas Reid, G.E. Moore and Chisholm are adherents of the 
common sense tradition. Lemos (2004, xii) understands the common sense tradition, roughly, as the view that we may 
take as data for philosophical inquiry many of the things we ordinarily think we know. In Chisholms terms, this seems 
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to be a tenet of particularists, but Lemos (2004, 9) wants to suggest that the common sense tradition is compatible with 
the method of reflective equilibrium. 
102 Also Paul Moser (1989, 261-265) has suggested that the problem of the criterion could be solved by applying the 
method of wide reflective equilibrium. 
103 Lemos (2004), 9. 
104 Ibid., my emphasis. 
105 Rescher (1980), 12-13. 
106 Cf. Rescher (1977), 17-18n6. 
107 Rescher (1980), 13. However, it should be pointed out that Reschers alleged solution to the problem of the criterion 
is pragmatic in character. Thus, he could still consistently think that the problem has no epistemically acceptable 
solution if knowledge is understood without practical and pragmatic considerations. Rescher seems to think that we 
should not limit our conception of knowledge to a purely theoretical notion, for also practical and pragmatic factors 
should bear relevance on it. Cf. Rescher (1977), 94-97. See also Amico (1993), chapter 3, where Amico discusses 
Reschers approach with respect to the problem of the criterion.    
108 Amicos interpretation of Rescher is found in Amico (1993), chapter 3, Nicholas Reschers Systems-Theoretic 
Approach. It is controversial, whether coherence is, as Amico thinks, the most crucial notion of Reschers overall 
epistemology. I follow Amicos interpretation, for it seems to be a plausible way to understand Reschers strand of 
thought.  
109 See Rescher (1977), chapter VI, Why Relate Success and Truthfulness? 
110 Rescher (1977), 83, emphasis in original. 
111 Ibid., 88, emphasis in original. 
112 Ibid., 90, emphasis in original. 
113 Ibid., 102. See also ibid., 125. 
114 Cf. ibid., 121-122. 
115 Ibid., 122, emphasis in original. 
116 These and other objections to coherentism are told with rather entertaining examples in Plantinga (1993a), 80-84.  
117 Lemos (2004), 164. 
118 Cling claims that there are actually six or eight  depending on how we count, broadly or narrowly,  anti-
skeptical responses to the problem of the criterion. However, he does not discuss in any detail other responses than 
particularism, methodism, and coherentism. Therefore, I assume that the aforementioned three are the only relevant 
responses to the problem, and specifically with respect to Chisholms account of the problem. See Cling (1994), 274-
275.   
119 Cf. Amico (1993), 66. 
120 Cf. ibid., 67. 
121 Cf. Rescher (1977), 107-108. 
122 Ibid., 109. 
123 Ibid, 122. 
124 Ibid. 
125 Ibid., 108. 
126 Cf. Amico (1993), 67-68. 
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127 Cf. Lemos (2004), 165. 
128 Cf. ibid., 164-166. 
129 These problematics have become to be known under the rubric of epistemic circularity that is discussed in chapter 
5. For now, see, e.g., Alston (1986a).  
130 Cf. Lemos (2004), 166. See also ibid., 36-47, where Lemos discusses the problem of epistemic circularity. 
131 Ibid., 169. 
132 Lammenranta (1996), 119. 
133 It should be noted that Lammenranta (1996) discusses the problem of the criterion with respect to epistemic 
justification, not knowledge. I believe, however, that his points pertaining to the method of wide reflective equilibrium 
are also relevant in the present context, in which the problem of the criterion is interpreted as focusing on knowledge. 
Lammenrantas (1996) general project is to apply the method of wide reflective equilibrium to a reliabilist theory of 
justification.       
134 Cf. Lammenranta (1996), 119-120. 
135 Cf. ibid., 120. 
136 Lammenranta (ibid., 119-120) acknowledges this objection and he tries to provide a kind of answer to it (ibid., 120-
123).  
137 Cf. Amico (1993), 106. 
138 Cf. ibid., 110. 
139 Ibid., emphasis in original. 
140 Cf. ibid., 111-113. 
141 Cf. ibid., 7-9. 
142 Ibid., 113. When Amico speaks of the modern problem of the criterion, he refers to Chisholms formulation, in 
contrast to the ancient problem that refers to Sextus formulation. Also, in the passage quoted Amico uses the term 
rational doubt that he defines as follows: 
 
RD: S has rational doubt about P = def. S is more justified in withholding belief in P than in accepting 
P or rejecting P. (Amico 1993, 9.) 
143 Cf. ibid., 8. 
144 Cf. ibid., 10. Amico (ibid.), however, claims that logical paradoxes actually are pseudoproblems if they, indeed, are 
impossible to solve. Thus, one could claim that Amicos account of pseudoproblem implies that logical paradoxes cease 
to be problems. This, however, seems to be highly unintuitive, for one could be seriously puzzled about a logical 
paradox, while acknowledging that it seems to be impossible to solve.    
145 Cf. ibid., 11. 
146 Cf. ibid., 13, 106. 
147 This criticism is also noted by Amico (1993, 113) himself who credits Sharon Ryan for pointing out this counter-
argument for him at a conference (cf. ibid., 117n45).  
148 Cf. ibid., 113-114. 
149 Mattey (1997), 229.  
150 Amico (1993), 10. 
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151 Amico also holds that the ancient account of the problem of the criterion can be dissolved as a pseudoproblem (see 
Amico 1993, especially chapter 5). However, it seems that thereafter he has changed his mind about the successfulness 
of his proposed solution, for in another occasion, he writes: [a] thoroughgoing Pyrrhonian sceptic makes no 
presuppositions whatsoever about what is or is not the case. The Pyrrhonian sceptic uses the presuppositions of others 
to criticize their views, to issue challenges, but never to make assertions or presuppositions about what is. (Amico 
2000, 714, emphasis in original.) Thus, Amico thinks that, after all, the ancient account of the problem of the criterion 
cannot be ignored as a pseudoproblem.       
152 Cf. Chisholm (1982), 66. 
153 See Cling (1994), especially 266-269. See also the so-called knowledge argument in Cling (1997), 112. 
 
3. THE PYRRHONIAN PROBLEM 
 
154 As suggested by, for example, J. Annas and J. Barnes in their introduction to Sextus work (Sextus Empiricus 2000, 
xii). It should also be noted that Annas and Barnes have decided to translate the title of Sextus work as Outlines of 
Scepticism, although the more accurate translation from the Greek title would be Outlines of Pyrrhonism. They defend 
their decision by saying that the word Pyrrhonism in the title could be misunderstood, hence the substitution with 
Scepticism seems to be justified (cf. Sextus Empiricus 2000, xxxiv, footnote 1).     
155 Cf. Barnes (1990a), vii. See also Gisela Strikers (1990) useful paper on the ancient Greek epistemology. 
156 PH I 7. 
157 Cf. Sextus Empiricus (2000), xvii. 
158 Cf. Barnes (1990a), vii. 
159 Cf. Sextus Empiricus (2000), xv. 
160 Cf. Burnyeat (1983), 2. 
161 Cf. Sextus Empiricus (2000), xviii. 
162 Cf. ibid., xviii-xix. 
163 Barnes (1990a), ix. 
164 PH I 26. 
165 PH I 12. 
166 Cf. ibid. 
167 Cf. Sedley (1983), 15 and Striker (2004), 15. 
168 PH I 10. 
169 Cf. PH I 2-3. 
170 Cf. PH I 3. 
171 Cf. Sextus Empiricus (2000), xx. 
172 Hereafter, in this chapter, I use the word skeptic for referring specifically to Pyrrhonian skeptics, i.e. Pyrrhonists. 
If Academian or other sorts of skeptics are referred to, clarifying qualifications will be added. 
173 PH I 26. 
174 PH I 10. 
175 Cf. PH I 31. 
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176 PH I 12. 
177 Cf. Striker (2004), 16. See also Williams (1988). 
178 Of this psychological interpretation of Pyrrhonism and of its criticism, see Lammenranta (2008), especially section 
2, The Practical Problem.  
179 PH I 8, my emphasis. 
180 Cf. Sedley (1983), 21. 
181 Cf. PH I 34. 
182 Cf. Barnes (1990a), 10. 
183 See, e.g., PH I 25, 200, 201. For a more comprehensive list of references, see Barnes (1990a), 10n11. 
184 Cf. Striker (2004), 16. 
185 PH I 19. 
186 Cf. PH I 20. 
187 Cf. Striker (1983), 99-100, 104; Lammenranta (2008); and Annas (2000), 274.   
188 Cf. Striker (1983), 95-97. 
189 Cf. ibid., 97. 
190 Cf. PH I 35. 
191 Cf. Striker (1983), 99. 
192 Cf. PH I 40-78. 
193 Cf. PH I 45. 
194 Cf. PH I 79-90. 
195 Cf. PH I 81-84. 
196 Cf. PH I 85. 
197 Cf. PH I 91-99. 
198 PH I 94. 
199 PH I 91, my emphasis. 
200 Sextus does not speak of an alleged correspondence between our appearances and the reality, but, in my view, the 
notion of correspondence fits well to the general picture Sextus draws of the workings of our sense faculties. Our senses 
provide appearances, and if we take them as true, they, thus, form the basis of our beliefs about the external world. As 
Sextus (PH I 14) writes, if you hold beliefs, then you posit as real the things you are said to hold beliefs about. If the 
beliefs are true, then we have knowledge; and Sextus could perfectly consistently agree on this point. The crucial 
question is, however, whether our beliefs are true, and, moreover, how we could know it.   
201 PH I 99. 
202 Cf. Striker (1983), 100. See also Hankinson (1998), 156. 
203 PH I 210. 
204 PH I 88. 
205 Cf. Striker (1983), 100. 
206 Cf. Barnes (1990a), 18. The passages Barnes (1990a, 18n21) mentions are the following: PH I 26, 29, 59, 178; II 85, 
113, 116, 181; III 54. 
207 Cf. Barnes (1990a), 19. For relevant references to Sextus, see Barnes (1990a), 19n22. 
208 Cf. Striker (1983), 105. 
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209 Cf. ibid., 101; cf. Barnes (1990a), 108. 
210 Cf. Barnes (1990a), 12-15. Barnes (1990a, 14-15) also suggests that we should understand disagreement as a 
situation of conflicting attitudes, to allow the skeptical epoché to be one of the parties of a disagreement. I bypass this 
further complexity, for I am not sure whether suspension of judgment could be said to be genuinely a part of a 
disagreement. Instead, it seems as if a person who suspends judgment about some matter willingly opts out of the 
debate.       
211 Cf. PH I 60-61, 114-117, 121-123. 
212 PH I 135. 
213 PH I 140. 
214 See also PH I 216-219. 
215 Cf. PH I 103, 132. 
216 Cf. Striker (1983), 105-110. 
217 Cf. PH I 39. 
218 Cf.  Striker (1983), 111-113. 
219 Cf. PH III 280. 
220 PH I 169. 
221 It should be noted that Aristotles discussion on Posterior Analytics A3 is strikingly similar to Agrippas Five 
Modes. Barnes (1990a, 122) even claims that Agrippas modes  or their central philosophical core  will have derived 
historically from the Posterior Analytics. See also Barnes (1990a, 120-122) for a brief discussion about the similarities 
between Agrippas modes and APst A3. Furthermore, also Platos Meno is an important figure whose skeptical 
arguments bear a close resemblance to the Pyrrhonian skeptics diallelus, see Meno dialogue in Plato (1985).      
222 PH I 165-169. 
223 Cf. Barnes (1990b), 205. 
224 Barnes (1990a), 113. 
225 Cf. ibid., 119. 
226 See, for example, Fogelin (1994), 116-117 and Klein (2003a), 80-81.  
227 Cf. Klein (2003a), 81. 
228 Sextus Empiricus (2000), xviii. 
229 Cf. Fogelin (1994), 116.  
230 Ibid. 
231 Cf. ibid. 
232 See Lammenranta (2008). Lammenranta (ibid.) argues, however, that the neglect of the challenging modes 
miscontrues Agrippas problem as its dialectical nature is therefore missed.  
233 Cf. Sosa (1997a), 229. 
234 PH I 165. 
235 Cf. Barnes (1990a), 16, 22-23. 
236 See PH I 178. 
237 Cf. Barnes (1990b), 219-220. 
238 See, for instance, sections 2.3.1. and 2.3.3. of the present work. 
239 Barnes (1990a), 116, emphasis in original. 
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240 Cf. Striker (1983), 111-112.  
241 PH I 167. 
242 See, e.g., Lammenranta (2008), n21 and Striker (1983), 112. 
243 Cf. PH II 20. 
244 PH I 166. 
245 Barnes (1990b), 209. 
246 Cf. ibid. 
247 Cf. Barnes (1990a), 42 and Hankinson (1998), 188. 
248 Cf. Barnes (1990b), 209. 
249 Cf. Barnes (1990a), 43. 
250 PH I 122. In addition to the fifth mode of the Ten Modes, the mode from infinite regress is also appealed to in the 
fourth mode of the Ten Modes, PH I 114-117, although Sextus claims that the mode working here is that of circularity. 
However, Barnes (1990a, 62-63) convincingly argues that the mode in work here is that of infinite regress, not of 
circularity.   
251 See section 2.4.2. 
252 The mode of circularity is at least hinted at in PH I 61. See also note 250 above.  
253 PH I 169. 
254 To be precise, Sextus attacks reciprocal arguments, that is, cases of circular reasoning that involve pairs of 
arguments. As Barnes (1990a, 60) explains the notion, you argue reciprocally when you use the conclusion of one 
argument as a premise in a second argument which itself is supposed to establish one of the premises of the first 
argument. However, as Barnes suggests (1990a, 64), we must suppose that Sextus opposes not only reciprocal 
arguments  that are special cases of circular reasoning  but all circular reasoning. See Barnes excellent discussion on 
the reciprocal mode; Barnes (1990a), chapter 3.        
255 Cf. Johnson (1978), 228, 237. 
256 Cf. Barnes (1990a), 43, 65-66. 
257 Cf. ibid., 66. 
258 In the Ten Modes, the mode from hypothesis occurs also, e.g., in PH I 114.   
259 PH I 122. 
260 PH I 168. 
261 PH I 173, my emphasis. 
262 Cf. Barnes (1990a), 98. 
263 Cf. Barnes (1990b), 211. 
264 Cf. Barnes (1990a), 109. 
265 See section 2.3.3.  
266 Cf. Barnes (1990a), 108-109. 
267 At PH I 164-169, where they are introduced for the first time. 
268 Cf. Barnes (1990a), 119. 
269 Cf. ibid., 115. 
270 See PH II 14, where it is explicitly said that the standards to be discussed are those of truth.    
271 PH II 20, my emphasis. 
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272 It could be always questioned whether the considered passage, PH II 20, really presents the definitive formulation of 
the problem of the criterion to be found in the Outlines. I am inclined to claim that it is the definitive passage, and 
scholars such as Popkin (1979, 3-4), Amico (1993, 17), and Floridi (1993, 207) agree. Moreover, even though Barnes 
does not use the term problem of the criterion, he (Barnes 1990a, 119) finds the philosophical core of Agrippan 
scepticism to be presented exactly in PH II 20. However, Barnes (1990a, 116) thinks that the mode of disagreement, 
found in PH II 20, is unnecessary for the presentation of the philosophical core of ancient skepticism.     
273 PH II 79. 
274 Furthermore, as Barnes (1990a, 115) notes, the mode of circularity appealed to in the passage concerning the 
criterion of truth, that is PH II 20, is not a genuine case of circularity but that of infinite regress of reasons. Thus, the 
argument is modified so that the mode of circularity really concerns circularity.  
275 See PH II 79. 
276 As Walton (2004) points out, two types of ad hominem arguments can be distinguished. The one is a fallacy that 
charges the opponent on the basis of her personal characteristics. The other form of ad hominem argument charges the 
opponent on the basis of her inconsistent commitment. The scheme of this latter type can be presented as follows (cf. 
Walton 2004, 365): 
 
Argument from Inconsistent Commitment  
 
(1) S is committed to proposition p. 
(2) S is committed to proposition ~p that is the conclusion of the argument S presently advocates. 
Therefore,  
(3) Ss argument should not be accepted. 
 
Obviously, it is this latter type of ad hominem that the skeptics utilize.  
277 Cf. Annas (2000) 279; Lammenranta (2008); and Sextus Empiricus (2000), xxix. 
278 Cf. Chisholm (1982), 65. 
279 Ibid., 61, my emphasis. 
280 Chisholm (1957), 32n2. 
281 Cf. Chisholm (1982), 61-62. 
282 Cf. Amico (1993), 39. 
283 Moser (1989), 260. 
284 PH II 20. 
285 Barnes (1990a), 74. 
286 Cf. Chisholm (1982), 64. 
287 Cf. ibid. 
288 Ibid., 67. 
289 Cf. Floridi (1993), 213-214. 
290 See PH II 20. 
291 In section 2.2., it was pointed out that as far as Chisholms formulation of the problem of the criterion is concerned, 
it can be questioned whether he presents the problem as epistemological or meta-epistemological. With respect to the 
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ancient version of the problem, in turn, I think that this question does not even arise. In my view, it is just obvious that 
the problem of the criterion presented in the Outlines challenges our knowledge directly, not through a detour as 
challenging our knowledge about knowledge. Barnes (1990a, 142, emphasis in original) agrees as he writes that the 
Pyrrhonian is not concerned with whether the Dogmatists knows that he knows that P. Instead, the Pyrrhonist is 
concerned whether the Dogmatist knows that p. 
292 Cf. Foley (2003), 62. 
293 Cf. Priest (2000), 193. 
294 Cf. PH I 14-15, 187. 
295 PH I 197. 
296 Cf. Landesman (2002), 66. 
297 Cf. PH I 206. 
298 PH III 280-281, my emphasis. 
299 Cf. Priest (2000), 193. 
300 PH I 23-24. 
301 See, for example, Fogelin (1994) for one who defends a reading of Pyrrhonism according to which Pyrrhonists did 
not call for the suspension of belief in all areas, but targeted only dogmatic philosophy and other theoretical activities 
akin to dogmatic philosophy (Fogelin (1997a), 395). For criticism of Fogelins interpretation, see, for example, 
Dretske (1997) and Stroud (2004).   
302 Cf. Priest (2000), 193-194. See also Burnyeat (1980).  
 
4. THE REGRESS PROBLEM AND EPISTEMIC JUSTIFICATION 
 
303 Aikin (2005), 191, emphasis in original. The abbreviation DL II in the quotation refers to Diogenes, L. Lives of 
Eminent Philosophers, vol. II. 
304 Fogelin (1994), 114. 
305 Cf. ibid., 117. 
306 Cf. Moser (1985), 29. 
307 Fogelin (1994), 11. 
308 Also Floridi (1997, 408) makes similar claim: 
 
[T]he problem discussed by Fogelin [i.e. the Agrippan problem as presented in the Five Modes] has 
three complex roots in the history of epistemology: (a) the contemporary debate within the German 
tradition, e.g., Alberts Münchhausen Trilemma, which can be traced through its Kantian origins 
(Hegels Scholasticus absurd resolution) to the neo-Kantian and Popperian discussion of Friess 
trilemma; (b) the debate within the English-speaking tradition (Chisholms problem of the criterion), 
which has Cartesian and sceptical origins in the discussion of the Cartesian circle (e.g., in Gassendi) 
and Montaignes rouet; and (c) Sextus Empiricus diallelus, to which both traditions are to be 
connected.  
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309 For instance, the regress problem can be seen as concerning the overall justificatory structure of belief system. 
Moreover, as Alvin Goldman (1986, 386n21) suggests, the structure of epistemic justification can be investigated with 
little or no concern for skepticism. However, Moser (1985, 25) complains that usually the skeptical option is 
unwarrantedly neglected with respect to the regress problem. To repeat, I agree with Moser that skepticism cannot be 
simply dismissed while considering the regress problem  a variant of the problem of the criterion.  
310 The epistemic status of necessary truths is discussed in more detail in section 4.3.  
311 See section 3.2.1. of the current work. 
312 However, see the excellent discussion in Heck (2000).  
313 Klein (1999), 297. 
314 Cf. Klein (2000), 17. 
315 Cf. Bergmann (2004a), 163. 
316 Ibid., 164. 
317 Ibid., 163-164. 
318 Ibid., 164. 
319 Cf. Klein (2004), 170. 
320 Cf. ibid., 169-171. 
321 Bergmann himself defends an externalist theory of justification and knowledge in his (2006a) Justification without 
Awareness. 
322 See also BonJours (1985, 30-33) influential formulation of this objection against foundationalism. 
323 See section 2.4.2. Objections against the Fourth Alternative. 
324 See section 3.3.3. The Mode of Circularity. 
325 Cf. Plantinga (1986), 124-125. 
326 See BonJour (1999), where he gives a defense of a foundationalist account of empirical justification. 
327 Plantinga (1993a), 99. 
328 Cf. BonJour (1985), 102-103.  
329 But it can be justification-affording, argues Cling (2002).  
330 Cf. BonJour (2001b), 625. 
331 BonJour (1998), 106, emphasis in original. 
332 Cf. ibid., 106-107.  
333 Ibid., 107. 
334 Cf. ibid., 108-109. 
335 Cf. ibid., 110-111. 
336 Alston (1993), 128. 
337 Cf. BonJour (1998), 112.  
338 Cf. ibid., 113-114. 
339 Ibid., 116. 
340 Cf. ibid., 116-119. 
341 Cf. ibid., 118-119. 
342 Cf. ibid., 120-124; BonJour (2001b), 629; and BonJour (2005), 99. 
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343 Cf. BonJour (2005), 100; and BonJour (2001c), 675-679. BonJour added this characterization of a priori justification 
as non-propositional in character after Paul Boghossians (2001) criticism. The criticism is closely related to Lewis 
Carrolls classic article, cf. Carroll (1895). Virtually the same criticism as Boghossian (2001) made against BonJours 
account on the a priori can also be found in an earlier article by Miscevic (1998).     
344 Cf. Bonjour (1998), 127-128. 
345 Ibid., 128. 
346 Ibid., 115-116. 
347 Ibid., 136. 
348 Ibid., 137. 
349 Cf. ibid., 116. 
350 Ibid., 111. 
351 Ibid., 119. 
352 Cf. ibid., 140, 142.  
353 BonJour disagrees, cf. ibid., 142n7. 
354 See section 4.2.1.   
355 BonJour (1998), 148. 
356 Ibid. 
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(PAA)  For all x, if a person, S, has a justification for x, then there is some reason, r1, available to S for x; and 
there is some reason, r2, available to S for r1, etc. (Klein 1999, 299.) 
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473 Alston (1989b), 328-329, my emphasis. 
474 Cf. Alston (1986a), 11-14. 
475 Cf. ibid., 15-17. 
476 See section 4.6. Externalism in Epistemology. 
477 See van Cleve (1979), where he, among other things, defends the idea that we may obtain knowledge of the 
reliability of our cognitive faculties by using those very faculties (van Cleve 2003, 45).   
478 Cf. van Cleve (2003), 47. 
479 Cf. Alston (2005), 203-204. 
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488 See, e.g., Alston (1989c) and Alston (2005) for further details of his epistemological theory. 
489 Alston (2005), 241. 
490 See section 4.5.4. for similar criticism against contextualist theories. 
491 See Alston (1986b). 
492 Cf. Plantinga (2000), 125.  
493 Ibid. 
494 Cf. ibid., 125n16. 
495 Plantingas general epistemology is presented in his (1993a) and (1993b), the Christian icing on his epistemology is 
revealed to its full in extension in the monumental Warranted Christian Belief (2000). 
496 See Stroud (1984), especially 270-272. 
497 Cf. ibid., 273-274. 
498 Cf. Chisholm (1966), 57. 
499 See section 3.4. 
500 As we saw in section 2.6., the demand of asymmetry was unjustified with respect to Chisholms formulation of the 
diallelus. So is it not unjustified also here? Short answer is, no. First, we could formulate the problem without using the 
structure Chisholm used, and thus we could also avoid the problem created by the demand of asymmetry (that 
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To be justified in believing one proposition P on the basis of another E one must be 1) justified in 
believing E and 2) justified in believing that E makes probable P.  
 
Now, in order to avoid an infinite regress, we should be non-inferentially justified in believing that some instances of E 
make P probable. However, according to internalist theories of justification, it is extremely implausible to suppose that 
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512 Cohen (2002, 2005) has also his own proposal for the solving of the problem of the easy knowledge. However, 
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553 To read more about the affinities and differences between Descartess and Plantingas respective epistemologies, see 
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